Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1016/J.JFINECO.2021.04.039
Tobias Berg, Markus Reisinger, D. Streitz
{"title":"Spillover Effects in Empirical Corporate Finance","authors":"Tobias Berg, Markus Reisinger, D. Streitz","doi":"10.1016/J.JFINECO.2021.04.039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JFINECO.2021.04.039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84547397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Kumhof, J. Allen, Will Bateman, R. Lastra, Simon Gleeson, S. Omarova
Based on legal arguments, we advocate a conceptual and normative shift in our understanding of the economic character of central bank money (CBM). The widespread treatment of CBM as a central bank liability goes back to the gold standard, and uses analogies with commercial bank balance sheets. However, CBM is sui generis and legally not comparable to commercial bank money. Furthermore, in modern economies, CBM holders cannot demand repayment of CBM in anything other than CBM. CBM is not an asset of central banks either, and it is not central bank shareholder equity because it does not confer the same ownership rights as regular shareholder equity. Based on comparisons across a number of legal characteristics of financial instruments, we suggest that an appropriate characterization of CBM is as ‘social equity’ that confers rights of participation in the economy’s payment system and thereby its economy. This interpretation is important for macroeconomic policy in light of quantitative easing and potential future issuance of central bank digital currency (CBDC). It suggests that in robust economies with credible monetary institutions, and where demand for CBM is sufficiently and sustainably high, large-scale issuance such as under CBDC is not inflationary, and it does not weaken public sector finances.
{"title":"Central Bank Money: Liability, Asset, or Equity of the Nation?","authors":"Michael Kumhof, J. Allen, Will Bateman, R. Lastra, Simon Gleeson, S. Omarova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3730608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730608","url":null,"abstract":"Based on legal arguments, we advocate a conceptual and normative shift in our understanding of the economic character of central bank money (CBM). The widespread treatment of CBM as a central bank liability goes back to the gold standard, and uses analogies with commercial bank balance sheets. However, CBM is sui generis and legally not comparable to commercial bank money. Furthermore, in modern economies, CBM holders cannot demand repayment of CBM in anything other than CBM. CBM is not an asset of central banks either, and it is not central bank shareholder equity because it does not confer the same ownership rights as regular shareholder equity. Based on comparisons across a number of legal characteristics of financial instruments, we suggest that an appropriate characterization of CBM is as ‘social equity’ that confers rights of participation in the economy’s payment system and thereby its economy. This interpretation is important for macroeconomic policy in light of quantitative easing and potential future issuance of central bank digital currency (CBDC). It suggests that in robust economies with credible monetary institutions, and where demand for CBM is sufficiently and sustainably high, large-scale issuance such as under CBDC is not inflationary, and it does not weaken public sector finances.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91496243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that risk mitigating incentives dominate risk shifting incentives in fragile banks. Risk shifting could be particularly severe in banking since it is the most opaque industry and banks are one of the most leveraged corporations with very low skin in the game. To analyze this question, we exploit security trading by banks during financial crises, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. However, in contrast with the risk shifting hypothesis, we find that less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial market stress shocks. We show this using the supervisory ISIN-bank-month level dataset from Italy with all securities for each bank. Our results are over and above capital regulation as we show lower reach-for-yield effects by less capitalized banks within government bonds (with zero risk weights) or within securities with the same rating and maturity in the same month (which determines regulatory capital). Effects are robust to controlling for the covariance with the existence portfolio, and less capitalized banks, if anything, reduce concentration risk. Further, effects are stronger when uncertainty is higher, despite that risk shifting motives may be then higher. Moreover, three separate tests – based on different accounting portfolios (trading book versus held to maturity), the distribution of capital and franchise value – suggest that bank own incentives, instead of supervision, are the main drivers. Results are confirmed if we consider other sources of balance sheet fragility and different measures of risk-taking. Finally, evidence from the recent COVID-19 shock corroborates findings from the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis.
{"title":"Risk Mitigating Versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises","authors":"J. Peydró, Andrea Polo, Enrico Sette","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3732831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732831","url":null,"abstract":"We show that risk mitigating incentives dominate risk shifting incentives in fragile banks. Risk shifting could be particularly severe in banking since it is the most opaque industry and banks are one of the most leveraged corporations with very low skin in the game. To analyze this question, we exploit security trading by banks during financial crises, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. However, in contrast with the risk shifting hypothesis, we find that less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial market stress shocks. We show this using the supervisory ISIN-bank-month level dataset from Italy with all securities for each bank. Our results are over and above capital regulation as we show lower reach-for-yield effects by less capitalized banks within government bonds (with zero risk weights) or within securities with the same rating and maturity in the same month (which determines regulatory capital). Effects are robust to controlling for the covariance with the existence portfolio, and less capitalized banks, if anything, reduce concentration risk. Further, effects are stronger when uncertainty is higher, despite that risk shifting motives may be then higher. Moreover, three separate tests – based on different accounting portfolios (trading book versus held to maturity), the distribution of capital and franchise value – suggest that bank own incentives, instead of supervision, are the main drivers. Results are confirmed if we consider other sources of balance sheet fragility and different measures of risk-taking. Finally, evidence from the recent COVID-19 shock corroborates findings from the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73390730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513552491.001
P. Hoffmann, L. Laeven, Lev Ratnovski
We study the effects of technological change on financial intermediation, distinguishing between innovations in information (data collection and processing) and communication (relationships and distribution). Both follow historic trends towards an increased use of hard information and less in-person interaction, which are accelerating rapidly. We point to more recent innovations, such as the combination of data abundance and artificial intelligence, and the rise of digital platforms. We argue that in particular the rise of new communication channels can lead to the vertical and horizontal disintegration of the traditional bank business model. Specialized providers of financial services can chip away activities that do not rely on access to balance sheets, while platforms can interject themselves between banks and customers. We discuss limitations to these challenges, and the resulting policy implications.
{"title":"Financial Intermediation and Technology: What's Old, What's New?","authors":"P. Hoffmann, L. Laeven, Lev Ratnovski","doi":"10.5089/9781513552491.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513552491.001","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects of technological change on financial intermediation, distinguishing between innovations in information (data collection and processing) and communication (relationships and distribution). Both follow historic trends towards an increased use of hard information and less in-person interaction, which are accelerating rapidly. We point to more recent innovations, such as the combination of data abundance and artificial intelligence, and the rise of digital platforms. We argue that in particular the rise of new communication channels can lead to the vertical and horizontal disintegration of the traditional bank business model. Specialized providers of financial services can chip away activities that do not rely on access to balance sheets, while platforms can interject themselves between banks and customers. We discuss limitations to these challenges, and the resulting policy implications.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80446337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that intensified competition changes the location of business activity and, in turn, affects supply chain relationships. Using establishment-level data, we find that, when upstream product markets become more competitive, suppliers are more likely to relocate their establishments closer to customers. Following the supplier’s relocation, its sales to the customer increase, its relationship with the customer is less likely to be terminated, and its innovation is more aligned with the customer’s innovation. The relocated supplier also experiences more analyst following and institutional ownership that are in common with the customer and is more likely to issue equity than debt. However, the improved relationship, by causing the supplier to engage more in innovation dedicated to the customer, adversely affects creative innovation, which is known to drive growth. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
{"title":"Product Market Competition and the Relocation of Economic Activity: Evidence from the Supply Chain","authors":"Chen Chen, S. Dasgupta, Thanh D. Huynh, Ying Xia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652190","url":null,"abstract":"We show that intensified competition changes the location of business activity and, in turn, affects supply chain relationships. Using establishment-level data, we find that, when upstream product markets become more competitive, suppliers are more likely to relocate their establishments closer to customers. Following the supplier’s relocation, its sales to the customer increase, its relationship with the customer is less likely to be terminated, and its innovation is more aligned with the customer’s innovation. The relocated supplier also experiences more analyst following and institutional ownership that are in common with the customer and is more likely to issue equity than debt. However, the improved relationship, by causing the supplier to engage more in innovation dedicated to the customer, adversely affects creative innovation, which is known to drive growth. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77339403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-01DOI: 10.1108/s0731-90532021000043b012
Dante Amengual, Enrique Sentana, Zhanyuan Tian
We study the statistical properties of Pearson correlation coefficients of Gaussian ranks, and Gaussian rank regressions -- OLS applied to those ranks. We show that these procedures are fully efficient when the true copula is Gaussian and the margins are non-parametrically estimated, and remain consistent for their population analogues otherwise. We compare them to Spearman and Pearson correlations and their regression counterparts theoretically and in extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Empirical applications to migration and growth across US states, the augmented Solow growth model, and momentum and reversal effects in individual stock returns confirm that Gaussian rank procedures are insensitive to outliers.
{"title":"Gaussian Rank Correlation and Regression","authors":"Dante Amengual, Enrique Sentana, Zhanyuan Tian","doi":"10.1108/s0731-90532021000043b012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0731-90532021000043b012","url":null,"abstract":"We study the statistical properties of Pearson correlation coefficients of Gaussian ranks, and Gaussian rank regressions -- OLS applied to those ranks. We show that these procedures are fully efficient when the true copula is Gaussian and the margins are non-parametrically estimated, and remain consistent for their population analogues otherwise. We compare them to Spearman and Pearson correlations and their regression counterparts theoretically and in extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Empirical applications to migration and growth across US states, the augmented Solow growth model, and momentum and reversal effects in individual stock returns confirm that Gaussian rank procedures are insensitive to outliers.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80063321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A major puzzle in financial contracting is consumers' aversion to adjustable rates. In the mortgage market, the empirical mix of contracts (80% fixed-rate) is inconsistent with standard life-cycle consumption models. We argue that these choices reflect the longlasting effect of the Great Inflation, and have sizable welfare implications. First, we show that consumers who have experienced higher inflation expect higher future interest-rate increases, which explains their preference for fixed-rate financing. Next, we quantify the influence of personal inflation experiences on mortgage financing using linked data from the Census Bureau's Residential Finance Survey. We estimate a discrete-choice model over mortgage financing alternatives. The structural parameters indicate that one additional percentage point of experienced inflation increases a borrower's willingness to pay for a fixed-rate mortgage by 6 to 14 basis points, compared to the adjustable-rate alternative in a given origination year. This experience effect has a major impact on the product mix of FRMs versus ARMs: Nearly one in seven households would switch to an ARM if not for the longlasting effect of personal inflation experiences. Our simulations suggest that households who would otherwise have switched pay $8,000-$16,000 in year-2000, after-tax dollars for the embedded inflation protection of the FRM.
{"title":"The Long Shadows of the Great Inflation: Evidence from Residential Mortgages","authors":"M. Botsch, Ulrike Malmendier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3888762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888762","url":null,"abstract":"A major puzzle in financial contracting is consumers' aversion to adjustable rates. In the mortgage market, the empirical mix of contracts (80% fixed-rate) is inconsistent with standard life-cycle consumption models. We argue that these choices reflect the longlasting effect of the Great Inflation, and have sizable welfare implications. First, we show that consumers who have experienced higher inflation expect higher future interest-rate increases, which explains their preference for fixed-rate financing. Next, we quantify the influence of personal inflation experiences on mortgage financing using linked data from the Census Bureau's Residential Finance Survey. We estimate a discrete-choice model over mortgage financing alternatives. The structural parameters indicate that one additional percentage point of experienced inflation increases a borrower's willingness to pay for a fixed-rate mortgage by 6 to 14 basis points, compared to the adjustable-rate alternative in a given origination year. This experience effect has a major impact on the product mix of FRMs versus ARMs: Nearly one in seven households would switch to an ARM if not for the longlasting effect of personal inflation experiences. Our simulations suggest that households who would otherwise have switched pay $8,000-$16,000 in year-2000, after-tax dollars for the embedded inflation protection of the FRM.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78875073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) slashed corporations’ median effective tax rates from 31.7% to 20.8%. Nevertheless, 15% of firms experienced an increase. One fifth of firms recorded nonrecurring tax costs or benefits exceeding 3% of total assets. Proxies that existing studies employ to assess the TCJA’s impacts account for just half of actual impacts. Stock prices impounded those proxies during the legislative process. Total impacts were impounded the following year, once firms published their financials. These results indicate that investors find it hard to predict even large and immediate changes to company cash flows due to unfamiliar events.
{"title":"The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Which Firms Won? Which Lost?","authors":"A. Wagner, R. Zeckhauser, Alexandre Ziegler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3629722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3629722","url":null,"abstract":"The Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) slashed corporations’ median effective tax rates from 31.7% to 20.8%. Nevertheless, 15% of firms experienced an increase. One fifth of firms recorded nonrecurring tax costs or benefits exceeding 3% of total assets. Proxies that existing studies employ to assess the TCJA’s impacts account for just half of actual impacts. Stock prices impounded those proxies during the legislative process. Total impacts were impounded the following year, once firms published their financials. These results indicate that investors find it hard to predict even large and immediate changes to company cash flows due to unfamiliar events.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81061459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well-known that luck increases the compensation of CEOs at their current firm. In this paper, we explore how luck affects CEOs' outside options in the labor market, and the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results show that luck at their current firm makes CEOs move to a new firm and be appointed as both CEO and chairman. Lucky CEOs tend to match with firms subject to low analyst coverage and operating in less competitive industries. Moreover, lucky CEOs are able to obtain a higher pay at the new firm (both in absolute terms and compared to new industry peers). Finally, difference-in-differences results show that hiring lucky CEOs hurts firm performance, mostly due to a surge in operating costs and a poorer usage of corporate assets.
{"title":"The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOS","authors":"M. Amore, Sebastian Schwenen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613544","url":null,"abstract":"It is well-known that luck increases the compensation of CEOs at their current firm. In this paper, we explore how luck affects CEOs' outside options in the labor market, and the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results show that luck at their current firm makes CEOs move to a new firm and be appointed as both CEO and chairman. Lucky CEOs tend to match with firms subject to low analyst coverage and operating in less competitive industries. Moreover, lucky CEOs are able to obtain a higher pay at the new firm (both in absolute terms and compared to new industry peers). Finally, difference-in-differences results show that hiring lucky CEOs hurts firm performance, mostly due to a surge in operating costs and a poorer usage of corporate assets.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77353291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Braggion, A. Manconi, Nicola Pavanini, Haikun Zhu
We study the welfare effects of the transition of online debt crowdfunding from the older "peer-to-peer" model to the "marketplace" model, where the crowdfunding platform sells diversified loan portfolios to investor. We develop an equilibrium model of debt crowdfunding capturing platform design (peer-to-peer or marketplace) and lender preferences over loan and portfolio product characteristics, and we estimate it on a novel database on credit at a large online platform based in China. Moving from the peer-to-peer to the marketplace model raises lender surplus, platform profits, and credit provision. At the same time, reducing lender exposure to liquidity risk can be beneficial. A counterfactual scenario where the platform resembles a bank by bearing liquidity risk has similar welfare properties as the marketplace model when liquidity is high, but results in larger lender surplus and credit provision, and only moderately lower platform profits, when liquidity is low.
{"title":"The Value of \"New\" and \"Old\" Intermediation in Online Debt Crowdfunding","authors":"F. Braggion, A. Manconi, Nicola Pavanini, Haikun Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3557942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557942","url":null,"abstract":"We study the welfare effects of the transition of online debt crowdfunding from the older \"peer-to-peer\" model to the \"marketplace\" model, where the crowdfunding platform sells diversified loan portfolios to investor. We develop an equilibrium model of debt crowdfunding capturing platform design (peer-to-peer or marketplace) and lender preferences over loan and portfolio product characteristics, and we estimate it on a novel database on credit at a large online platform based in China. Moving from the peer-to-peer to the marketplace model raises lender surplus, platform profits, and credit provision. At the same time, reducing lender exposure to liquidity risk can be beneficial. A counterfactual scenario where the platform resembles a bank by bearing liquidity risk has similar welfare properties as the marketplace model when liquidity is high, but results in larger lender surplus and credit provision, and only moderately lower platform profits, when liquidity is low.","PeriodicalId":9906,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Financial Economics (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83143212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：