Building organizational adaptive capacity: the U.S. Army's performance in the Iraq War and its implications for the ROK Army

Abstract

Abstract This study delves into the issues of the U.S. Army's adaptive capacity in the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Phase IV. The author borrows the concept of organizational adaptive capacity while arguing that adaptive capacity framework can provide coherent theoretical explanations for the U.S. Army's unsatisfactory performance in OIF Phase IV. The author, then, tries to apply the analysis of U.S. Army's experience to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. The ROK Army has tried to follow the U.S. Army from doctrine to weapon systems and the author sees that there is a possibility that the ROK Army will be faced with similar challenges that the U.S. Army had to deal with. Thus, the author argues that drawing theoretical implications and lessons from U.S. experiences should be regarded important tasks for the ROK Army.