Maskelyne Astronomer Royal

Abstract

its approach ‘from below’, that is beginning with the basic tactical features of the galley, showing how relatively simple procedures, systems and conventions determined the approach to warfare. The chapter on the life and training of the galley oarsmen (the Chusma) stresses that the skills and endurance of the rowers were the key to the success of a fleet. The author estimates a mortality rate of 50 per cent for oarsmen in the various squadrons of the Spanish fleet. While it could be useful and expected to compare this figure with the Ottomans, the author makes a strange and totally out-of-context comparison with the Soviet Gulag. The author takes issue with Fernand Braudel’s argument about the shift of the two major powers to the Atlantic after 1580. Instead he very plausibly argues that major campaigns in the inland sea came to a halt after 1574 precisely because of armed deterrence and not abandonment. This might be considered another significant contribution to the historiography of the subject. Surprisingly the author makes no references to new studies by Turkish historians in English, such as Emrah Safa Gürkan’s MA and PhD theses, covering Ottoman corsairs, espionage and secret diplomacy in the sixteenth century Mediterranean in the context of the Ottoman Habsburg rivalry. Gürkan has argued that the Ottoman corsairs formed a network between Constantinople and provincial port cities and constituted a faction (‘the Mediterranean faction’) which vied for power in the Ottoman capital, participating in court rivalries and shaping the formation of Ottoman strategy. Except for a limited time, the Habsburgs and the Ottomans at that time did not have permanent embassies in each other. However, diplomacy was conducted through go-betweens and Gürkan’s PhD thesis shows a high level of cooperation between the two imperial elites. These spies and agents however, as argued by Gürkan, could manipulate their governments and pursue their self-interest to such a degree that made them another actor of the historical scene. While Philip II and Suleiman the Magnificent posed themselves as defenders of Catholicism and of Islam respectively, most historians would attribute more importance to economic factors in their actions. Turkish historiography until recently upheld the paradigm of holy war (ghaza), but newer studies have changed this view. Williams follows this argument, suggesting that the activities of the corsairs of Algiers (el corso) were often the actions of the desperate and is perhaps best understood as a consequence of overpopulation and poverty than as the manifestation of any religious sentiment. The relations between the Catholic monarchy and the Christian privateers were also ambiguous. On the nature of holy war in the Mediterranean the author accepts neither the ‘messianic imperialism’ thesis, nor Braudel’s view of the determining cycles of economic development, but concludes that holy war was the result of ‘royal feudalism’ or the initial pledge of Philip II to the pope to fight for the ‘cause of God’ against heretics and Saracens, although the limits of this pledge were not clear. Thus the author’s conclusion is not very decisive on this point. Despite this and other minor deficiencies, the book is useful for undergraduate and graduate students of the Mediterranean. The book would have been enriched with a map of the Mediterranean, however. candan badem tunceli university, turKey http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2014.1025512 © Candan Badem