{"title":"Heterogeneous Investors, Negotiation Strength & Asset Prices in Private Markets: Evidence from Commercial Real Estate","authors":"David C. Ling","doi":"10.13128/AESTIMUM-13122","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of heterogeneous investors with asymmetric bargaining positions on transaction prices in private commercial real estate markets. Using a dataset that contains nearly 100,000 commercial real estate transactions during 1997-2009, we examine the extent to which common conditions of sale and buyer characteristics affect bargaining power and negotiated prices. We find that tax-motivated buyers seeking to complete a delayed Section 1031 exchange pay an average price premium of 12.5% when purchasing smaller properties. However, these price premiums for exchange motivated buyers are not observed among more expensive properties. We find strong evidence that out-of-state buyers pay significantly more (8 - 11% premium) for commercial properties than in-state buyers. Consistent with our expectations, we find that sellers of distressed properties negotiate significantly lower transaction prices (13 - 15% discount) than sellers of non-distressed properties, all else equal. Finally, we find evidence that REITs pay price premiums between 14 - 16% for office and industrial and retail properties. Our results strongly support the notion that relative bargaining power influences negotiated transaction prices.","PeriodicalId":53999,"journal":{"name":"Aestimum","volume":"3 1","pages":"5-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"15","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Aestimum","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.13128/AESTIMUM-13122","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Abstract
We examine the impact of heterogeneous investors with asymmetric bargaining positions on transaction prices in private commercial real estate markets. Using a dataset that contains nearly 100,000 commercial real estate transactions during 1997-2009, we examine the extent to which common conditions of sale and buyer characteristics affect bargaining power and negotiated prices. We find that tax-motivated buyers seeking to complete a delayed Section 1031 exchange pay an average price premium of 12.5% when purchasing smaller properties. However, these price premiums for exchange motivated buyers are not observed among more expensive properties. We find strong evidence that out-of-state buyers pay significantly more (8 - 11% premium) for commercial properties than in-state buyers. Consistent with our expectations, we find that sellers of distressed properties negotiate significantly lower transaction prices (13 - 15% discount) than sellers of non-distressed properties, all else equal. Finally, we find evidence that REITs pay price premiums between 14 - 16% for office and industrial and retail properties. Our results strongly support the notion that relative bargaining power influences negotiated transaction prices.
期刊介绍:
Aestimum is a peer-reviewed Journal dedicated to the methodological study of appraisal and land economics. Established in 1976 by the Italian Association of Appraisers and Land Economists, which was legally recognized by Ministerial Decree, March 1993. Topics of interests comprise rural, urban and environmental appraisal, evaluation of public investments and land use planning. All the areas under discussion are addressed to the International scene. The interdisciplinary approach is one of the mainstays of this editorial project and all of the above mentioned topics are developed taking into consideration the economic, legal and urban planning aspects. Aestimum is biannual Journal and publishes articles both in Italian and English. Articles submitted are subjected to a double blind peer review process.