Ranking Season: Combating Commercial Banks' Systemic Discrimination of Consumers

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 BUSINESS American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2022-04-06 DOI:10.1111/ablj.12200
Nizan Geslevich Packin, Srinivas Nippani
{"title":"Ranking Season: Combating Commercial Banks' Systemic Discrimination of Consumers","authors":"Nizan Geslevich Packin,&nbsp;Srinivas Nippani","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12200","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The recent disbursement of COVID-19 pandemic-related federal relief funds to businesses and individuals under the CARES Act exposed significant problems in the U.S. system of money and payments. U.S. banks' wealth maximization objectives clashed with the federal government's goals of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI). The discriminatory, self-interested behavior of banks, which essentially served as the federal government's long arm in these transactions, worsened the pandemic-induced economic crisis for many, especially women and minorities, and intensified racial injustice. The U.S. government's inability in 2020 to successfully execute its stimulus plan and give all its intended recipients the benefits it had designated due to the role played by banks begs the question: Should U.S. banks be subject to any legal obligations when they help the government execute its fiscal goals? This article argues that U.S. banks should help advance the federal government's fiscal policy, including the DEI social agenda, especially during critical junctures such as the economic crisis instigated by COVID-19, and proposes an agency theory approach to mandate the implementation of government social policy goals among commercial banks via a CAMELS rating-like system that includes social goals, such as DEI. This DEI rating system would create public consequences for noncomplying banks, including depositors withdrawing their funds from lower-rated banks and redepositing them in top-rated banks, resulting in higher-rated DEI banks overtaking lower-rated banks. This DEI rating system will also provide an incentive for banks to compete for more diversity and inclusion, which would solve many of the systemic discrimination-related issues that led to economic inequality and intensified the 2020–2021 crisis. Lastly, DEI-based scores could help prevent banks from finding themselves on the losing side of the growing public banking movement in the United States, enabling banks to reposition themselves and avoid future radical changes in the banking industry.</p>","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"59 1","pages":"123-174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ablj.12200","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Business Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ablj.12200","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

The recent disbursement of COVID-19 pandemic-related federal relief funds to businesses and individuals under the CARES Act exposed significant problems in the U.S. system of money and payments. U.S. banks' wealth maximization objectives clashed with the federal government's goals of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI). The discriminatory, self-interested behavior of banks, which essentially served as the federal government's long arm in these transactions, worsened the pandemic-induced economic crisis for many, especially women and minorities, and intensified racial injustice. The U.S. government's inability in 2020 to successfully execute its stimulus plan and give all its intended recipients the benefits it had designated due to the role played by banks begs the question: Should U.S. banks be subject to any legal obligations when they help the government execute its fiscal goals? This article argues that U.S. banks should help advance the federal government's fiscal policy, including the DEI social agenda, especially during critical junctures such as the economic crisis instigated by COVID-19, and proposes an agency theory approach to mandate the implementation of government social policy goals among commercial banks via a CAMELS rating-like system that includes social goals, such as DEI. This DEI rating system would create public consequences for noncomplying banks, including depositors withdrawing their funds from lower-rated banks and redepositing them in top-rated banks, resulting in higher-rated DEI banks overtaking lower-rated banks. This DEI rating system will also provide an incentive for banks to compete for more diversity and inclusion, which would solve many of the systemic discrimination-related issues that led to economic inequality and intensified the 2020–2021 crisis. Lastly, DEI-based scores could help prevent banks from finding themselves on the losing side of the growing public banking movement in the United States, enabling banks to reposition themselves and avoid future radical changes in the banking industry.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
排名季:打击商业银行对消费者的系统性歧视
最近根据CARES法案向企业和个人发放了与新冠肺炎疫情相关的联邦救济金,这暴露了美国货币和支付系统的重大问题。美国银行的财富最大化目标与联邦政府的多样性、公平性和包容性(DEI)目标相冲突。银行的歧视性、自利行为本质上是联邦政府在这些交易中的长臂,加剧了疫情引发的许多人,尤其是妇女和少数民族的经济危机,并加剧了种族不公正。由于银行所扮演的角色,美国政府在2020年无法成功执行其刺激计划,也无法向所有预定的接受者提供其指定的福利,这就引出了一个问题:美国银行在帮助政府执行财政目标时,是否应该承担任何法律义务?本文认为,美国银行应帮助推进联邦政府的财政政策,包括DEI社会议程,尤其是在新冠肺炎引发的经济危机等关键时刻,并提出了一种代理理论方法,通过一个包含社会目标(如DEI)的类似CAMELS评级的系统来强制商业银行执行政府社会政策目标。这种DEI评级系统将给不遵守规定的银行带来公共后果,包括储户从评级较低的银行提取资金,并将其重新存入评级最高的银行,导致评级较高的DEI银行超过评级较低银行。这一DEI评级系统还将激励银行竞争更多的多样性和包容性,这将解决许多导致经济不平等和加剧2020-2021年危机的系统性歧视相关问题。最后,基于DEI的评分有助于防止银行在美国日益增长的公共银行运动中处于失败的一边,使银行能够重新定位自己,避免银行业未来发生根本性变化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
16.70%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The ABLJ is a faculty-edited, double blind peer reviewed journal, continuously published since 1963. Our mission is to publish only top quality law review articles that make a scholarly contribution to all areas of law that impact business theory and practice. We search for those articles that articulate a novel research question and make a meaningful contribution directly relevant to scholars and practitioners of business law. The blind peer review process means legal scholars well-versed in the relevant specialty area have determined selected articles are original, thorough, important, and timely. Faculty editors assure the authors’ contribution to scholarship is evident. We aim to elevate legal scholarship and inform responsible business decisions.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information Rebooting the Community Reinvestment Act High-status versus low-status stakeholders Innovation stakeholders: Developing a sustainable paradigm to integrate intellectual property and corporate social responsibility Issue Information
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1