Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2008-03-01 DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2009.5520
R. Gilson, C. Milhaupt
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引用次数: 73

Abstract

Suspension of the voting rights of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) addresses one facet of the competition between market and new-mercantilist capitalism. It solves the immediate problem at which it is addressed : the use of a portfolio company's corporate governance structure to influence its decisions in a fashion that works to the advantage of the SWF's government owner at the expense of the portfolio company's other shareholders and potentially the host country itself. This solution cannot solve the larger problems that arise from the interaction of different concepts of capitalism, but it can address the most serous risk SWFs pose : that the perception of strategic behavior by foreign state-owned entities will result in a protectionist backlash. ; JEL Classification : F30, G29, G34
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主权财富基金与公司治理:对新重商主义的极简回应
暂停主权财富基金(SWFs)的投票权,解决了市场与新重商资本主义之间竞争的一个方面。它解决了它所要解决的直接问题:利用被投资公司的公司治理结构,以一种有利于主权财富基金政府所有者的方式影响其决策,而牺牲了被投资公司的其他股东,甚至可能是东道国本身的利益。这种解决方案无法解决不同资本主义概念相互作用所产生的更大问题,但它可以解决主权财富基金构成的最严重风险:对外国国有实体战略行为的看法将导致保护主义反弹。;JEL分类:F30, G29, G34
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