MacroInstitutional Political Structures and Their Development in Armenia

Q2 Social Sciences Demokratizatsiya Pub Date : 2006-03-01 DOI:10.3200/DEMO.14.2.159-170
A. Markarov
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The question of adopting forms of institutions, defining the manner in which state institutions should interact, and defining executive-legislative relations was part of the political discourse of all post-Soviet nations, especially in the early 1990s. In some cases the debate is still raging and the processes are ongoing, such as in Armenia, where a revised constitution was put to a general referendum in November 2005.In Armenia the issues of institutional design and the adoption of a new constitution, were put forward soon after Armenia's Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration on Independence (which laid the groundwork for the referendum on the Declaration of Independence in September 1991). On November 5, 1990, the Parliament established the Constitutional Commission, which was comprised of twenty politicians, members of the Parliament, and lawyers, to draft a new constitution. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Levon Ter-Petrossian, headed the commission. However, before the commission's first meeting on October 15, 1992, the Armenian political system had undergone considerable changes. Based on the Declaration on Independence, which separated the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the Supreme Soviet decided to formally establish the presidency on June 25, 1991, and to hold elections three months later on October 16. Ter-Petrossian scored an overwhelming victory, receiving 83 percent of the votes cast. Paruyr Hayrikyan, of the Union of National Self-Determination Party (AIM), received 7.2 percent of the votes, while the candidate of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (HHD) received 4.3 percent of the votes.While there was no doubt the presidency was necessary, there were disagreements over the limits of presidential powers. Two main camps, one favoring a stronger Parliament, the other a more powerful presidency, had already emerged in the summer of 1991. Those favoring the parliamentary system stressed its implicit democratic nature, cautioning against the ills of too much power being concentrated in the hands of one individual. They also argued that Armenia had a parliamentary tradition, pointing to the experiences of the First Armenian Republic (1918-1920) and Soviet Armenia. Furthermore, they argued, a strong Parliament would assist in the institutionalization of political parties, while a strong presidency would discourage it. Advocates of a strong presidency made their own arguments, stipulating that a nonprofessional Parliament, composed of weak political parties, would be detrimental to the young republic, leaving the country in anarchy, and thus one step away from the emergence of a dictatorship. They pointed out that using the Soviet system as an example was not a valid model, as real authority during the Soviet period was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party and its first secretary, providing the basis instead of one-person and one-party rule. No less important for those arguing for a strong presidency was the context of the time, including the need for a strong leadership to transform the political and economic systems, in addition to the processes of state and nation building. Additionally, Armenia was overburdened by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the economic blockades by Turkey and Azerbaijan. This led some to see a strong presidency as a more effective way of dealing with the problems of the time.In 1991, the Supreme Soviet adopted two laws-the Law on the President of the Republic of Armenia (August 1), and the Law on the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia (November 19)-which were the first steps taken toward the creation of a strong presidency. The debates on presidential authority have continued to the present, generally falling into two camps: those in power favoring a strong presidency and those in opposition favoring a strong Parliament.After the introduction of the presidency in Armenia, and the adoption of the laws on the Supreme Soviet and the president, the balance in executive-legislative relations shifted in favor of the president. …
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亚美尼亚宏观制度政治结构及其发展
采用制度形式、界定国家机构互动的方式以及界定行政-立法关系等问题,是所有后苏联国家政治话语的一部分,尤其是在20世纪90年代初。在某些情况下,辩论仍在激烈进行,进程仍在进行中,例如在亚美尼亚,修订后的宪法于2005年11月进行了全民公决。在亚美尼亚,体制设计和通过新宪法的问题是在亚美尼亚最高苏维埃通过《独立宣言》(该宣言为1991年9月就《独立宣言》进行全民公决奠定了基础)后不久提出的。1990年11月5日,议会成立了宪法委员会,该委员会由20名政治家、议会议员和律师组成,负责起草新宪法。最高苏维埃主席列翁·捷尔-彼得罗相领导了这个委员会。然而,在1992年10月15日委员会第一次会议之前,亚美尼亚的政治制度已经发生了相当大的变化。根据《独立宣言》,将政府的行政、立法和司法部门分开,最高苏维埃决定于1991年6月25日正式设立总统职位,并在三个月后的10月16日举行选举。捷尔-彼得罗相获得了压倒性的胜利,获得了83%的选票。民族自决权联盟党(AIM)的帕鲁尔·海里基扬获得7.2%的选票,而亚美尼亚革命联盟(HHD)的候选人获得4.3%的选票。虽然总统职位无疑是必要的,但对总统权力的限制存在分歧。两个主要阵营,一个支持更强大的议会,另一个支持更强大的总统,已经在1991年夏天出现。那些赞成议会制的人强调了议会制隐含的民主本质,告诫人们不要将过多的权力集中在一个人手中。他们还认为亚美尼亚有议会传统,指出亚美尼亚第一共和国(1918-1920)和苏维埃亚美尼亚的经验。此外,他们认为,一个强大的议会将有助于政党的制度化,而一个强大的总统将阻碍它。强有力的总统制度的支持者提出了他们自己的论点,他们规定,由弱势政党组成的非专业议会将对这个年轻的共和国有害,使国家陷入无政府状态,从而离独裁政权的出现只有一步之遥。他们指出,以苏联体制为例并不是一个有效的模式,因为苏联时期的真正权力集中在共产党及其第一书记手中,提供了代替一人一党统治的基础。对于那些主张强势总统的人来说,同样重要的是当时的背景,除了国家和民族建设的进程之外,还需要一个强有力的领导人来改革政治和经济制度。此外,纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫冲突和土耳其和阿塞拜疆的经济封锁使亚美尼亚负担过重。这使得一些人认为,一个强有力的总统是处理当时问题的更有效的方式。1991年,最高苏维埃通过了两部法律——《亚美尼亚共和国总统法》(8月1日)和《亚美尼亚共和国最高苏维埃法》(11月19日)——这是朝着建立强有力的总统制迈出的第一步。关于总统权力的辩论一直持续到现在,大致分为两大阵营:当权者支持强有力的总统,反对派则支持强有力的议会。在亚美尼亚引入总统制,并通过关于最高苏维埃和总统的法律后,行政-立法关系的平衡向有利于总统的方向转移。…
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Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
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期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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