Central Bank Money: Liability, Asset, or Equity of the Nation?

Michael Kumhof, J. Allen, Will Bateman, R. Lastra, Simon Gleeson, S. Omarova
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

Based on legal arguments, we advocate a conceptual and normative shift in our understanding of the economic character of central bank money (CBM). The widespread treatment of CBM as a central bank liability goes back to the gold standard, and uses analogies with commercial bank balance sheets. However, CBM is sui generis and legally not comparable to commercial bank money. Furthermore, in modern economies, CBM holders cannot demand repayment of CBM in anything other than CBM. CBM is not an asset of central banks either, and it is not central bank shareholder equity because it does not confer the same ownership rights as regular shareholder equity. Based on comparisons across a number of legal characteristics of financial instruments, we suggest that an appropriate characterization of CBM is as ‘social equity’ that confers rights of participation in the economy’s payment system and thereby its economy. This interpretation is important for macroeconomic policy in light of quantitative easing and potential future issuance of central bank digital currency (CBDC). It suggests that in robust economies with credible monetary institutions, and where demand for CBM is sufficiently and sustainably high, large-scale issuance such as under CBDC is not inflationary, and it does not weaken public sector finances.
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中央银行货币:负债、资产还是国家权益?
基于法律论据,我们主张在我们对中央银行货币(CBM)的经济特征的理解上进行概念和规范的转变。将CBM视为央行负债的普遍做法可以追溯到金本位,并将其与商业银行的资产负债表进行类比。然而,CBM是自成一体的,在法律上不能与商业银行的货币相提并论。此外,在现代经济中,CBM持有者不能要求以CBM以外的任何形式偿还CBM。CBM也不是央行的资产,也不是央行的股东权益,因为它不赋予与普通股东权益相同的所有权。基于对金融工具的许多法律特征的比较,我们认为CBM的适当特征是“社会公平”,它赋予了参与经济支付系统的权利,从而赋予了经济的权利。鉴于量化宽松和未来可能发行的央行数字货币(CBDC),这种解释对宏观经济政策很重要。它表明,在拥有可靠货币机构的强劲经济体中,以及对CBM的需求足够高且持续高的地方,CBDC等大规模发行不会导致通胀,也不会削弱公共部门的财政。
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