{"title":"Revisiting Reverse Eikos: Dialectical Evaluation of a Rhetorical Argument","authors":"H. Jansen","doi":"10.5325/philrhet.56.2.0168","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Reverse eikos (plausibility) arguments are notorious for reversing a reason that supports an accusation into a reason that denies this accusation. This article offers new insights on their analysis and evaluation, by reconstructing a reverse eikos argument’s line of reasoning as an argumentative pattern. The pattern reveals that this type of argument centers not only on the arguer’s claim that by doing the act of which they have been accused, they would risk becoming the likely suspect, but also on the connected reasoning that they would not want to risk this since that would be stupid and they are not stupid. The proposed analysis, which is illustrated with classic and modern examples of reverse eikos arguments, shows that the evaluation of these arguments boils down to estimating the arguer’s calculation of the costs and benefits of taking the risk, while taking into account the arguer’s character, intellect, and circumstances.","PeriodicalId":46176,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.56.2.0168","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"LITERATURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
abstract:Reverse eikos (plausibility) arguments are notorious for reversing a reason that supports an accusation into a reason that denies this accusation. This article offers new insights on their analysis and evaluation, by reconstructing a reverse eikos argument’s line of reasoning as an argumentative pattern. The pattern reveals that this type of argument centers not only on the arguer’s claim that by doing the act of which they have been accused, they would risk becoming the likely suspect, but also on the connected reasoning that they would not want to risk this since that would be stupid and they are not stupid. The proposed analysis, which is illustrated with classic and modern examples of reverse eikos arguments, shows that the evaluation of these arguments boils down to estimating the arguer’s calculation of the costs and benefits of taking the risk, while taking into account the arguer’s character, intellect, and circumstances.
期刊介绍：
Philosophy and Rhetoric is dedicated to publication of high-quality articles involving the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric. It has a longstanding commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship and welcomes all theoretical and methodological perspectives that advance the journal"s mission. Philosophy and Rhetoric invites articles on such topics as the relationship between logic and rhetoric, the philosophical aspects of argumentation, philosophical views on the nature of rhetoric held by historical figures and during historical periods, psychological and sociological studies of rhetoric with a strong philosophical emphasis, and philosophical analyses of the relationship to rhetoric of other areas of human culture and thought, political theory and law.
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