This issue of Demokratizatsiya presents some of the first results for a research project entitled "Choices of Russian Modernization" organized by the Finnish Center of Excellence in Russian Studies. (1) While Russia has by 2014 abandoned the very discourse of modernization, which was so popular during Dmitry Medvedev's presidency (2008-12), the time is ripe to discuss the continuing need for modernization in Russia after the Soviet collapse and its likely consequences. The idea of achieving major economic and social advances in Russia without free and fair political competition formed the essence of the post-Soviet modernization project. Indeed, the outcomes of this project so far have been rather mixed. Even though in the 2000s Russia experienced impressive economic growth after a period of deep and protracted recession, these successes did not produce any major institutional changes which could bolster the rule of law, good governance, and protection of human rights. No wonder that developments in Russia following the annexation of Crimea and the increasing confrontation with the West call into question the entire project of authoritarian modernization. Analyzing the politics and policies of Russia's post-Soviet authoritarian modernization is important not only for answering the eternal Russian question "Who is to be blamed?" It is also relevant for assessing Russia's prospects. The contributors whose articles are published here deal with a wide range of issues, but they focused on the role of choices made by Russian actors under certain structural conditions. The interests, ideas, and perceptions of the various actors affected these choices, but they also often resulted in unintended consequences, given the many uncertainties of the Russian political, economic, and social landscape. Thus, the implementation of the "authoritarian modernization" project was far from its ideals: dictatorial trends in Russia increased over time while economic and social well-being faced rising challenges and constraints. The contributions to this issue elaborate this common theme in a range of different contexts. Vladimir Gel'man's article, "The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia," analyzes the logic of regime change in post-Soviet Russia. It argues that the rise of electoral authoritarianism was a side effect of the failure of democratization launched in the late Soviet period. This reverse tide distorted Russia's main democratic institutions, which the Kremlin used as tools of political legitimation and mimicry. But even though it is well entrenched today, electoral authoritarianism itself is vulnerable due to numerous challenges, which will affect its further trajectory, though in unpredictable ways. Against this political background, the subsequent articles dealt with reforms in specific policy areas in Russia. In their article, "Paradoxes of Agency: Democracy and Welfare in Russia," Meri Kulmala, Markus Kainu, Jouko Nikula and Markku Kiv
{"title":"Authoritarian Modernization in Russia","authors":"V. Gel’man","doi":"10.4324/9781315568423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315568423","url":null,"abstract":"This issue of Demokratizatsiya presents some of the first results for a research project entitled \"Choices of Russian Modernization\" organized by the Finnish Center of Excellence in Russian Studies. (1) While Russia has by 2014 abandoned the very discourse of modernization, which was so popular during Dmitry Medvedev's presidency (2008-12), the time is ripe to discuss the continuing need for modernization in Russia after the Soviet collapse and its likely consequences. The idea of achieving major economic and social advances in Russia without free and fair political competition formed the essence of the post-Soviet modernization project. Indeed, the outcomes of this project so far have been rather mixed. Even though in the 2000s Russia experienced impressive economic growth after a period of deep and protracted recession, these successes did not produce any major institutional changes which could bolster the rule of law, good governance, and protection of human rights. No wonder that developments in Russia following the annexation of Crimea and the increasing confrontation with the West call into question the entire project of authoritarian modernization. Analyzing the politics and policies of Russia's post-Soviet authoritarian modernization is important not only for answering the eternal Russian question \"Who is to be blamed?\" It is also relevant for assessing Russia's prospects. The contributors whose articles are published here deal with a wide range of issues, but they focused on the role of choices made by Russian actors under certain structural conditions. The interests, ideas, and perceptions of the various actors affected these choices, but they also often resulted in unintended consequences, given the many uncertainties of the Russian political, economic, and social landscape. Thus, the implementation of the \"authoritarian modernization\" project was far from its ideals: dictatorial trends in Russia increased over time while economic and social well-being faced rising challenges and constraints. The contributions to this issue elaborate this common theme in a range of different contexts. Vladimir Gel'man's article, \"The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,\" analyzes the logic of regime change in post-Soviet Russia. It argues that the rise of electoral authoritarianism was a side effect of the failure of democratization launched in the late Soviet period. This reverse tide distorted Russia's main democratic institutions, which the Kremlin used as tools of political legitimation and mimicry. But even though it is well entrenched today, electoral authoritarianism itself is vulnerable due to numerous challenges, which will affect its further trajectory, though in unpredictable ways. Against this political background, the subsequent articles dealt with reforms in specific policy areas in Russia. In their article, \"Paradoxes of Agency: Democracy and Welfare in Russia,\" Meri Kulmala, Markus Kainu, Jouko Nikula and Markku Kiv","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"68 1","pages":"499"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79856492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-22DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2012-67-4-65-88
V. Gel’man
By the 2010s, almost nobody used the term "democracy" when referring to Russia, and debates among experts were mostly focused on how far the country deviated from democratic standards.1 While "pessimists" wrote of the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Russia,2 "optimists" avoided such firm claims, focusing instead on the low level of repression by Russia's political regime3 or labeling it as a "hybrid" due to the presence of some democratic institutions.4 To some extent, these terminological controversies reflected conceptual problems in the study of regimes globally.5 But, beyond that, most scholars agree that Russian politics under Vladimir Putin has been marked by such pathologies as outrageously unfair and fraudulent elections, the coexistence of weak and impotent political parties with a dominant "party of power," a heavily censored (often self-censored) media, rubber-stamping legislatures at the national and sub-national levels, politically subordinated courts, arbitrary use of the economic powers of the state, and widespread corruption.In this article, I attempt to explain the logic of the emergence and development of Russia's current political regime, identify its major features and peculiarities, reconsider its institutional foundations and mechanisms of enforcement, analyze the trajectory of the regime's "life cycle," and reflect on possible trajectories for future evolution.Electoral Authoritarianism: Why?If one placed post-communist Russia on the world map of political regimes, it would fit into the category of "electoral" or "competitive" authoritarianism.6 These regimes, although authoritarian, incorporate elections that are meaningful, and stand in contrast to "classical" versions of authoritarianism, which are known for their "elections without choice."7 However, in electoral or competitive authoritarianism, and in contrast to electoral democracies, elections are marked by an uneven playing field based on: formal and informal rules that construct prohibitively high barriers to participation; sharply unequal access of competitors to financial and media resources; abuses of power by the state apparatus for the sake of maximizing incumbent votes; and multiple instances of electoral fraud. The uneven playing field serves as a defining distinction between electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy.Recently, there has been a proliferation of electoral authoritarian regimes as a result of two different, although not mutually exclusive, forces. First, regular elections under tightly controlled party competition allows rulers of authoritarian regimes to effectively monitor their country's elites, the state apparatus, and the citizenry, thus averting risks of the regime's sudden collapse due to domestic political conflicts.8 Second, autocrats across the globe hold elections as a means of legitimizing the status quo in the eyes of both domestic and international actors.9 However, such elections have become a crucial test of
{"title":"The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia","authors":"V. Gel’man","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2012-67-4-65-88","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2012-67-4-65-88","url":null,"abstract":"By the 2010s, almost nobody used the term \"democracy\" when referring to Russia, and debates among experts were mostly focused on how far the country deviated from democratic standards.1 While \"pessimists\" wrote of the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Russia,2 \"optimists\" avoided such firm claims, focusing instead on the low level of repression by Russia's political regime3 or labeling it as a \"hybrid\" due to the presence of some democratic institutions.4 To some extent, these terminological controversies reflected conceptual problems in the study of regimes globally.5 But, beyond that, most scholars agree that Russian politics under Vladimir Putin has been marked by such pathologies as outrageously unfair and fraudulent elections, the coexistence of weak and impotent political parties with a dominant \"party of power,\" a heavily censored (often self-censored) media, rubber-stamping legislatures at the national and sub-national levels, politically subordinated courts, arbitrary use of the economic powers of the state, and widespread corruption.In this article, I attempt to explain the logic of the emergence and development of Russia's current political regime, identify its major features and peculiarities, reconsider its institutional foundations and mechanisms of enforcement, analyze the trajectory of the regime's \"life cycle,\" and reflect on possible trajectories for future evolution.Electoral Authoritarianism: Why?If one placed post-communist Russia on the world map of political regimes, it would fit into the category of \"electoral\" or \"competitive\" authoritarianism.6 These regimes, although authoritarian, incorporate elections that are meaningful, and stand in contrast to \"classical\" versions of authoritarianism, which are known for their \"elections without choice.\"7 However, in electoral or competitive authoritarianism, and in contrast to electoral democracies, elections are marked by an uneven playing field based on: formal and informal rules that construct prohibitively high barriers to participation; sharply unequal access of competitors to financial and media resources; abuses of power by the state apparatus for the sake of maximizing incumbent votes; and multiple instances of electoral fraud. The uneven playing field serves as a defining distinction between electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy.Recently, there has been a proliferation of electoral authoritarian regimes as a result of two different, although not mutually exclusive, forces. First, regular elections under tightly controlled party competition allows rulers of authoritarian regimes to effectively monitor their country's elites, the state apparatus, and the citizenry, thus averting risks of the regime's sudden collapse due to domestic political conflicts.8 Second, autocrats across the globe hold elections as a means of legitimizing the status quo in the eyes of both domestic and international actors.9 However, such elections have become a crucial test of","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"47 1","pages":"503-522"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83659700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-09-22DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.18.4.287-308
Suvi Salmenniemi
Abstract: This paper discusses the shifting relationships between civic organizations and the state in contemporary Russia. Drawing on a case study of the provincial city of Tver, the paper explores how local activists and authorities interpret citizenship and draw the state-society boundaries at the juncture between the Socialist past and the capitalism of today. The paper argues that the authorities advocate a statist model of citizenship that conceives of civic organizations as an auxiliary of the state, taking over formerly state-provided services and activating citizens to assist the state in governance. Organizations founded during the Soviet era attempt to retain the Soviet citizenship model and the paternalist social contract underpinning it, while organizations founded during the post-Soviet period call for more participatory notions of citizenship. Keywords: citizenship, civic organizations, Russia, state ********** "I think these notions are somewhat strange to us, that there should be an agreement, public decision, some joint symposia, congresses, compacts, deals. People power. Today, we need strict power--I may be wrong though--but it should be a strict vertical power arrangement, to establish some kind of order in our country." This quotation from an official of the regional government in Tver, contemplating whether citizens and their organizations should have more say about local issues, captures the prevailing ethos in state-society relations in contemporary Russia. While during the Yeltsin era the political landscape was characterized by the dispersion of power from the federal to the regional and municipal levels and the mushrooming of independent civic organizations, Vladimir Putin's and Dmitry Medvedev's terms in office have been marked by a recentralization of power and a more active and interventionist role of the state in steering social development in the spirit of "sovereign democracy." In terms of civic activism, this process has been riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, civic organizations and governmental structures have started collaborating with one another more than before, and various mechanisms of cooperation have been established. For example, two federal-level civic forums were organized in Moscow in 2001 and 2008, followed by a number of similar regional forums, and a system of federal and regional public chambers (obshchestvennye palaty) has been created that seeks to foster dialogue between the state and society. (1) The authorities have also begun distributing funding to civic organizations, prioritizing in particular youth and social-welfare initiatives. (2) The political elite also actively circulate the concept of civil society in public discourse and emphasize its importance--implying that the concept has certain symbolic value in their own concept of political development. (3) On the other hand, the state has also placed several new restrictions on activism and increased its bureaucratic contro
{"title":"Struggling for Citizenship: Civic participation and the State in Russia","authors":"Suvi Salmenniemi","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.18.4.287-308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.18.4.287-308","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: This paper discusses the shifting relationships between civic organizations and the state in contemporary Russia. Drawing on a case study of the provincial city of Tver, the paper explores how local activists and authorities interpret citizenship and draw the state-society boundaries at the juncture between the Socialist past and the capitalism of today. The paper argues that the authorities advocate a statist model of citizenship that conceives of civic organizations as an auxiliary of the state, taking over formerly state-provided services and activating citizens to assist the state in governance. Organizations founded during the Soviet era attempt to retain the Soviet citizenship model and the paternalist social contract underpinning it, while organizations founded during the post-Soviet period call for more participatory notions of citizenship. Keywords: citizenship, civic organizations, Russia, state ********** \"I think these notions are somewhat strange to us, that there should be an agreement, public decision, some joint symposia, congresses, compacts, deals. People power. Today, we need strict power--I may be wrong though--but it should be a strict vertical power arrangement, to establish some kind of order in our country.\" This quotation from an official of the regional government in Tver, contemplating whether citizens and their organizations should have more say about local issues, captures the prevailing ethos in state-society relations in contemporary Russia. While during the Yeltsin era the political landscape was characterized by the dispersion of power from the federal to the regional and municipal levels and the mushrooming of independent civic organizations, Vladimir Putin's and Dmitry Medvedev's terms in office have been marked by a recentralization of power and a more active and interventionist role of the state in steering social development in the spirit of \"sovereign democracy.\" In terms of civic activism, this process has been riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, civic organizations and governmental structures have started collaborating with one another more than before, and various mechanisms of cooperation have been established. For example, two federal-level civic forums were organized in Moscow in 2001 and 2008, followed by a number of similar regional forums, and a system of federal and regional public chambers (obshchestvennye palaty) has been created that seeks to foster dialogue between the state and society. (1) The authorities have also begun distributing funding to civic organizations, prioritizing in particular youth and social-welfare initiatives. (2) The political elite also actively circulate the concept of civil society in public discourse and emphasize its importance--implying that the concept has certain symbolic value in their own concept of political development. (3) On the other hand, the state has also placed several new restrictions on activism and increased its bureaucratic contro","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"2012 1","pages":"309-328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78459735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-05-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.18.2.122-147
Alexei Trochev
Contrary to the theories of judicial empowerment that argue that the presence of strong political opposition is necessary for the development of an independent judiciary, the increasing fragmentation of power in today’s Ukraine goes hand-in-hand with judicial disempowerment - dependent courts regularly provide important benefits to rival elites.
{"title":"Meddling with Justice: Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in Post-Orange Ukraine","authors":"Alexei Trochev","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.18.2.122-147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.18.2.122-147","url":null,"abstract":"Contrary to the theories of judicial empowerment that argue that the presence of strong political opposition is necessary for the development of an independent judiciary, the increasing fragmentation of power in today’s Ukraine goes hand-in-hand with judicial disempowerment - dependent courts regularly provide important benefits to rival elites.","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"101 1","pages":"122-147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72539920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.18.2.160-181
Ausra Park
Abstract: Top political leadership can and often does play a crucial role in countries that transition from one political system to another. As a former Lithuanian Communist Party leader, the first president of independent Lithuania, and the longest-serving prime minister, Algirdas Brazauskas is one of a few Lithuanian policymakers who has left a profound impact on the country. This article reviews Brazauskas' rise to the pinnacles of political power, evaluates his pursued policies, and assesses the legacies he left behind after withdrawing from politics in 2006. The author also examines the claim that Lithuania is facing a leadership crisis in the aftermath of Brazauskas' departure. Keywords: Brazauskas, presidency, prime ministership, legacy, leadership vacuum ********** A political earthquake shook Lithuania on June 1, 2006, when a long-term political survivor, Algirdas Brazauskas--who served as Lithuania's prime minister from 2001-2006--decided to resign, together with all of his cabinet members. A prime minister's departure, in and of itself a commonplace occurrence in European politics, marked a profound turning point in Lithuania's political life. On the one hand, this event signified the end of what became referred to as the country's political "patriarch's" era of rule. On the other hand, analysts both in the country and abroad began pointing to the "leaderless" Lithuania phenomenon. Why was so much attention devoted to this single politician and his departure from a political scene in a small country on the Baltic coast? Individual studies of political leaders always tackle challenging questions: "Why should one care about a particular individual?" and "Did he or she really matter as a leader?" Before these questions are addressed, a quick clarification of terminology is in order. The term leadership, as used in this study, should not be understood as a simple holding of a high office position, but rather as a complex phenomenon that encompasses an important quality--the power to sway others and make people do things that they would not have otherwise done. Individuals in power positions are not only able to exercise leadership, but also to achieve success and leave a profound impact on their surroundings through the skillful exploitation of various opportunities (i.e., unique once-in-a-lifetime situations, redefined institutional structures, stretching of assigned constitutional powers, the political culture, or support by constituents) as well as their own personal skills. Studies of political leadership have shown that every individual leader certainly does not matter in all situations all of the time. For instance, Anthony Mughan's and Samuel Patterson's research suggests that leaders are likely to matter more under extreme political circumstances, such as crises and wars.j Furthermore, Timothy Colton and Robert Tucker, Martin Westlake, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, Archie Brown, and George Breslauer have established that leader
{"title":"The End of the Lithuanian Political \"Patriarch's\" Era: From Rise to Decline and Legacies Left Behind","authors":"Ausra Park","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.18.2.160-181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.18.2.160-181","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Top political leadership can and often does play a crucial role in countries that transition from one political system to another. As a former Lithuanian Communist Party leader, the first president of independent Lithuania, and the longest-serving prime minister, Algirdas Brazauskas is one of a few Lithuanian policymakers who has left a profound impact on the country. This article reviews Brazauskas' rise to the pinnacles of political power, evaluates his pursued policies, and assesses the legacies he left behind after withdrawing from politics in 2006. The author also examines the claim that Lithuania is facing a leadership crisis in the aftermath of Brazauskas' departure. Keywords: Brazauskas, presidency, prime ministership, legacy, leadership vacuum ********** A political earthquake shook Lithuania on June 1, 2006, when a long-term political survivor, Algirdas Brazauskas--who served as Lithuania's prime minister from 2001-2006--decided to resign, together with all of his cabinet members. A prime minister's departure, in and of itself a commonplace occurrence in European politics, marked a profound turning point in Lithuania's political life. On the one hand, this event signified the end of what became referred to as the country's political \"patriarch's\" era of rule. On the other hand, analysts both in the country and abroad began pointing to the \"leaderless\" Lithuania phenomenon. Why was so much attention devoted to this single politician and his departure from a political scene in a small country on the Baltic coast? Individual studies of political leaders always tackle challenging questions: \"Why should one care about a particular individual?\" and \"Did he or she really matter as a leader?\" Before these questions are addressed, a quick clarification of terminology is in order. The term leadership, as used in this study, should not be understood as a simple holding of a high office position, but rather as a complex phenomenon that encompasses an important quality--the power to sway others and make people do things that they would not have otherwise done. Individuals in power positions are not only able to exercise leadership, but also to achieve success and leave a profound impact on their surroundings through the skillful exploitation of various opportunities (i.e., unique once-in-a-lifetime situations, redefined institutional structures, stretching of assigned constitutional powers, the political culture, or support by constituents) as well as their own personal skills. Studies of political leadership have shown that every individual leader certainly does not matter in all situations all of the time. For instance, Anthony Mughan's and Samuel Patterson's research suggests that leaders are likely to matter more under extreme political circumstances, such as crises and wars.j Furthermore, Timothy Colton and Robert Tucker, Martin Westlake, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, Archie Brown, and George Breslauer have established that leader","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"4 1","pages":"160-181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85085357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.18.2.148-159
Keiji Sato
The "Commission of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies for the Political and Legal Estimation of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939" (hereafter, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Commission, or MRC) was an important landmark in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pact and the secret protocol attached to it, signed by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on August 23, 1939, drastically redrew the map of Eastern Europe. In 1939 and 1940, the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic countries, Bessarabia, Karelia, and the eastern territories of Poland into its domain. The existence of the secret protocol was a longestablished concern of Baltic intellectuals, although Soviet authorities repeatedly denied its very existence.Perestroika changed the situation. On June 8, 1989, pressed by the Baltic republics, the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies decided to set up the MRC. As Table 1 shows, the MRC included a disproportionately large number of Baltic representatives, who earnestly debated against the MRC majority that continued to hold the traditional view of the pact's exploitation of "contradictions between imperialisms to earn time." On December 24, 1989, having listened to the report submitted by the MRC, the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocol null and void since the time of their signature. This decision facilitated the overwhelming victory of the national democrats of the Baltic republics in the republican Soviet elections held in February-March 1990.Looking at the MRC retrospectively, one would be surprised at the Caliber of its members: Aleksandr Yakovlev (chairman), Yuri Afanas'ev, Georgi Arbatov, and Chingiz Aitomatov as star ideologues of Perestroika; Baltic nationalists or grave diggers of the Soviet Union, such as Vytautas Landsbergis, the future chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Seimas and Edgar Savisaar, the future Estonian prime minister; and Metropolitan Alexy II (Alexy Ridiger), the future patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.What is less known is the role played by the MRC during the beginning of the post-Soviet era in the emergence of secessionist territories that strove to gain international recognition as independent states in their own right. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocol were the legal foundation of Soviet Moldova, which integrated the left and right banks of the Nistru River. During the interwar period, the former Tiraspol Uezd of Kherson Gubernia (in the Russian Empire) had its own autonomy, the Moldovan ASS, as part of Soviet Ukraine; the right bank, Bessarabia, belonged to Romania from 1918 to 1940. On June 23, 1990, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet confirmed the conclusion of the MRC and declared Moldova's sovereignty, identifying the territorial transfer of Romanian Bessarabia to the Soviet Union as illegal from the beginning. Responding to this, the left bank, Transnis
{"title":"The Molotov-Ribbentrop Commission and Claims of Post-Soviet Secessionist Territories to Sovereignty","authors":"Keiji Sato","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.18.2.148-159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.18.2.148-159","url":null,"abstract":"The \"Commission of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies for the Political and Legal Estimation of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939\" (hereafter, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Commission, or MRC) was an important landmark in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pact and the secret protocol attached to it, signed by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on August 23, 1939, drastically redrew the map of Eastern Europe. In 1939 and 1940, the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic countries, Bessarabia, Karelia, and the eastern territories of Poland into its domain. The existence of the secret protocol was a longestablished concern of Baltic intellectuals, although Soviet authorities repeatedly denied its very existence.Perestroika changed the situation. On June 8, 1989, pressed by the Baltic republics, the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies decided to set up the MRC. As Table 1 shows, the MRC included a disproportionately large number of Baltic representatives, who earnestly debated against the MRC majority that continued to hold the traditional view of the pact's exploitation of \"contradictions between imperialisms to earn time.\" On December 24, 1989, having listened to the report submitted by the MRC, the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocol null and void since the time of their signature. This decision facilitated the overwhelming victory of the national democrats of the Baltic republics in the republican Soviet elections held in February-March 1990.Looking at the MRC retrospectively, one would be surprised at the Caliber of its members: Aleksandr Yakovlev (chairman), Yuri Afanas'ev, Georgi Arbatov, and Chingiz Aitomatov as star ideologues of Perestroika; Baltic nationalists or grave diggers of the Soviet Union, such as Vytautas Landsbergis, the future chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Seimas and Edgar Savisaar, the future Estonian prime minister; and Metropolitan Alexy II (Alexy Ridiger), the future patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.What is less known is the role played by the MRC during the beginning of the post-Soviet era in the emergence of secessionist territories that strove to gain international recognition as independent states in their own right. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocol were the legal foundation of Soviet Moldova, which integrated the left and right banks of the Nistru River. During the interwar period, the former Tiraspol Uezd of Kherson Gubernia (in the Russian Empire) had its own autonomy, the Moldovan ASS, as part of Soviet Ukraine; the right bank, Bessarabia, belonged to Romania from 1918 to 1940. On June 23, 1990, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet confirmed the conclusion of the MRC and declared Moldova's sovereignty, identifying the territorial transfer of Romanian Bessarabia to the Soviet Union as illegal from the beginning. Responding to this, the left bank, Transnis","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"103 1","pages":"148-159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75686530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.18.2.101-121
C. Schenk
Abstract: Russia's choice to pursue restrictive immigration policies is counterintuitive, given the acute need for labor migrants. This analysis argues that in response to pervasive xenophobia, the state has embarked on a labor migration policy agenda that does not reflect the demographic reality of Russia's rapidly declining working age population. Institutional and societal manifestations of xenophobia work together to demand and justify restrictive immigration policies. The state provokes and reinforces these nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies and practices such as ethnic profiling and allowing extremist groups to operate with impunity. The literature on migration policy systematically neglects illiberal polities, making this discussion linking the policy input of xenophobia to restrictive policy outputs a unique contribution to the ongoing study of how states respond to immigration. (1) Keywords: demographic crisis, immigration policy, labor migration, nationalism, Russia, xenophobia ********** New migration rules in Russia, enacted on January 15, 2007, are part of an ongoing effort to address the current demographic crisis. In a period of massive population decline, the state has made policy efforts to create balanced immigration by enticing Russian "compatriots" while limiting migrants from the former Soviet countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While CIS citizens are not required to have visas to travel to the Russian Federation, the 2007 legislation introduced a quota system limiting the number of work permits available to these migrants. (2) Quota levels have decreased every year since their institution, shrinking incrementally from 6 million in 2007 to 1.3 million in 2010. Furthermore, in the sector of retail trade (almost exclusively manned by immigrants), foreign workers were banned altogether as of April 2007. Why would Russia, whose population is decreasing by 700,000 per year, institute restrictive immigration policies? (3) In fact, many believe immigration is the only source of population growth in Russia. (4) This article argues that in response to growing xenophobia in society, the state has embarked on a labor migration policy agenda that does not reflect the demographic realities present in Russia. Nationalism and xenophobia have a number of manifestations in both the state and society. The state continually reinforces nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies. These efforts resonate with the public, which passively supports xenophobia, and with nationalist actors who actively promote anti-migrant agendas. Pervasive institutional and societal manifestations of xenophobia work together to both demand and justify restrictive immigration policies. By setting forth the Russian case as an example of a state that uses restrictive policies and nationalist discourse as key components of its immigration strategy, this article contributes to an understanding
{"title":"Open borders, closed minds: Russia's changing migration policies: Liberalization or xenophobia?","authors":"C. Schenk","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.18.2.101-121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.18.2.101-121","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Russia's choice to pursue restrictive immigration policies is counterintuitive, given the acute need for labor migrants. This analysis argues that in response to pervasive xenophobia, the state has embarked on a labor migration policy agenda that does not reflect the demographic reality of Russia's rapidly declining working age population. Institutional and societal manifestations of xenophobia work together to demand and justify restrictive immigration policies. The state provokes and reinforces these nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies and practices such as ethnic profiling and allowing extremist groups to operate with impunity. The literature on migration policy systematically neglects illiberal polities, making this discussion linking the policy input of xenophobia to restrictive policy outputs a unique contribution to the ongoing study of how states respond to immigration. (1) Keywords: demographic crisis, immigration policy, labor migration, nationalism, Russia, xenophobia ********** New migration rules in Russia, enacted on January 15, 2007, are part of an ongoing effort to address the current demographic crisis. In a period of massive population decline, the state has made policy efforts to create balanced immigration by enticing Russian \"compatriots\" while limiting migrants from the former Soviet countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While CIS citizens are not required to have visas to travel to the Russian Federation, the 2007 legislation introduced a quota system limiting the number of work permits available to these migrants. (2) Quota levels have decreased every year since their institution, shrinking incrementally from 6 million in 2007 to 1.3 million in 2010. Furthermore, in the sector of retail trade (almost exclusively manned by immigrants), foreign workers were banned altogether as of April 2007. Why would Russia, whose population is decreasing by 700,000 per year, institute restrictive immigration policies? (3) In fact, many believe immigration is the only source of population growth in Russia. (4) This article argues that in response to growing xenophobia in society, the state has embarked on a labor migration policy agenda that does not reflect the demographic realities present in Russia. Nationalism and xenophobia have a number of manifestations in both the state and society. The state continually reinforces nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies. These efforts resonate with the public, which passively supports xenophobia, and with nationalist actors who actively promote anti-migrant agendas. Pervasive institutional and societal manifestations of xenophobia work together to both demand and justify restrictive immigration policies. By setting forth the Russian case as an example of a state that uses restrictive policies and nationalist discourse as key components of its immigration strategy, this article contributes to an understanding","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"18 1","pages":"101-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80837020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past two decades, human trafficking has become an increasingly serious problem for Russia. Because it has been framed as a manifestation of transnational organized crime, law enforcement has the primary role in making sure that traffickers are found and punished. Russian law enforcement’s perceived failure to effectively prosecute traffickers is often blamed on corruption and their efforts have been criticized by domestic and foreign actors alike. This article explores human trafficking in the context of the criminal justice system as a whole, examining the incentives and disincentives that Russian law enforcement agencies have for enforcing anti-trafficking laws. Analysis reveals that poor performance is not due solely to corruption or disinterest in human trafficking. Structural impediments combined with problems specific to the anti-trafficking law have made it more likely that they will use other parts of the Criminal Code to prosecute traffickers instead of the laws specific to trafficking.
{"title":"Beyond Corruption: An Assessment of Russian Law Enforcement’s Fight Against Human Trafficking","authors":"Lauren A. McCarthy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1462842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1462842","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past two decades, human trafficking has become an increasingly serious problem for Russia. Because it has been framed as a manifestation of transnational organized crime, law enforcement has the primary role in making sure that traffickers are found and punished. Russian law enforcement’s perceived failure to effectively prosecute traffickers is often blamed on corruption and their efforts have been criticized by domestic and foreign actors alike. This article explores human trafficking in the context of the criminal justice system as a whole, examining the incentives and disincentives that Russian law enforcement agencies have for enforcing anti-trafficking laws. Analysis reveals that poor performance is not due solely to corruption or disinterest in human trafficking. Structural impediments combined with problems specific to the anti-trafficking law have made it more likely that they will use other parts of the Criminal Code to prosecute traffickers instead of the laws specific to trafficking.","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"174 1","pages":"5-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76646384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: Much of the debate about the rule of law in democratizing states centers on formal institutional design as the key to building a democratic judiciary. While acknowledging the importance of a good institutional blueprint, I argue that superior institutional rules do not necessarily lead to a healthy judicial culture that enshrines democratic principles and compels actors within the judiciary to take the formal rules seriously. Drawing on nearly 400 original survey and interview responses from judges in Romania and the Czech Republic, this article offers an empirical overview of aggregate-level trends across several key dimensions of judicial culture, including perceptions of judicial independence, attitudes toward corruption in the judiciary, and the professional satisfaction and commitment of judges. The findings of the study not only run counter to the institutionalist thesis that better institutional rules will produce a more democratic judiciary, they suggest an important theoretical linkage between judicial culture and patterns of trust in the self-governing institutions of the judiciary. (1) Keywords: Czech Republic, democratization, judicial culture, Romania, rule of law ********** In both academic and policy circles, the "rule of law" (2) is often treated as a kind of panacea for democratizing states--at once credited with protecting the basic rights and liberties of citizens, providing a key horizontal check on government power, and laying the institutional groundwork for a functioning market economy. (3) In turn, a substantial body of literature has emerged in recent years examining the development of the rule of law in politically transitioning states around the world, including a significant corpus of research focused specifically on the challenges faced by transitioning legal systems in the post-Communist region. One of the clearest themes in this literature is the importance of institutional design in the post-Communist legal reform process. More specifically, reform advocates argue that by crafting institutional rules that encourage judicial independence and protect against political interference in the judiciary, policymakers can stave off corruption and lay the foundations for the democratic rule of law. However, empirical studies of courts in the region tell a different story, indicating that court performance is seldom a direct function of formal institutional powers and protections. Moreover, a large body of social science research suggests that formal legal institutions, like other political and social institutions, are shaped by powerful informal rules and norms that may contradict or undercut the effectiveness of formal procedures and safeguards. Following these insights, the present study explores the role of the judiciary's informal culture in the process of post-Communist legal reform. While acknowledging the importance of a good institutional blueprint, I argue that superior institutional rules do not necessari
{"title":"A Tale of Two Transitions: Exploring the Origins of Post-Communist Judicial Culture in Romania and the Czech Republic","authors":"Daniel J. Beers","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.18.1.28-55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.18.1.28-55","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Much of the debate about the rule of law in democratizing states centers on formal institutional design as the key to building a democratic judiciary. While acknowledging the importance of a good institutional blueprint, I argue that superior institutional rules do not necessarily lead to a healthy judicial culture that enshrines democratic principles and compels actors within the judiciary to take the formal rules seriously. Drawing on nearly 400 original survey and interview responses from judges in Romania and the Czech Republic, this article offers an empirical overview of aggregate-level trends across several key dimensions of judicial culture, including perceptions of judicial independence, attitudes toward corruption in the judiciary, and the professional satisfaction and commitment of judges. The findings of the study not only run counter to the institutionalist thesis that better institutional rules will produce a more democratic judiciary, they suggest an important theoretical linkage between judicial culture and patterns of trust in the self-governing institutions of the judiciary. (1) Keywords: Czech Republic, democratization, judicial culture, Romania, rule of law ********** In both academic and policy circles, the \"rule of law\" (2) is often treated as a kind of panacea for democratizing states--at once credited with protecting the basic rights and liberties of citizens, providing a key horizontal check on government power, and laying the institutional groundwork for a functioning market economy. (3) In turn, a substantial body of literature has emerged in recent years examining the development of the rule of law in politically transitioning states around the world, including a significant corpus of research focused specifically on the challenges faced by transitioning legal systems in the post-Communist region. One of the clearest themes in this literature is the importance of institutional design in the post-Communist legal reform process. More specifically, reform advocates argue that by crafting institutional rules that encourage judicial independence and protect against political interference in the judiciary, policymakers can stave off corruption and lay the foundations for the democratic rule of law. However, empirical studies of courts in the region tell a different story, indicating that court performance is seldom a direct function of formal institutional powers and protections. Moreover, a large body of social science research suggests that formal legal institutions, like other political and social institutions, are shaped by powerful informal rules and norms that may contradict or undercut the effectiveness of formal procedures and safeguards. Following these insights, the present study explores the role of the judiciary's informal culture in the process of post-Communist legal reform. While acknowledging the importance of a good institutional blueprint, I argue that superior institutional rules do not necessari","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"100 1","pages":"28-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89920846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life, Eric Ulsaner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.In his book Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life, Eric Uslaner takes on the task of researching the interception of such fundamental determinants as corruption, inequality, and the rule of law. While inequality and the rule of law are by now well-researched both quantitatively and qualitatively, the issue of corruption remains in many ways terra incognita even for the scholarly community, and more so for professionals and ordinary people. Corruption itself is often a taboo topic in state and international organizations. For reasons based on political correctness and diplomacy, many public figures avoid talking about this inconvenient topic, as do many scholars. Uslaner is obviously not one of those politically correct scholars. He pinpoints the roots of corruption, saying that it rests "upon economic inequality and low trust in people who are different from yourself. Corruption, in its turn, leads to less trust in other people and more inequality" (4).Built around the concept of the inequality trap, the book takes us through the definitions and conceptualizations of corruption, theoretical frameworks, aggregate cross-national tests of the inequality trap thesis, and corruption in former Communist countries, as well as suggestions on how to eliminate corruption. Cases of countries successful in curbing corruption, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, are also addressed in this study. To the author's credit, he uses examples of malfeasance in the United States as well. Measurements of corruption that remain a constant challenge for any researcher are taken into account.Traditionally-to the extent that the field of corruption may fit the definition of traditional- political science writings on corruption remain largely built around specific cases. Uslaner clearly breaks this tradition, and does it exceptionally well. One cannot help but be impressed by the scope of quantitative econometric analysis presented, both within the text and in the appendices. This is rather unusual for a political science book, especially one focused on such a "data scarce" problem as corruption. Even though some proxies used in the regression analysis may be interpreted as quite liberal approximations, the presence of such analysis is a clear and bold merit of the book. Indeed, it makes it an unparalleled source of information to which a graduate student or a scholar may turn not just for excellent analytical points, but for the results of data analysis as well.Uslaner points continuously to the merits and virtues of universal education, including in the task of reducing corruption. …
{"title":"Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life","authors":"Ararat L. Osipian","doi":"10.5860/choice.46-3495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.46-3495","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life, Eric Ulsaner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.In his book Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life, Eric Uslaner takes on the task of researching the interception of such fundamental determinants as corruption, inequality, and the rule of law. While inequality and the rule of law are by now well-researched both quantitatively and qualitatively, the issue of corruption remains in many ways terra incognita even for the scholarly community, and more so for professionals and ordinary people. Corruption itself is often a taboo topic in state and international organizations. For reasons based on political correctness and diplomacy, many public figures avoid talking about this inconvenient topic, as do many scholars. Uslaner is obviously not one of those politically correct scholars. He pinpoints the roots of corruption, saying that it rests \"upon economic inequality and low trust in people who are different from yourself. Corruption, in its turn, leads to less trust in other people and more inequality\" (4).Built around the concept of the inequality trap, the book takes us through the definitions and conceptualizations of corruption, theoretical frameworks, aggregate cross-national tests of the inequality trap thesis, and corruption in former Communist countries, as well as suggestions on how to eliminate corruption. Cases of countries successful in curbing corruption, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, are also addressed in this study. To the author's credit, he uses examples of malfeasance in the United States as well. Measurements of corruption that remain a constant challenge for any researcher are taken into account.Traditionally-to the extent that the field of corruption may fit the definition of traditional- political science writings on corruption remain largely built around specific cases. Uslaner clearly breaks this tradition, and does it exceptionally well. One cannot help but be impressed by the scope of quantitative econometric analysis presented, both within the text and in the appendices. This is rather unusual for a political science book, especially one focused on such a \"data scarce\" problem as corruption. Even though some proxies used in the regression analysis may be interpreted as quite liberal approximations, the presence of such analysis is a clear and bold merit of the book. Indeed, it makes it an unparalleled source of information to which a graduate student or a scholar may turn not just for excellent analytical points, but for the results of data analysis as well.Uslaner points continuously to the merits and virtues of universal education, including in the task of reducing corruption. …","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"5 1","pages":"94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88051802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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