What Is God Doing in the Quad

Abstract

I begin with an examination of Berkeley's various suggestions about how to account for the continued existence of physical objects which are unperceived by finite spirits. After dismissing some of these suggestions I attempt to combine others in a unified theory which involves an appeal to what finite perceivers would perceive if they were in the right conditions, to the operation of the will of God, and to the perception of God. I assess the merits, both philosophical and textual, of the unified theory. In the final section I comment on the implications of this theory of continuity for our conception of a Berkeleian physical object. 1. The Continuity Problem. If esse est percipi, that is if to be is to be perceived, then physical objects which are not being perceived do not exist. Yet commonsense suggests that physical objects exist when they are not being perceived. How is Berkeley to make sense of this commonsense belief? It is hard to know how important it is to Berkeley to accommodate commonsense beliefs. I assume that the more prevalent and deep-seated he takes a putative commonsense belief to be, the greater is his concern to show he can accept it, or at least to show how it can be interpreted so that it is consistent with his views. The commonsense belief in the continued existence of unperceived objects is very prevalent and very deep-seated. So it is no surprise to find Berkeley dealing with the issue of continuity from the earliest entry in the Philosophical Commentaries to the final pages of the Dialogues. 2. Two Unsatisfactory Responses to the Continuity Problem. Sometimes it seems that Berkeley's response to the continuity problem is simply that it is impossible to believe in the existence of unperceived objects, for "unperceived object" is a contradiction in terms. What is not perceived does not exist. This response is presented in the course of Berkeley's reply to the fourth objection to his views which he considers in the Principles. The fourth objection is that it follows from his principles that "things are every moment annihilated and created anew" and that "[the] objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the par-