{"title":"Front-End Fiduciaries: Pre-Certification Duties and Class Conflict","authors":"Nick Landsman-Roos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2155365","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On August 31, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles to decide whether named plaintiffs may defeat removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing 'binding stipulations' with complaints in state court, capping a class’s recovery at under $5 million (the jurisdictional threshold for removal). The case presents an opportunity to address an issue under-theorized in the existing literature on class actions: what fiduciary duties, if any, are owed by a plaintiff's attorney to potential absent class members in a class action prior to certification? What are the contours or scope of such a pre-certification fiduciary duty? This paper fills two gaps in the literature about fiduciary duties (or more broadly conflicts of interest) in class actions. First, there has been little scholarly treatment of the scope and contours of an attorney’s fiduciary duty to class members prior to class certification - that is, outside the strictures of Rule 23. Pre-certification conflicts are far more difficult to address because no federal rules-based framework exists for addressing pre-certification conduct. Second, this is the first academic treatment of means-based decision making in class actions. Unlike post-certification inquiries into conflicts of interest concerning settlements, this inquiry is particularly complicated because there is often inadequate information about likely outcomes when certain means are employed. Conceivably, there is considerably more grey area surrounding means-related decision making. In the pre-certification stage, without information about how the litigation will run its course, attorneys make decisions that could credibly be defended as in the best interest of the class, or as in breach of the attorney’s fiduciary obligations to those class members. In discussing pre-certification fiduciary duties, this paper investigates the legitimacy of 'binding stipulations' as a case study. In addition to this specific analysis, this paper offers a specific formulation of the scope of attorneys’ pre-certification fiduciary duties: an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty to class members when he makes a decision that prejudices the substantive legal rights of absent class members without notice and opportunity for objection. When an action potentially prejudices or does prejudice a substantive legal right of absent class members, an attorney should have an opportunity to offer a good faith defense - that the course of conduct was undertaken in a good faith belief that it would maximize the class’s recovery. That defense, in turn, can be evaluated in terms of whether it is legitimate, genuine, or pretextual.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"65 1","pages":"817"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9000,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Stanford Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2155365","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
On August 31, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles to decide whether named plaintiffs may defeat removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing 'binding stipulations' with complaints in state court, capping a class’s recovery at under $5 million (the jurisdictional threshold for removal). The case presents an opportunity to address an issue under-theorized in the existing literature on class actions: what fiduciary duties, if any, are owed by a plaintiff's attorney to potential absent class members in a class action prior to certification? What are the contours or scope of such a pre-certification fiduciary duty? This paper fills two gaps in the literature about fiduciary duties (or more broadly conflicts of interest) in class actions. First, there has been little scholarly treatment of the scope and contours of an attorney’s fiduciary duty to class members prior to class certification - that is, outside the strictures of Rule 23. Pre-certification conflicts are far more difficult to address because no federal rules-based framework exists for addressing pre-certification conduct. Second, this is the first academic treatment of means-based decision making in class actions. Unlike post-certification inquiries into conflicts of interest concerning settlements, this inquiry is particularly complicated because there is often inadequate information about likely outcomes when certain means are employed. Conceivably, there is considerably more grey area surrounding means-related decision making. In the pre-certification stage, without information about how the litigation will run its course, attorneys make decisions that could credibly be defended as in the best interest of the class, or as in breach of the attorney’s fiduciary obligations to those class members. In discussing pre-certification fiduciary duties, this paper investigates the legitimacy of 'binding stipulations' as a case study. In addition to this specific analysis, this paper offers a specific formulation of the scope of attorneys’ pre-certification fiduciary duties: an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty to class members when he makes a decision that prejudices the substantive legal rights of absent class members without notice and opportunity for objection. When an action potentially prejudices or does prejudice a substantive legal right of absent class members, an attorney should have an opportunity to offer a good faith defense - that the course of conduct was undertaken in a good faith belief that it would maximize the class’s recovery. That defense, in turn, can be evaluated in terms of whether it is legitimate, genuine, or pretextual.
2012年8月31日,最高法院在“标准火灾保险诉诺尔斯案”(Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles)一案中批准了调卷令,以决定指定原告是否可以根据《2005年集体诉讼公平法》(collective Action Fairness Act of 2005)向州法院提交“有约束力的规定”,将集体赔偿上限限制在500万美元以下(诉讼撤诉的司法门槛),从而否决撤诉。该案例提供了一个机会来解决现有集体诉讼文献中理论化不足的问题:在证明之前,原告律师对集体诉讼中可能缺席的集体成员负有什么信托义务(如果有的话)?这种核证前的信义责任的轮廓或范围是什么?本文填补了文献中关于集体诉讼中的信义义务(或更广泛的利益冲突)的两个空白。首先,在集体认证之前,律师对集体成员的信义义务的范围和范围,也就是说,在规则23的限制之外,很少有学术研究。预认证冲突更难解决,因为没有联邦规则框架来解决预认证行为。其次,这是学术界首次对集体诉讼中基于经济能力的决策进行研究。与对涉及和解的利益冲突进行核证后调查不同,这种调查特别复杂,因为关于采用某些手段可能产生的结果的信息往往不足。可以想象,在与手段相关的决策过程中,存在着相当多的灰色地带。在预认证阶段,在没有关于诉讼将如何进行的信息的情况下,律师做出的决定可能会被可信地辩护为符合集体的最佳利益,或者违反律师对这些集体成员的信托义务。在讨论认证前信义义务时,本文以“约束性规定”的合法性为例进行了研究。在此具体分析的基础上,本文对律师认证前信义义务的范围进行了具体表述:律师在未事先通知和没有异议机会的情况下,作出损害缺席的集体成员实体合法权利的决定,即违反了其对集体成员的信义义务。当一项诉讼可能损害或确实损害了缺席的集体成员的实质性法律权利时,律师应该有机会提供善意辩护-行为过程是出于善意的信念,它将最大限度地提高集体的赔偿。反过来,这种辩护可以根据它是合法的、真实的还是借口来评估。