Public Enforcement of Patent Law

IF 1.6 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Boston University Law Review Pub Date : 2015-09-28 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2666835
Megan M. La Belle
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Abstract

Law enforcement in the modern regulatory state is largely a joint enterprise. In areas such as securities, antitrust, civil rights, and environmental law, enforcement responsibilities are allocated between public and private actors. Patent law, on the other hand, is enforced almost exclusively through private lawsuits. Considering patent law’s constitutionally-mandated public purpose — “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts�? — this privatization of patent enforcement is troubling. In recent years, there has been some movement away from this purely private enforcement regime for patent law. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, for example, have involved themselves in certain patent matters that implicate antitrust law. While heading in the right direction, these regulators alone cannot adequately enforce patent law due to their limited jurisdiction, resources, and expertise. This Article thus proposes a more robust public enforcement mechanism for patent law. It argues that Congress should arm the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the agency responsible for reviewing patents ex ante, with broad powers to police patent validity ex post. The PTO is best situated to lead this effort because of the agency’s expertise, institutional resources, and enhanced powers under the America Invents Act. Moreover, charging the PTO with the responsibility for policing patents should serve to dispel allegations of agency capture and institutional bias toward patent owners.
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专利法的公共实施
现代监管型国家的执法在很大程度上是一项联合事业。在证券、反垄断、民权和环境法等领域,执法责任在公共和私人行为体之间分配。另一方面,专利法几乎完全通过私人诉讼来执行。考虑到专利法的宪法规定的公共目的——“促进科学和实用艺术的进步”?专利执行的私有化令人不安。近年来,专利法的这种纯粹的私人执行机制出现了一些变化。例如,司法部和联邦贸易委员会已经卷入了涉及反垄断法的某些专利事务。虽然朝着正确的方向前进,但由于这些监管机构的管辖权、资源和专业知识有限,它们无法充分执行专利法。因此,本文提出了一个更强大的专利法公共执法机制。它认为国会应该武装美国专利和商标局(PTO),该机构负责事前审查专利,并赋予其广泛的权力来事后监督专利的有效性。由于专利商标局的专业知识、制度资源以及《美国发明法》赋予的更大权力,它最适合领导这项工作。此外,让专利商标局承担监管专利的责任,应该有助于消除对机构俘获和对专利权人的制度偏见的指控。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
5.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Boston University Law Review provides analysis and commentary on all areas of the law. Published six times a year, the Law Review contains articles contributed by law professors and practicing attorneys from all over the world, along with notes written by student members.
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