Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Pub Date : 1997-01-01 DOI:10.7916/D8Z037S2
T. Merrill
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

Some legal scholars have argued that public choice theory justifies certain kinds of judicial activism.! Others have said it does not. 2 Given the present state of the debate, it would appear that those finding no necessary support for judicial activism have the stronger argument. I will suggest, however, that if we tweak the analysis a little further, it may turn out that public choice theory provides limited support for judicial activism after all. From an economic perspective-which is to say, the public choice perspective-it may be useful to think of judicial activism as part of a larger market in which a product called "law change" is bought and sold.3 This market has many potential buyers, in the form of the interest groups to which the previous panelists have already referred. Virtually every group has some change in law it would like to see adopted, whether it be producer groups that would like to see new limitations on entry by potential competitors, or environmental groups that would like to see new limitations on the development of natural resources. On the seller side, we can simplifY the analysis by assuming that there are only two firms in the market for law change-the legislature and the courts. We can then reformulate the inquiry as follows: what sorts of factors will determine the demand for
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公共选择理论是否为司法能动主义辩护
一些法律学者认为,公共选择理论为某些类型的司法能动主义辩护。其他人则表示并非如此。考虑到辩论的现状,那些认为没有必要支持司法能动主义的人似乎有更有力的论据。然而,我建议,如果我们进一步调整分析,可能会发现公共选择理论对司法能动主义提供的支持毕竟是有限的。从经济的角度来看,也就是说,从公共选择的角度来看,把司法能动主义看作一个更大的市场的一部分可能是有用的,在这个市场中,一种被称为“法律变革”的产品被买卖这个市场有许多潜在的买家,以利益集团的形式,前面的小组成员已经提到了。实际上,每一个团体都希望在法律上有所改变,无论是希望看到对潜在竞争者进入的新限制的生产者团体,还是希望看到对自然资源开发的新限制的环境团体。在卖方方面,我们可以通过假设法律变更市场上只有两家公司——立法机构和法院——来简化分析。然后,我们可以重新制定如下的调查:什么样的因素将决定需求
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0.80
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0.00%
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期刊介绍: The Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy is published three times annually by the Harvard Society for Law & Public Policy, Inc., an organization of Harvard Law School students. The Journal is one of the most widely circulated student-edited law reviews and the nation’s leading forum for conservative and libertarian legal scholarship. The late Stephen Eberhard and former Senator and Secretary of Energy E. Spencer Abraham founded the journal twenty-eight years ago and many journal alumni have risen to prominent legal positions in the government and at the nation’s top law firms.
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