Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2007-01-30 DOI:10.1353/epi.0.0005
R. Kukla
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

Epistemologists generally think that genuine warrant that is available to anyone must be available to everyone who is exposed to the relevant causal inputs and is able and willing to properly exercise her rationality. The motivating idea behind this requirement is roughly that an objective view is one that is not bound to a particular perspective. In this paper I ask whether the aperspectivality of our warrants is a precondition for securing the objectivity of our claims. I draw upon a Sellarsian account of perception in order to argue that it is not; rather, inquirers can have contingent properties and perspectives that give them access to forms of rational warrant and objective knowledge that others do not have. The universal accessibility of reasons, on my account, is not a precondition for the legitimacy of any actual warrant, but rather a regulative ideal governing inquiry and communication.
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经验知识中的客观性与视角
认识论家通常认为,任何人都能得到的真正的保证,必须对每一个接触到相关因果输入的人都能得到,并且能够并且愿意适当地运用自己的理性。Â这一要求背后的激励思想大致是,客观观点是不受特定观点约束的观点。Â在本文中,我问我们的认股权证的洞察力是否是确保我们的要求的客观性的先决条件。Â我引用了塞拉斯对知觉的描述,以证明它不是;相反,询问者可以有偶然的属性和视角,使他们能够获得其他人没有的理性保证和客观知识。在我看来,理由的普遍可及性并不是任何实际搜查令合法性的先决条件,而是一种管理调查和沟通的规范理想。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
11.80%
发文量
48
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