Teacher Unions, Political Machines, and the Thorny Politics of Education Reform in Latin America

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1177/00323292211002788

Ben Ross Schneider

引用次数: 7

Abstract

Existing research on developing countries emphasizes the decisive power of teacher unions in education politics. Yet that power varies, and a full understanding of the roots of union power and the sources of cross-national variation requires deeper analysis of organizational dynamics within unions. This analysis supports four arguments. First, teachers have a range of advantages in overcoming obstacles to collective action. Second, unions are not all alike; they vary widely, from interest groups (in Chile, Brazil, and Peru) to powerful political machines (in Mexico and Ecuador). Third, the source of this variation lies in factors (e.g., influence over teacher hiring) that shift power within unions from members to leaders in political-machine unions. Fourth, analyzing the dimensions of variation helps explain the different outcomes of recent reforms to teacher careers in Latin America, especially in highlighting the staunch opposition from political-machine unions.

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拉丁美洲教师工会、政治机器和教育改革的棘手政治

现有对发展中国家的研究强调教师工会在教育政治中的决定性力量。然而，这种权力是不同的，要充分理解工会权力的根源和跨国差异的来源，需要对工会内部的组织动态进行更深入的分析。这一分析支持了四个论点。首先，教师在克服集体行动的障碍方面具有一系列优势。其次，工会并非都一样;从利益集团(在智利、巴西和秘鲁)到强大的政治机器(在墨西哥和厄瓜多尔)，它们差别很大。第三，这种差异的根源在于一些因素(例如，对教师招聘的影响)，这些因素将工会内部的权力从成员转移到政治机器工会的领导人手中。第四，分析变化的维度有助于解释最近拉丁美洲教师职业改革的不同结果，特别是在强调政治机器工会的坚定反对方面。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

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