Pretrial Beliefs and Verdict Accuracy: Costly Juror Effort and Free Riding

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI:10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0020
Guha Brishti
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

If jurors care about reaching the correct verdict, but also experience costs to paying attention during the trial, even a small effort cost generates interesting interactions between pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy. I demonstrate the existence of a strong free riding effect; jurors respond to a more informative prior by reducing their probabilities of paying attention, to the extent that over a non-empty range, a more informative prior will be associated with poorer verdicts. Pretrial beliefs can depend on several factors: I consider two – the extent of discovery during the pre-plea bargaining process, and the efficiency of the police. My results imply that more liberal discovery rules, which result in a less noisy plea bargaining process, will actually be complemented by greater juror effort over a range, resulting in more accurate verdicts. In contrast, greater police efficiency will, over a range, elicit a sufficient drop in juror effort such that verdicts are less accurate. Thus, improving discovery has added benefits over a range, while the benefits of exogenous improvements in policing may be dampened. I briefly extend the model to cases where attentive jurors receive an imperfect public signal instead of a perfect one, and to cases where jurors’ utilities from convicting a guilty defendant differ from their utilities from acquitting an innocent one.
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审前信念与判决准确性:昂贵的陪审员努力和搭便车
如果陪审员关心做出正确的判决,但也经历了在审判过程中注意的成本,即使是很小的努力成本,也会在审前信念和判决准确性之间产生有趣的相互作用。我证明了搭便车效应的存在;陪审员对信息更丰富的先验的反应是减少他们注意的概率,在一定程度上,在非空范围内,信息更丰富的先验将与较差的判决相关联。审前信念可能取决于几个因素:我认为有两个因素——在辩诉前交易过程中发现证据的程度,以及警方的效率。我的研究结果表明,更自由的证据开示规则,会减少辩诉交易过程的嘈杂,实际上会得到陪审团在一定范围内更大努力的补充,从而产生更准确的判决。相比之下,在一定范围内,更高的警察效率将导致陪审员努力的充分减少,从而使判决不那么准确。因此,改进发现在一定范围内增加了好处,而警务方面的外生改进的好处可能会受到抑制。我简要地将该模型扩展到以下情况:细心的陪审员接收到的是不完美的公共信号,而不是完美的公共信号;以及陪审员判定有罪被告的效用与宣告无罪被告的效用不同的情况。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
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