{"title":"Rent-seeking Practices in the Housing Development Approval Process","authors":"Abdul-Rashid Abdul-Aziz, Suhaila Ali","doi":"10.21315/km2021.39.2.2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The lengthy, uncertain and onerous planning approval process in various countries\naround the world has prompted frustrated housing developers to seek influence by\npaying off approving officials. A research was conducted in Malaysia to investigate\nin greater detail this rent-seeking phenomenon by asking six fundamental\nquestions. Rich data were obtained by interviewing 22 housing developers and\nconsultants who work for them. Developers engage in rent-seeking behaviours to\novercome genuine and artificial hurdles when applying for development approval.\nAll approving agencies, though not all their staff, reciprocate to such behaviours.\nThe monetary value of the payoffs depend on the rank of the public actor and\nproject features. The higher the office holder is, the larger is the expected pay-off.\nBig and complex development projects in urban centres have a higher pay-off tag.\nLow value items television sets and car repairs serve to support normal lifestyle\nwhereas high value items such as golfing and holiday trips support lavish lifestyle.\nEstablishing good rapport is a prerequisite to the rent seeking and giving exchange.\nElements which help foster reciprocity by state actors to housing developers’ rentseeking behaviours include low civil servant salary and high living cost, and weak\npunitive action. Common ethnicity facilitates nuanced communication by the latter,\nbut common religion may dampen the former’s enthusiasm to accept any payoffs. Eventually house buyers and the general public are the casualties by virtue of\nhigher house prices and substandard infrastructure. Given the combination of\ninherent features of the planning system and certain elements that impinge on state\nactors both of which promote rent-seeking practices, a realistic law enforcement\nsolution is to prioritise illicit market-state exchanges involving grossly distorting\nrent extraction and pecuniary rewards of significant magnitude rather than total\neradication of the practice.","PeriodicalId":43145,"journal":{"name":"Kajian Malaysia","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kajian Malaysia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21315/km2021.39.2.2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The lengthy, uncertain and onerous planning approval process in various countries
around the world has prompted frustrated housing developers to seek influence by
paying off approving officials. A research was conducted in Malaysia to investigate
in greater detail this rent-seeking phenomenon by asking six fundamental
questions. Rich data were obtained by interviewing 22 housing developers and
consultants who work for them. Developers engage in rent-seeking behaviours to
overcome genuine and artificial hurdles when applying for development approval.
All approving agencies, though not all their staff, reciprocate to such behaviours.
The monetary value of the payoffs depend on the rank of the public actor and
project features. The higher the office holder is, the larger is the expected pay-off.
Big and complex development projects in urban centres have a higher pay-off tag.
Low value items television sets and car repairs serve to support normal lifestyle
whereas high value items such as golfing and holiday trips support lavish lifestyle.
Establishing good rapport is a prerequisite to the rent seeking and giving exchange.
Elements which help foster reciprocity by state actors to housing developers’ rentseeking behaviours include low civil servant salary and high living cost, and weak
punitive action. Common ethnicity facilitates nuanced communication by the latter,
but common religion may dampen the former’s enthusiasm to accept any payoffs. Eventually house buyers and the general public are the casualties by virtue of
higher house prices and substandard infrastructure. Given the combination of
inherent features of the planning system and certain elements that impinge on state
actors both of which promote rent-seeking practices, a realistic law enforcement
solution is to prioritise illicit market-state exchanges involving grossly distorting
rent extraction and pecuniary rewards of significant magnitude rather than total
eradication of the practice.