Hume on Rational Final Ends

Adrian M. S. Piper
{"title":"Hume on Rational Final Ends","authors":"Adrian M. S. Piper","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989142","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Historically, the view, prevalent in contemporary economics and decision theory as well as philosophy, that rational action consists simply in satisfying one's desires, whatever they may be, as efficiently as possible, is to be found first in Book II of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. This view has counterintuitive and self-refuting implications, in that it recognizes as rational behavior that may reveal a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Accordingly, many Hume scholars have tried to show recently that this view was not Hume's; and that, on the contrary, Hume did supply an account of rational [mal ends--in his discussion of the calm passions, the \"steady and general view\" that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual's desires and perceptions, and elsewhere. But a detailed reconstruction of Hume's views on these matters that assembles all the relevant texts does not support this thesis. Instead, it undermines it. Hence the counterintuitive and self-refuting implications of Hume's view of rational action must be allowed to stand. IMlccording to what I shall call the traditional view, reason functions to make inferences and categorical and hypothetical judgments, formulate hypotheses, and derive conclusions from evidential statements, deductive premises, and syllogisms. Reason on the traditional view is a logical arbiter, a calculator and discoverer of the relations between abstract concepts and states or events in the world. There is a certain model of rational action, call it the utility-maximization model of rationality, which many have taken to be a direct consequence of the traditional view of reason. The basic premise of the utility-maximization model is that rationality is a purely theoretical or logical capacity which consists in ascertaining, through investigation and calculation, the most efficient means possible of achieving our desired [mal ends, whatever these may be. \"Efficient means\" typically include whatever resources happen to be available to us, i.e., time, energy, physical labor, and material goods, expended with as little cost as possible. Call this basic premise the positive utility-maximization","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"193-228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989142","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989142","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

Historically, the view, prevalent in contemporary economics and decision theory as well as philosophy, that rational action consists simply in satisfying one's desires, whatever they may be, as efficiently as possible, is to be found first in Book II of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. This view has counterintuitive and self-refuting implications, in that it recognizes as rational behavior that may reveal a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Accordingly, many Hume scholars have tried to show recently that this view was not Hume's; and that, on the contrary, Hume did supply an account of rational [mal ends--in his discussion of the calm passions, the "steady and general view" that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual's desires and perceptions, and elsewhere. But a detailed reconstruction of Hume's views on these matters that assembles all the relevant texts does not support this thesis. Instead, it undermines it. Hence the counterintuitive and self-refuting implications of Hume's view of rational action must be allowed to stand. IMlccording to what I shall call the traditional view, reason functions to make inferences and categorical and hypothetical judgments, formulate hypotheses, and derive conclusions from evidential statements, deductive premises, and syllogisms. Reason on the traditional view is a logical arbiter, a calculator and discoverer of the relations between abstract concepts and states or events in the world. There is a certain model of rational action, call it the utility-maximization model of rationality, which many have taken to be a direct consequence of the traditional view of reason. The basic premise of the utility-maximization model is that rationality is a purely theoretical or logical capacity which consists in ascertaining, through investigation and calculation, the most efficient means possible of achieving our desired [mal ends, whatever these may be. "Efficient means" typically include whatever resources happen to be available to us, i.e., time, energy, physical labor, and material goods, expended with as little cost as possible. Call this basic premise the positive utility-maximization
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
休谟论理性的最终目的
从历史上看,在当代经济学和决策理论以及哲学中普遍存在的观点是,理性行为仅仅包括满足一个人的欲望,不管它们是什么,尽可能有效,首先可以在休谟的《人性论》第二卷中找到。这种观点具有反直觉和自我反驳的含义,因为它认为理性行为可能显示出明显程度的不负责任或心理不稳定。因此,最近许多研究休谟的学者试图表明,这种观点不是休谟的;相反,休谟确实提供了一种理性目的的解释——在他对平静的激情的讨论中,“稳定而普遍的观点”纠正了个人欲望和感知的偏见和偶然性,以及其他地方。但是,对休谟关于这些问题的观点进行详细的重构,将所有相关文本集合起来,并不能支持这一论点。相反,它破坏了它。因此,必须允许休谟的理性行为观点的反直觉和自我反驳的含义成立。根据我所称的传统观点,理性的作用是进行推论、直言判断和假设性判断,制定假设,并从证据陈述、演绎前提和三段论中得出结论。在传统观点中,理性是抽象概念与世界状态或事件之间关系的逻辑仲裁者、计算器和发现者。有一种特定的理性行为模型,称为理性的效用最大化模型,许多人认为这是传统理性观的直接结果。效用最大化模型的基本前提是,理性是一种纯粹的理论或逻辑能力,它包括通过调查和计算,确定实现我们期望的目标(无论这些目标是什么)的最有效手段。“有效手段”通常包括我们可以获得的任何资源,即时间、能量、体力劳动和物质产品,以尽可能少的成本消耗。把这个基本前提称为正效用最大化
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Selective Conscientious Objection Medieval Arabic Poetics: Poetic Syllogism and Community in Avicenna’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics Reichenbach and Smart on Temporal Discourse Ockham’s Razor and the Identity of Indiscernables A Critique of Kant’s Defense of Theistic Faith
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1