Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions

E. Baldwin, P. Goldberg, P. Klemperer, Edwin Lock
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions: it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction’s bidding language to truthfully express their strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary number of goods, each of which is available in multiple discrete units. Our use of the bidding language and the information it provides contrasts with existing algorithms that rely on access to a valuation or demand oracle. We compute market-clearing prices using algorithms that apply existing submodular minimization methods. Allocating the supply among the bidders at these prices then requires solving a novel constrained matching problem. Our algorithm iteratively simplifies the allocation problem, perturbing bids and prices in a way that resolves tie-breaking choices created by bids that can be accepted on more than one good. We provide practical running time bounds on both price finding and allocation and illustrate experimentally that our allocation mechanism is practical. Funding: E. Baldwin and P. Klemperer were supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [Grant ES/L003058/1]. P. W. Goldberg and E. Lock were supported by a JP Morgan faculty fellowship during the work on the final version of the paper. Supplemental Material: The online companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0248 .
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解决强替代产品组合拍卖问题
本文开发了解决强替代产品组合拍卖的算法:它为使用该拍卖的竞标语言来真实表达其对任意数量商品的强替代偏好的代理找到竞争性均衡价格和数量,每个商品都有多个离散单元。我们使用的投标语言及其提供的信息与现有的依赖于估价或需求预测的算法形成了对比。我们使用应用现有的次模块化最小化方法的算法来计算市场出清价格。以这些价格在竞标者之间分配供应需要解决一个新的约束匹配问题。我们的算法迭代地简化了分配问题,以一种可以接受多个商品的出价所产生的决胜选择的方式来干扰出价和价格。我们提供了价格发现和分配的实际运行时间限制,并通过实验说明我们的分配机制是可行的。资助:E. Baldwin和P. Klemperer由经济和社会研究委员会资助[Grant ES/L003058/1]。p·w·戈德堡和e·洛克在完成论文最终版本的过程中得到了摩根大通教师奖学金的支持。补充材料:在线伴侣可在https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0248上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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