Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.002
R. E. Derr
This paper argues that North Korea’s unwillingness to seriously negotiate during the 2018-2020 period of dovish outreach by American President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in will return the North Korea policy debate to the pre-Trump status quo of containment, deterrence, sanction, and isolation, while also opening that debate to more hawkish options. North Korea failed to grasp a historically unprecedented three-year window of two overlapping dovish presidents governing its primary geopolitical opponents. Trump and Moon both aggressively sought a major inter-Korean breakthrough; they represented a unique opportunity in the long Korean stand-off for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to press his peninsular claims. Yet Pyongyang offered no serious concessions in the 2018-2020 window, and the politico-military situation on the ground in Korea is essentially unchanged today. We argue that this failure will, at minimum, encourage the reemergence of establishmentarian, status quo policies under the new American administration of President Joseph Biden. Further, North Korea’s recalcitrance in this unique dovish period will likely push the “Overton Window” of acceptable counter-North Korea policy options rightward. Harsher measures will be considered in the wake of engagement’s failure.
{"title":"North Korea’s Missed Opportunity: The Unique, Dovish Moment of the Overlapping Trump and Moon Presidencies","authors":"R. E. Derr","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that North Korea’s unwillingness to seriously negotiate during the 2018-2020 period of dovish outreach by American President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in will return the North Korea policy debate to the pre-Trump status quo of containment, deterrence, sanction, and isolation, while also opening that debate to more hawkish options. North Korea failed to grasp a historically unprecedented three-year window of two overlapping dovish presidents governing its primary geopolitical opponents. Trump and Moon both aggressively sought a major inter-Korean breakthrough; they represented a unique opportunity in the long Korean stand-off for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to press his peninsular claims. Yet Pyongyang offered no serious concessions in the 2018-2020 window, and the politico-military situation on the ground in Korea is essentially unchanged today. We argue that this failure will, at minimum, encourage the reemergence of establishmentarian, status quo policies under the new American administration of President Joseph Biden. Further, North Korea’s recalcitrance in this unique dovish period will likely push the “Overton Window” of acceptable counter-North Korea policy options rightward. Harsher measures will be considered in the wake of engagement’s failure.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"23-42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.007
S. Jung
This study examines two institutional explanations of the presence or absence of diversionary conflict. The two approaches emphasize different factors―external transparency and domestic constraints, respectively―in describing the relationship between domestic institutions and diversionary actions. Up to this point, they have not been compared theoretically and empirically in an explicit way. The present study contrasts their causal explanations and tests two competing sets of hypotheses, using cases derived from directed dyad-years from 1950 to 2000. The results show that either external transparency (strategic interaction) or internal constraints (domestic checks and balances) discourages diversionary conflict, and that mature democracies, domestically constrained and externally transparent, are least likely to initiate diversionary conflict.
{"title":"Democracy and Diversionary Conflict: External Transparency and Domestic Constraints","authors":"S. Jung","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.007","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines two institutional explanations of the presence or absence of diversionary conflict. The two approaches emphasize different factors―external transparency and domestic constraints, respectively―in describing the relationship between domestic institutions and diversionary actions. Up to this point, they have not been compared theoretically and empirically in an explicit way. The present study contrasts their causal explanations and tests two competing sets of hypotheses, using cases derived from directed dyad-years from 1950 to 2000. The results show that either external transparency (strategic interaction) or internal constraints (domestic checks and balances) discourages diversionary conflict, and that mature democracies, domestically constrained and externally transparent, are least likely to initiate diversionary conflict.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"141-163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.001
Toby Kim
Pressure policies to induce North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization failed to achieve measurable progress toward that objective. The consolidation of nuclear andmissile capabilities by North Korea points to the need for a new strategy to mitigate the potential for conflict: to pursue progress toward peace and denuclearization simultaneously. The most appropriate mechanism for implementing such a strategy is arms control, defined here as a progressive series of restrictions, limitations and constraints on arms (nuclear and conventional) and associated steps that reduce the risks of conflict and insulate relations against crises and escalation. Detractors of arms control for North Korea argue that it would convey status as a possessor of nuclear weapons, and that it would require accepting some level of mutual deterrence. States would need to consider such criticisms as they weigh the risks and costs of pursuing arms control compared to alternatives such as containment and deterrence. An arms control-oriented roadmap would integrate parallel progress on establishing a durable peace regime and capping and then reducing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Monitoring and verifying compliance with this type of roadmap would require a hybrid approach drawing on both traditional safeguards-style methods and novel approaches designed to build confidence.
{"title":"Negotiating Nuclear Arms Control with North Korea: Why and How?","authors":"Toby Kim","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.001","url":null,"abstract":"Pressure policies to induce North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization failed to achieve measurable progress toward that objective. The consolidation of nuclear andmissile capabilities by North Korea points to the need for a new strategy to mitigate the potential for conflict: to pursue progress toward peace and denuclearization simultaneously. The most appropriate mechanism for implementing such a strategy is arms control, defined here as a progressive series of restrictions, limitations and constraints on arms (nuclear and conventional) and associated steps that reduce the risks of conflict and insulate relations against crises and escalation. Detractors of arms control for North Korea argue that it would convey status as a possessor of nuclear weapons, and that it would require accepting some level of mutual deterrence. States would need to consider such criticisms as they weigh the risks and costs of pursuing arms control compared to alternatives such as containment and deterrence. An arms control-oriented roadmap would integrate parallel progress on establishing a durable peace regime and capping and then reducing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Monitoring and verifying compliance with this type of roadmap would require a hybrid approach drawing on both traditional safeguards-style methods and novel approaches designed to build confidence.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.006
N. Park, Changhyung Lee, Soyeon Kim
This paper analyzes the electronic warfare capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), established in 2015 in China. Based on the investigation, this paper aims to examine the impacts of electronic warfare capabilities of PLASSF on South Korea as well as the implications for Korean security. The core mission of the PLASSF is to perform space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare. Under the Network Systems Department of the PLASSF, the units for electronic warfare operates ground-based equipment, (un) manned aircraft, and electronic warfare satellites. Based on this fact, this paper argues the impacts of the PLASSF’s electronic warfare capabilities are threefold: First, the PLASSF’s manned electronic aircraft allows them to collect the electronic intelligence regarding the major military equipment not only of the Korean military but of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Second, it is also expected that the PLASSF would conduct electronic warfare activities very close to the Korean Peninsula by utilizing its unmanned stealth electronic aircraft. Third, the PLASSF is highly likely to gather signals intelligence from space via electronic warfare satellites. In this regard, it is necessary for the Korean military to 1) develop a more concrete concept of electronic warfare; 2) explore the ways to refuse China’s electronic information collection; and 3) secure the electronic warfare countermeasure weapons system.
{"title":"Analysis of Electronic Warfare Capability of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF): Its Impacts and Implications on Korean Security","authors":"N. Park, Changhyung Lee, Soyeon Kim","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.006","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the electronic warfare capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), established in 2015 in China. Based on the investigation, this paper aims to examine the impacts of electronic warfare capabilities of PLASSF on South Korea as well as the implications for Korean security. The core mission of the PLASSF is to perform space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare. Under the Network Systems Department of the PLASSF, the units for electronic warfare operates ground-based equipment, (un) manned aircraft, and electronic warfare satellites. Based on this fact, this paper argues the impacts of the PLASSF’s electronic warfare capabilities are threefold: First, the PLASSF’s manned electronic aircraft allows them to collect the electronic intelligence regarding the major military equipment not only of the Korean military but of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Second, it is also expected that the PLASSF would conduct electronic warfare activities very close to the Korean Peninsula by utilizing its unmanned stealth electronic aircraft. Third, the PLASSF is highly likely to gather signals intelligence from space via electronic warfare satellites. In this regard, it is necessary for the Korean military to 1) develop a more concrete concept of electronic warfare; 2) explore the ways to refuse China’s electronic information collection; and 3) secure the electronic warfare countermeasure weapons system.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"30 1","pages":"119-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.004
K. Chung
The launch of an ROK-led combined defense system and the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) will be an epochal moment in the ROK？U.S. alliance and signal the start of a new era. The study provides a historical review of OPCON, addresses the significance of wartime OPCON transition, and examines contending views on the ROK-U.S. command structure. The article analyzes the tenets and roadmap for the OPCON from a tripartite perspective, including citizens, the government, and the military. ROK-U.S. strategic communication and a gradual transition are then discussed. The study concludes by exploring the actualization of a self-reliant national defense as a sovereign state, the commencement of an ROK-led future Combined Forces Command, and mutual relations among ROK JCS, Future CFC, UNC, and USFK, along with policy recommendations.
{"title":"The Transition of Wartime Operational Control for Entering a New Era","authors":"K. Chung","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.004","url":null,"abstract":"The launch of an ROK-led combined defense system and the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) will be an epochal moment in the ROK？U.S. alliance and signal the start of a new era. The study provides a historical review of OPCON, addresses the significance of wartime OPCON transition, and examines contending views on the ROK-U.S. command structure. The article analyzes the tenets and roadmap for the OPCON from a tripartite perspective, including citizens, the government, and the military. ROK-U.S. strategic communication and a gradual transition are then discussed. The study concludes by exploring the actualization of a self-reliant national defense as a sovereign state, the commencement of an ROK-led future Combined Forces Command, and mutual relations among ROK JCS, Future CFC, UNC, and USFK, along with policy recommendations.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"67-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.003
Jhu Ban Gil
{"title":"Aircraft Carrier Balancing in Northeast Asia and South Korean Carrier Program: Power, Threat, and Function","authors":"Jhu Ban Gil","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"43-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.005
T. Young
In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Department of Defense would henceforth use capabilitiesbased planning to guide the development of the armed forces. The popularity of the idea spread to many allied countries that also embraced the concept. However, the successful implementation of the method has been hindered by a number of factors: lack of an agreed lexicon, confusion in many defense organizations to the degree to which “threats” are used, inattention to policy priorities, heavy institutional analytical requirements, and a lack of acknowledgement of the importance money must play in any planning system. The paper concludes that whilst elements of the method are well-suited to providing objective data in support of senior leadership’s decision-making; alone, it is insufficient to drive planning, which is inherently a political process.
{"title":"Capabilities-Based “Confusion”: Why Capabilities-Based Planning Systems Struggle","authors":"T. Young","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.005","url":null,"abstract":"In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Department of Defense would henceforth use capabilitiesbased planning to guide the development of the armed forces. The popularity of the idea spread to many allied countries that also embraced the concept. However, the successful implementation of the method has been hindered by a number of factors: lack of an agreed lexicon, confusion in many defense organizations to the degree to which “threats” are used, inattention to policy priorities, heavy institutional analytical requirements, and a lack of acknowledgement of the importance money must play in any planning system. The paper concludes that whilst elements of the method are well-suited to providing objective data in support of senior leadership’s decision-making; alone, it is insufficient to drive planning, which is inherently a political process.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"95-118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.008
S. Ahn
This article examines Korean-Russian relations from a new dimension of security, economic security. This is an important study of an understudied relationship in East Asia that has significant implications for the security, energy and other economic activities of the region. The objective of this article is to broaden the concept of security, conceptualize the notion of economic security and apply it to the case of bilateral relations between Moscow and Seoul. This article focuses on the securitization process of international political issues and security-building processes between two nations. Specifically, this study intends to specifically look at the following four aspects of security: nation states’ perceptions of security, securitization, the security-building process, and potential security threats. In this respect, the article begins by redefining the definition of security and economic security and applying their relevance to the Russian-South Korean bilateral relations. And then the article explores specific elements of economic security, including energy, transportation linkage, and fishery cooperation since these three elements represent core elements of economic security cooperation between two countries.
{"title":"Conceptualizing and Framing Economic Security?: The Case of 30 Year Russian-Korean Security Relations Tested","authors":"S. Ahn","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2021.33.1.008","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines Korean-Russian relations from a new dimension of security, economic security. This is an important study of an understudied relationship in East Asia that has significant implications for the security, energy and other economic activities of the region. The objective of this article is to broaden the concept of security, conceptualize the notion of economic security and apply it to the case of bilateral relations between Moscow and Seoul. This article focuses on the securitization process of international political issues and security-building processes between two nations. Specifically, this study intends to specifically look at the following four aspects of security: nation states’ perceptions of security, securitization, the security-building process, and potential security threats. In this respect, the article begins by redefining the definition of security and economic security and applying their relevance to the Russian-South Korean bilateral relations. And then the article explores specific elements of economic security, including energy, transportation linkage, and fishery cooperation since these three elements represent core elements of economic security cooperation between two countries.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"33 1","pages":"165-183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.001
M. Koo
A realist perspective is prevalent in relation to the newly emerging naval rivalry between the United States and China and its consequences for their neighbors. China’s drive to construct artificial islands in the South China Sea has drawn global attention, while its Belt and Road Initiative has induced the United States and Japan to counter-propose the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. The shifting attention beyond the China Seas has everyone scrambling to protect their commercial interests and national security, which are heavily dependent on the sea lines of communication. This study examines the rivalry between the United States, China and Japan, and draws its implications for South Korea from a ‘point-line-plane’ perspective. In the face of thorny challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, South Korea needs to rejuvenate its long-lost identity as a sea power and its navy should work closely with the Vietnam People’s Navy. In particular, establishing a strategic point at one of the naval bases in southern Vietnam such as Danang, Cam Ranh or Nhơn Trạch will have significant consequences not just for their bilateral ties but also for the South China Sea region and beyond.
{"title":"The Hegemonic Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region and the Making of South Korea as a Middle Sea Power","authors":"M. Koo","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.001","url":null,"abstract":"A realist perspective is prevalent in relation to the newly emerging naval rivalry between the United States and China and its consequences for their neighbors. China’s drive to construct artificial islands in the South China Sea has drawn global attention, while its Belt and Road Initiative has induced the United States and Japan to counter-propose the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. The shifting attention beyond the China Seas has everyone scrambling to protect their commercial interests and national security, which are heavily dependent on the sea lines of communication. This study examines the rivalry between the United States, China and Japan, and draws its implications for South Korea from a ‘point-line-plane’ perspective. In the face of thorny challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, South Korea needs to rejuvenate its long-lost identity as a sea power and its navy should work closely with the Vietnam People’s Navy. In particular, establishing a strategic point at one of the naval bases in southern Vietnam such as Danang, Cam Ranh or Nhơn Trạch will have significant consequences not just for their bilateral ties but also for the South China Sea region and beyond.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45239027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.005
K. Cho, Seung pil Kim, A. Bossard, Dong-Jeong Kim
The Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to the terms of the Wartime OPCON Transfer contingent upon meeting specific conditions. The OPCON Transfer should lead to improved security of the Korean Peninsula while improving the ROK-U.S. combined defense capability. Hence, the Korea Armed Forces must exert efforts to acquire the capabilities and conditions required for the transfer. Further, “the United States’ supplementation and continuation capabilities” and “the provision and employment of extended deterrence methods and strategic assets” must be continued. The way to firmly maintain security over the Korean Peninsula is for the ROK military to possess capabilities required for the OPCON Transfer. Of these capabilities, ROKAF’s capability is crucial and the ISR+PGMs capabilities must be obtained without fail. Accurate information on military threats and the ability to strike those targets are prerequisites to winning wars. In pursuing the national security strategy task of “strengthening national defense capabilities based on the ROK-U.S. alliance,” with support from the general public, rational decisions on airpower requirements and the measurement of enemies’ airpower must be made at the national strategic level, to determine what it would take for the ROKAF to lead ROK-U.S. combined air operations. Concurrently, we need to be ready and be prepared to respond to the expansion of neighboring nations’ airpower capability.
{"title":"Study of Republic of Korea Air Force’s Military Capability Enhancement Measures in Preparation for Wartime Operational Control Transfer","authors":"K. Cho, Seung pil Kim, A. Bossard, Dong-Jeong Kim","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.005","url":null,"abstract":"The Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to the terms of the Wartime OPCON Transfer contingent upon meeting specific conditions. The OPCON Transfer should lead to improved security of the Korean Peninsula while improving the ROK-U.S. combined defense capability. Hence, the Korea Armed Forces must exert efforts to acquire the capabilities and conditions required for the transfer. Further, “the United States’ supplementation and continuation capabilities” and “the provision and employment of extended deterrence methods and strategic assets” must be continued. The way to firmly maintain security over the Korean Peninsula is for the ROK military to possess capabilities required for the OPCON Transfer. Of these capabilities, ROKAF’s capability is crucial and the ISR+PGMs capabilities must be obtained without fail. Accurate information on military threats and the ability to strike those targets are prerequisites to winning wars. In pursuing the national security strategy task of “strengthening national defense capabilities based on the ROK-U.S. alliance,” with support from the general public, rational decisions on airpower requirements and the measurement of enemies’ airpower must be made at the national strategic level, to determine what it would take for the ROKAF to lead ROK-U.S. combined air operations. Concurrently, we need to be ready and be prepared to respond to the expansion of neighboring nations’ airpower capability.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"81-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48005950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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