Ambiguity and Awareness: A Coherent Multiple Priors Model

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-26 DOI:10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0185
S. Grant, Ani Guerdjikova, J. Quiggin
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Abstract Ambiguity in the ordinary language sense means that available information is open to multiple interpretations. We model this by assuming that individuals are unaware of some possibilities relevant to the outcome of their decisions and that multiple probabilities may arise over an individual’s subjective state space depending on which of these possibilities are realized. We formalize a notion of coherent multiple priors and derive a representation result that with full awareness corresponds to the usual unique (Bayesian) prior but with less than full awareness generates multiple priors. When information is received with no change in awareness, each element of the set of priors is updated in the standard Bayesian fashion (that is, full Bayesian updating). An increase in awareness, however, leads to an expansion of the individual’s subjective state and (in general) a contraction in the set of priors under consideration.
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歧义与意识:一个连贯的多先验模型
摘要一般意义上的歧义意味着可用信息可以接受多种解释。我们通过假设个体不知道与他们的决策结果相关的一些可能性来对此进行建模,并且根据这些可能性中的哪一种被实现,个体的主观状态空间可能会出现多种可能性。我们形式化了相干多先验的概念,并导出了一个表示结果,该结果在完全意识的情况下对应于通常的唯一(贝叶斯)先验,但在不完全意识的条件下生成多个先验。当在意识没有变化的情况下接收信息时,以标准贝叶斯方式更新先验集的每个元素(即,完全贝叶斯更新)。然而,意识的提高会导致个人主观状态的扩大,以及(通常)所考虑的先验集的收缩。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
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