Pub Date : 1988-10-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/198914SUPPLEMENT35
S. Kemal
'Medieval Arabie Poetics' The paper concerns the Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics written by Avicenna (Ibn Sina : 930-1037AD). The paper is divided into two parts, the first of which examines Avicenna's account of poetic imagination and the use he makes of this concept in justifying a 'poetic syllogism' that accounts for aesthetic validity. The second part develops this account of the poetic syllogism to show that the completeness of the syllogistic requires us to consider the kind of commurlty and moral validity sustained by poetic validity. To explain the first claim for poetic syllogisms the paper examines Avicenna's writings on logic and parts of his commentaries on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, linking these to issues in his commentary on the Poetics. To explain the relation of poetry to community, the paper develops issues from the commentary on the Poetics, especially Avicenna's use of the concept of 'themes'.
{"title":"Medieval Arabic Poetics: Poetic Syllogism and Community in Avicenna’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics","authors":"S. Kemal","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/198914SUPPLEMENT35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/198914SUPPLEMENT35","url":null,"abstract":"'Medieval Arabie Poetics' The paper concerns the Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics written by Avicenna (Ibn Sina : 930-1037AD). The paper is divided into two parts, the first of which examines Avicenna's account of poetic imagination and the use he makes of this concept in justifying a 'poetic syllogism' that accounts for aesthetic validity. The second part develops this account of the poetic syllogism to show that the completeness of the syllogistic requires us to consider the kind of commurlty and moral validity sustained by poetic validity. To explain the first claim for poetic syllogisms the paper examines Avicenna's writings on logic and parts of his commentaries on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, linking these to issues in his commentary on the Poetics. To explain the relation of poetry to community, the paper develops issues from the commentary on the Poetics, especially Avicenna's use of the concept of 'themes'.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"20-122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/198914SUPPLEMENT35","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891421
D. M. Adams
Several philosophers, including most prominently Theodore Benditt, have recently urged that the discourse of rights, widely thought to be a central, if not foundational feature of moral and political thought, is in reality a mere "redundant" appendage-a discourse that holds no distinctive place in moral or legal reasoning owing to the fact that it is thoroughly derivative because collapsible into other forms of moral or legal language. In this paper I attempt to (1) flesh out this "Redundancy" Thesis (R1) and (2) identify and criticize at least two general arguments that might be thought to give rise to it: the claims that rights reduce (respectively) to duties (the Correlativity Thesis) or to permissions (the Permissibility Thesis). I try to show how and why these arguments fail and why they do not therefore support R T.
{"title":"In Defense of the Autonomy of Rights","authors":"D. M. Adams","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891421","url":null,"abstract":"Several philosophers, including most prominently Theodore Benditt, have recently urged that the discourse of rights, widely thought to be a central, if not foundational feature of moral and political thought, is in reality a mere \"redundant\" appendage-a discourse that holds no distinctive place in moral or legal reasoning owing to the fact that it is thoroughly derivative because collapsible into other forms of moral or legal language. In this paper I attempt to (1) flesh out this \"Redundancy\" Thesis (R1) and (2) identify and criticize at least two general arguments that might be thought to give rise to it: the claims that rights reduce (respectively) to duties (the Correlativity Thesis) or to permissions (the Permissibility Thesis). I try to show how and why these arguments fail and why they do not therefore support R T.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"51-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891421","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891413
Q. Smith
This short article aims to illustrate the mutually question-begging arguments that are often presented in debates between opponents and defenderss of McTaggart's ·proof' that A-properties (pastness, presentness and futurity) are logically incoherent. A sample of such arguments is taken from a recent debate between L. Nathan Oaklander (a defender of McTaggart) and myself (an opponent of McTaggart) and a method of escaping the impasse that is often reached in such debates is suggested.
{"title":"The Logical Structure of the Debate About McTaggart’s Paradox","authors":"Q. Smith","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891413","url":null,"abstract":"This short article aims to illustrate the mutually question-begging arguments that are often presented in debates between opponents and defenderss of McTaggart's ·proof' that A-properties (pastness, presentness and futurity) are logically incoherent. A sample of such arguments is taken from a recent debate between L. Nathan Oaklander (a defender of McTaggart) and myself (an opponent of McTaggart) and a method of escaping the impasse that is often reached in such debates is suggested.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"371-379"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891413","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891427
J. Feinberg
Prospective ascription of responsibility is hypothetical, commonly noting or setting conditions for critical judgment or liability if some event occurs or fails to occur, thus determining vulnerability to retrospective judgments. Prospective liabilities can be classified by source, by type or degree (if any) of accompanying control, and by structure or stages. But not all prospective responsibility can be understood in terms of liability. Actual or de facto control over X and/or responsibility for Y (persons, animals, inanimate things, etc.), though they may involve prospective liabilities, may not be responsibilities to any person in particular. Such responsibilities may be called responsibilities in rem and distinguished from those assignable to persons (responsibilities in personam). Though prospective responsibility judgments often provide the most important grounds for retrospective judgments, if the concern is with the meaning of responsibility judgments, retrospective responsibility judgments are more basic. For, while we can understand retrospective judgments even though we know nothing of prospective ones, the opposite is not true 1. Prospective and Retrospective Judgments esponsibility is sometimes ascribed before the fact by persons whose eyes are on the future, and sometimes after the fact by critics and judges looking to the past. Prospective ascriptions of responsibility are hypothetical pronouncements about the future, often to the effect that if some event occurs (or fails to occur), the person now judged responsible for it will then be the proper subject of certain other judgments-for example, those ascribing credit or blame, or liability to punishment or reward. Those further judgments will, of course, be made retrospectively, for they will be about an event that has already occurred or failed to occur. Thus, if George is the one who is responsible for seeing to it that X happens, and then X fails to happen,
{"title":"Responsibility for the Future","authors":"J. Feinberg","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891427","url":null,"abstract":"Prospective ascription of responsibility is hypothetical, commonly noting or setting conditions for critical judgment or liability if some event occurs or fails to occur, thus determining vulnerability to retrospective judgments. Prospective liabilities can be classified by source, by type or degree (if any) of accompanying control, and by structure or stages. But not all prospective responsibility can be understood in terms of liability. Actual or de facto control over X and/or responsibility for Y (persons, animals, inanimate things, etc.), though they may involve prospective liabilities, may not be responsibilities to any person in particular. Such responsibilities may be called responsibilities in rem and distinguished from those assignable to persons (responsibilities in personam). Though prospective responsibility judgments often provide the most important grounds for retrospective judgments, if the concern is with the meaning of responsibility judgments, retrospective responsibility judgments are more basic. For, while we can understand retrospective judgments even though we know nothing of prospective ones, the opposite is not true 1. Prospective and Retrospective Judgments esponsibility is sometimes ascribed before the fact by persons whose eyes are on the future, and sometimes after the fact by critics and judges looking to the past. Prospective ascriptions of responsibility are hypothetical pronouncements about the future, often to the effect that if some event occurs (or fails to occur), the person now judged responsible for it will then be the proper subject of certain other judgments-for example, those ascribing credit or blame, or liability to punishment or reward. Those further judgments will, of course, be made retrospectively, for they will be about an event that has already occurred or failed to occur. Thus, if George is the one who is responsible for seeing to it that X happens, and then X fails to happen,","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"93-113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891427","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891433
J. Treloar
{"title":"The Polemical Employment of Pure Reason and Kantian Ethics","authors":"J. Treloar","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891433","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"183-192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891433","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891419
C. Kelly
{"title":"Why God is Not Really Related to the World","authors":"C. Kelly","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891419","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"455-487"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891419","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891422
D. Boersema
In this paper I suggest that Searle's theory of reference is immune to the specific criticisms that have been levelled against it. I first present an overview of Searle's "cluster" theory, followed by an overview of the Kripkean critique. I then examine in detail Kripke's objections and suggest that they are not sufficient for a rejection of Searle's theory. Finally, I consider several general objections to the cluster theory and argue that they, too, do not suffice to reject it. "When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less". "The question is", said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things". Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass Dn Naming and Necessity Kripke rejects the Russellian theory of proper names as neither an adequate nor a correct treatment of ordinary (proper) names.1 Kripke argues (with many others) that the Russellian view fails to account for the significance of the fact that different descriptions may be (and are) used in place of a name to designate an object. So one person might think of Aristotle as 'the teacher of Alexander', another as 'the most famous student of Plato', yet another as 'the author of the Metaphysics', and so on. (Even a single speaker might use these various descriptions at different times when referring to Aristotle). No one of these descriptions could be the meaning of the name 'Aristotle' or else the meaning of the name would be in constant flux. Additionally, the notion of proper names as disguised or shorthand definite descriptions is faulty, for if 'Aristotle' means 'the teacher of Alexander', then the statement 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander' would be a tautologysomething it is not. (Indeed, not only is this statement not a tautology, but we could 518 DAVID B. BOERSEMA very well discover that it is false.) So, says Kripke, being the teacher of Alexander cannot be part of [the sense] of the name 'Aristotle'. Kripke then goes on to say that the most common way out of this difficulty with such a view of names is to say that no particular description may be substituted for a name; rather what is needed is a/amily, or cluster, of descriptions. A good example of this, says Kripke, is found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.2 Kripke quotes the following part of paragraph 79 as introducing the idea of family resemblances: Consider this example. If one says 'Moses did not exist', this may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt -or: their leader was not called Moses-or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses... But when I make a statement about Moses, -am I always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions for 'Moses'? I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have
{"title":"Is the Descriptivist / Cluster Theory of Reference “Wrong from the Fundamentals”?","authors":"D. Boersema","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891422","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I suggest that Searle's theory of reference is immune to the specific criticisms that have been levelled against it. I first present an overview of Searle's \"cluster\" theory, followed by an overview of the Kripkean critique. I then examine in detail Kripke's objections and suggest that they are not sufficient for a rejection of Searle's theory. Finally, I consider several general objections to the cluster theory and argue that they, too, do not suffice to reject it. \"When I use a word\", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, \"it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less\". \"The question is\", said Alice, \"whether you can make words mean so many different things\". Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass Dn Naming and Necessity Kripke rejects the Russellian theory of proper names as neither an adequate nor a correct treatment of ordinary (proper) names.1 Kripke argues (with many others) that the Russellian view fails to account for the significance of the fact that different descriptions may be (and are) used in place of a name to designate an object. So one person might think of Aristotle as 'the teacher of Alexander', another as 'the most famous student of Plato', yet another as 'the author of the Metaphysics', and so on. (Even a single speaker might use these various descriptions at different times when referring to Aristotle). No one of these descriptions could be the meaning of the name 'Aristotle' or else the meaning of the name would be in constant flux. Additionally, the notion of proper names as disguised or shorthand definite descriptions is faulty, for if 'Aristotle' means 'the teacher of Alexander', then the statement 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander' would be a tautologysomething it is not. (Indeed, not only is this statement not a tautology, but we could 518 DAVID B. BOERSEMA very well discover that it is false.) So, says Kripke, being the teacher of Alexander cannot be part of [the sense] of the name 'Aristotle'. Kripke then goes on to say that the most common way out of this difficulty with such a view of names is to say that no particular description may be substituted for a name; rather what is needed is a/amily, or cluster, of descriptions. A good example of this, says Kripke, is found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.2 Kripke quotes the following part of paragraph 79 as introducing the idea of family resemblances: Consider this example. If one says 'Moses did not exist', this may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt -or: their leader was not called Moses-or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses... But when I make a statement about Moses, -am I always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions for 'Moses'? I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have ","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"517-538"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891422","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891429
William L. Langenfus
{"title":"A Problem for Harman’s Moral Relativism","authors":"William L. Langenfus","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891429","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"121-136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891429","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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