Bias in Open Peer-Review: Evidence from the English Superior Courts

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2015-08-01 DOI:10.1093/JLEO/EWV004
Jordi Blanes i Vidal, C. Leaver
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

This paper explores possible biases in open peer-review using data from the English superior courts. Exploiting the random timing of on-the-job interaction between reviewers and reviewees, we find evidence that reviewers are reluctant to reverse the judgments of reviewees with whom they are about to interact, and that this effect is stronger when reviewer and reviewee share the same rank. The average bias is substantial: the proportion of reviewer affirmances is 30% points higher in the group where reviewers know they will soon work with their reviewee, relative to groups where such interaction is absent. Our results suggest reforms for the judicial listing process, and caution against recent trends in performance appraisal techniques and scientific publishing. (JEL A12, C21, K40, Z13)
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公开同行评议中的偏见:来自英国高等法院的证据
本文利用英国高等法院的数据探讨了公开同行评议中可能存在的偏见。利用审稿人和被审稿人之间在职互动的随机时间,我们发现审稿人不愿意改变审稿人对他们即将与之互动的人的判断,并且当审稿人和被审稿人拥有相同的级别时,这种影响更强。平均偏差是相当大的:在评审者知道他们将很快与他们的评审者合作的小组中,评审者肯定的比例比没有这种互动的小组高30%。我们的研究结果建议对司法上市程序进行改革,并对绩效评估技术和科学出版的最新趋势提出警告。(凝胶a12, c21, k40, z13)
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CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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