Comment Letter on Fincen's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Anti-Money Laundering Program Effectiveness

Benjamin Edwards, James Fallows Tierney
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Abstract

We submitted these comments in response to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's advance notice of proposed rulemaking on the definition of an "effective and reasonably designed" anti-money laundering program applicable broadly to financial institutions. Our comments highlight industry-specific obligations of brokers and dealers in securities to have reasonably designed anti-money-laundering programs.

We argue that in undertaking future rulemaking, FinCEN should account for industry-specific statutory requirements, and how these bear on regulators’ experiences implementing AML program obligations analogous to those the advance notice of proposed rulemaking contemplates. Regulators’ experience enforcing compliance with FINRA's informal guidance under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for instance, raises questions about whether FinCEN’s proposals to elaborate on AML obligations through periodic guidance would impose obligations enforceable at all. In particular, FinCEN should carefully consider whether essential enforcement regimes will require additional rulemaking because simply issuing official guidance may not create fully enforceable obligations in all regulatory frameworks. For self-regulatory organizations overseen by the SEC, guidance alone may not suffice to create an enforceable obligation. In instances where the SEC reviews SRO enforcement actions, it considers whether conduct violated the SRO's “rules,” meaning rules approved by the SEC. As explained in greater detail below, official guidance may not meet this standard, creating doubt, enforcement challenges, and likely inhibiting FinCEN’s compliance objectives.
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关于金融监管局关于反洗钱项目有效性建议规则制定的预先通知意见书
我们提交这些评论是为了回应金融犯罪执法网络(Financial Crimes Enforcement Network)关于“有效且设计合理”的反洗钱计划的定义的拟议规则制定通知,该计划广泛适用于金融机构。我们的意见强调了证券经纪人和交易商在合理设计反洗钱程序方面的行业特定义务。我们认为,在进行未来的规则制定时,FinCEN应考虑到行业特定的法定要求,以及这些要求如何影响监管机构实施“反洗钱”计划义务的经验,类似于拟议规则制定的预先通知所考虑的那些。例如,监管机构根据1934年《证券交易法》(Securities Exchange Act of 1934)强制遵守FINRA非正式指导的经验,引发了人们的疑问,即FinCEN通过定期指导详细阐述“反洗钱”义务的提议是否会强制执行义务。特别是,FinCEN应仔细考虑必要的执法制度是否需要额外的规则制定,因为仅仅发布官方指导可能无法在所有监管框架中产生完全可执行的义务。对于受SEC监管的自律组织来说,仅凭指导可能不足以形成可执行的义务。在美国证券交易委员会审查SRO执法行动的情况下,它会考虑行为是否违反了SRO的“规则”,即美国证券交易委员会批准的规则。正如下面更详细地解释的那样,官方指导可能不符合这一标准,从而产生疑问,执法挑战,并可能阻碍FinCEN的合规目标。
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