Reasons, reasonableness and intelligible justification in judicial review

IF 0.7 Q2 LAW SYDNEY LAW REVIEW Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3661007
L. Mcdonald
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Australian courts have not recognised a general obligation to give reasons for administrative decisions. This article considers two contexts in which the inadequacy of reasons may nonetheless give rise to legal consequences: first, where there is a breach of a statutory obligation to give reasons and, second, where deficiencies in justification are relevant to the application of the unreasonableness ground of review. The aim is to contribute to a clearer understanding of the ways in which the inadequacy of reasons may reveal or constitute reviewable errors. More broadly, the article considers how review of the adequacy of reasons fits within the conceptual framework of judicial review in Australia given the propensity for a procedural obligation to give reasons to invite analysis of the substance of reasons. A possible strategy to limit any slide from the review of 'procedural' reason-giving obligations into 'substantive' review is to distinguish 'intelligible' reasons and 'persuasive' reasons. The overall argument is that although the concept of intelligibility is being explored in the cases, even minimal intelligibility requirements will have substantive elements and, further, there is as yet little judicial guidance as to how any inquiry into the intelligibility of reasons can be quarantined from broader substantive questions about the persuasiveness of justifications.
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司法审查的理由、合理性和可理解的正当理由
澳大利亚法院不承认为行政决定提供理由的一般义务。本条考虑了两种情况,在这种情况下,理由不足仍可能引起法律后果:第一,违反法定义务提供理由的情况;第二,正当理由不足与适用不合理的审查理由有关的情况。其目的是有助于更清楚地了解原因不充分可能揭示或构成可审查错误的方式。更广泛地说,鉴于提出理由的程序性义务倾向于引起对理由实质的分析,本文考虑了对理由充分性的审查如何符合澳大利亚司法审查的概念框架。限制审查从“程序性”给出理由义务滑向“实质性”审查的可能策略是区分“可理解的”理由和“有说服力的”理由。总的论点是,尽管在案件中正在探讨可理解性的概念,但即使是最低限度的可理解性要求也将具有实质性要素,此外,关于如何将对理由的可理解性的任何调查与有关理由的说服力的更广泛的实质性问题隔离开来,迄今几乎没有司法指导。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
5
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