Assessing the Effectiveness of the Carrot and Stick Counter-terrorist Measure: A Comparison of Algeria and Yemen

Abstract

Abstract: This article seeks to explain the differing counter-terrorist effects in Algeria and Yemen over the past two decades. While terrorism peaked in both countries in the late 1990s and incumbents in both countries responded with “carrot and stick” strategies, the results have been entirely different, with Yemen mired in deeper violence, whereas domestic terrorist forces were almost wiped out in Algeria in the late 2000s. To account for this variance and to measure the effects of the “carrot and stick” approach, the article adopts the state capacity model by analyzing how Bouteflika centralized Algeria’s bureaucracy and administration since 1999 which facilitated the communication between the intelligence, military and judiciary, thus strengthening military operations and law enforcement, and how Saleh’s Yemen filled with separatism and sectarianism aggravated the regime’s deficiencies of information collection and revenue concentration, leading to the continuation of terrorism. Evidence from my framework and cases suggest that coping with terrorist violence requires much more thoroughgoing measures than military blows; legislative efforts and national dialogues. The study is not limited to the cases of Algeria and Yemen, but aims at shedding light on more countries confronted with terrorist threat.