Why the United States will have to accept a nuclear North Korea

IF 0.3 4区 社会学 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Pub Date : 2009-09-08 DOI:10.1080/10163270903087147
A. Lankov
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Abstract It is often argued that the North Korean regime, if faced with the right combination of pressure and concessions, will surrender its nuclear program. This article is critical of this viewpoint. Pyongyang's decision to go nuclear reflects long-term strategic concerns, and no amount of aid and payments will compensate for the loss of strategic advantages created by the possession of a nuclear capability. At the same time, the outside world does not have sufficiently powerful leverage at its disposal as well. Hence, a prolonged stalemate should be expected.
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为什么美国必须接受一个拥有核武器的朝鲜
人们经常认为,如果压力和让步相结合,朝鲜政权将放弃其核计划。这篇文章对这一观点持批评态度。北韩的拥核决定反映了其长期的战略考虑,任何援助和支付都无法弥补因拥有核能力而失去的战略优势。与此同时,外部世界也没有足够强大的杠杆可供支配。因此,僵局将会持续很长时间。
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来源期刊
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
25.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Since its first publication in 1989, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis has been covering a broad range of topics related to foreign policy, defense and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. As the oldest SSCI registered English journal of political science in Asia, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis has promoted efforts to provide an arena for sharing initiatives and new perspectives on military and security issues of the Asia-Pacific region. To offer better support to this idea of active intercommunication amongst scholars and defense experts around the globe, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis made a decision to publish quarterly, starting from 2005.
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