This article highlights the revolutionary and dramatic implications brought about by the advances in genetics. Among the myriad of legal problems involved, gene patenting is regarded as one of the most controversial. In a critical evaluation of the current inquiry into gene patenting and human health, the author argues that the Australian Law Reform Commission falls short of a thorough recommendation by failing to grant due recognition to the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. Starting with the fundamental premise that the human genome is the 'heritage of humanity', it is argued that the fruits of genetic research must flow back to humankind, and any law reform process must thereby ensure that the economic and health benefits of genetic research are available to all. Specifically, the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) should be amended to include the 'medical treatment' defence to patent infringement, following the lead of overseas jurisdictions. It should also incorporate an 'experimental use' defence to ensure an unhindered approach to research and development. In doing so, the patent law regime will be truly balancing the interests at stake, which will accommodate more fully Australia's domestic needs and international obligations.
In this article, we question the apparent simplicity of medical law's construction of 'life and death' cases as a clash between the sanctity of life principle and patient autonomy. Our main purpose in doing so is to try to understand more fully the nature of law's regulation of the existence and non-existence of life. Specifically, we argue that, by broadening the understanding of autonomy in this area beyond a simple concern for patients' rights and self-determination, to include a focus on the individual generally, it becomes possible to identify some of the legal practices that are central to the manner in which law regulates the threshold between life and death. Through an analysis of a recent case in English law--Re B (an adult: refusal of medical treatment)--(although Australian jurisdictions presently disclose no similar, authoritative case, ours presently is almost an arbitrary choice)--we demonstrate the central role played in this regulation by tests for mental capacity, questions of character, explanation, and imagination. We conclude that medical law, at least in this context, can be theorised as a normalising practice--one in which the determination of norms often occurs through patients.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：