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The Value of Risk in Transformative Experience 变革经验中的风险价值
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.53
Petronella Randell
Abstract Risk is inherent to many, if not all, transformative decisions. The risk of regret, of turning into a person you presently consider to be morally objectionable, or of value change are all risks of choosing to transform. This aspect of transformative decision-making has thus far been ignored, but carries important consequences to those wishing to defend decision theory from the challenge posed by transformative decision-making. I contend that a problem lies in a common method used to cardinalise utilities – the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) method – which measures an agent's utility function over sure outcomes. I argue that the risks involved in transformative experiences are constitutively valuable, and hence their value cannot be accurately measured by the vNM method. In Section 1, I outline what transformative experiences are and the problem they pose to decision theory. In Section 2, I outline Pettigrew's (2019, Choosing for Changing Selves ) decision-theoretic response, and in Section 3, I present the case for thinking that risks can carry value. In Section 4, I argue for the claim that at least some transformative experiences involve constitutive risk. I argue that this causes a problem for decision-theoretic responses within the vNM framework in Section 5.
风险是许多(如果不是全部的话)变革决策所固有的。后悔的风险,变成一个你现在认为在道德上令人反感的人的风险,或者价值观改变的风险,都是选择转变的风险。变革性决策的这一方面迄今为止一直被忽视,但对于那些希望捍卫决策理论免受变革性决策挑战的人来说,它具有重要的后果。我认为,问题在于一种用于对效用进行基数化的常用方法——冯·诺伊曼和摩根斯特恩(vNM)方法——它衡量的是智能体在确定结果上的效用函数。我认为,涉及变革经验的风险在本质上是有价值的,因此它们的价值不能用vNM方法精确地衡量。在第1节中,我概述了什么是变革经验,以及它们给决策理论带来的问题。在第2节中,我概述了Pettigrew(2019年,选择改变自我)的决策理论反应,在第3节中,我提出了认为风险可以带来价值的案例。在第4节中,我论证了至少一些变革经历涉及构成风险的说法。我认为这会导致第5节中vNM框架中的决策理论响应问题。
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引用次数: 0
The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism 认识论分离主义的获取难题
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.51
Paweł Grad
Abstract In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p ) just by having E and/or reflecting on E . This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology.
在本文中,我确定了认识论分离主义(ED)获取的难题:鉴于感知经验E对其自身的认知属性是不透明的,主体S不可能仅仅通过拥有E和/或反思E来知道认知命题(I)(即E对经验命题p是有效的)。即使(i)为真,情况也是如此。我首先提出了获取的难题(第2节),然后重构和分析了三种方法,在这些方法中,edist论证了感知经验的活动特征的内部可获取性。这些论点从感知能力和理性能力的统一(第3节)、偏好支持(第4节)和自我认知的外向型模型(第5节)的角度解释了内部访问。我的结论(第6节)是,这些反应都不起作用。然后,我建议如何修改ED,使其成为一种可接近的内在主义认识论。
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引用次数: 0
In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics 为美学的认识原则辩护
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.50
Andrea Sauchelli
Abstract Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are mistaken and that, when properly qualified, the acquaintance principle (in some of its versions) is not threatened by their examples and arguments.
要对一个物体或审美属性做出适当的审美判断,需要对该物体或属性有第一手的体验。许多人认为这一原则是美学认识论中有效的认识论规范。然而,最近一些哲学家认为,某些概念艺术作品和其他反例反驳了所讨论的原则,即使是适当的修改。在本文中,我认为这些哲学家是错误的,并且,当适当地限定时,认识原则(在其某些版本中)不会受到他们的例子和论点的威胁。
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引用次数: 0
Evidentialism, Judgment, and Suspension: Meeting Sosa's Challenges 证据主义、判断与中止:迎接索萨的挑战
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.48
Kevin McCain
Abstract Ernest Sosa has recently presented three challenges for evidentialism. The challenges concern what is required for epistemically justified judging and suspending of judgment. The aim of this article is to respond to these challenges on behalf of the evidentialist. Importantly, responding to Sosa's challenges requires giving substance to the idea of appreciating what one's evidence supports. This idea has been mentioned by prominent evidentialists but not given adequate development. Hence, this article marks a significant move forward in the understanding of evidentialism as well as a defense of the theory from Sosa's prima facie serious objections.
欧内斯特·索萨最近对证据主义提出了三个挑战。这些挑战涉及到认识论上合理的判断和暂停判断所需要的东西。本文的目的是代表证据主义者回应这些挑战。重要的是,要回应索萨的挑战,就需要让“欣赏证据所支持的东西”这一理念具体化。这一观点已被著名的证据主义者提及,但没有得到充分的发展。因此,这篇文章标志着对证据主义的理解向前迈出了重要一步,也标志着对索萨的初步反对意见的辩护。
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引用次数: 0
The Rationality of COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy COVID-19疫苗犹豫的合理性
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.47
Joshua Kelsall
Abstract Some vaccine-hesitant people lack epistemic trust in the COVID-19 vaccine recommendation that because vaccines have been shown to be medically safe and effective, one ought to get vaccinated. Citing what I call exception information , they claim that whatever the general safety and efficacy of vaccines, the vaccines may not be safe and effective for them. Examples include parents citing information about their children's health, pregnant women's concerns about the potential adverse effects of treatment on pregnant women, young people citing their relative invulnerability to extreme COVID-19 symptoms, or members of vulnerable racial groups citing epistemic injustice, such as a lack of representation in COVID-19 vaccine trials. This paper examines the extent to which a lack of epistemic trust in vaccine recommendations, based on such exemption information, is rational.
一些疫苗犹豫者对COVID-19疫苗推荐缺乏认知信任,因为疫苗已被证明在医学上安全有效,所以应该接种疫苗。他们引用我所说的例外信息,声称无论疫苗的一般安全性和有效性如何,疫苗对他们来说可能并不安全有效。例子包括父母引用有关子女健康的信息,孕妇担心治疗对孕妇的潜在不利影响,年轻人引用他们相对不易受到COVID-19极端症状的影响,或弱势种族群体成员引用认知不公正,例如在COVID-19疫苗试验中缺乏代表性。本文考察了基于此类豁免信息的疫苗推荐缺乏认知信任的合理性程度。
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引用次数: 0
Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs 武断的辩护和证言信仰
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.49
Emmanuel Smith
Abstract I argue that a general feature of human psychology provides strong reason to modify or reject anti-reductionism about the epistemology of testimony. Because of the work of what I call “the background” (which is a collection of all of an individual's synthetizations, summarizations, memories of experiences, beliefs, etc.) we cannot help but form testimonial beliefs on the basis of a testifier's say so along with additional evidence, concepts, beliefs, and so on. Given that we arrive at testimonial beliefs through the work of the background, to be justified in holding a testimonial belief, we must not only have a rational speaker's say so, but we must also form such beliefs in a right way. If this is right, then, contrary to typical anti-reductionism, justified testimonial beliefs require more than just a trustworthy testifier's say so – another requirement is that they are formed in a right way.
摘要本文认为,人类心理的一个普遍特征为修改或拒绝反还原论的证言认识论提供了强有力的理由。由于我称之为“背景”的工作(它是一个人对所有经历的综合、总结、记忆、信念等的集合),我们不得不在证人的证词以及其他证据、概念、信念等的基础上形成证词信念。考虑到我们通过背景的工作得出了证言性信念,为了证明持有证言性信念是合理的,我们不仅必须有一个理性的演讲者这样说,而且我们还必须以正确的方式形成这样的信念。如果这是正确的,那么,与典型的反还原论相反,正当的证词信仰需要的不仅仅是一个值得信赖的证人的说法——另一个要求是它们是以正确的方式形成的。
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引用次数: 0
Partisan Epistemology and Misplaced Trust 党派认识论和错误的信任
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.46
Boyd Millar
The fact that each of us has significantly greater confidence in the claims of co-partisans – those belonging to groups with which we identify – explains, in large part, why so many people believe a significant amount of the misinformation they encounter. It's natural to assume that such misinformed partisan beliefs typically involve a rational failure of some kind, and philosophers and psychologists have defended various accounts of the nature of the rational failure purportedly involved. I argue that none of the standard diagnoses of the irrationality of misinformed partisan beliefs is convincing, but I also argue that we ought to reject attempts to characterize these beliefs as rational or consistent with epistemic virtue. Accordingly, I defend an alternative diagnosis of the relevant epistemic error. Specifically, I maintain that such beliefs typically result when an individual evaluating testimony assigns more weight to co-partisanship than he ought to under the circumstances, and consequently believes the testimony of co-partisans when better alternatives are available.
我们每个人都对同党者(那些属于我们认同的群体的人)的说法有更大的信心,这一事实在很大程度上解释了为什么这么多人相信他们遇到的大量错误信息。人们很自然地认为,这种被误导的党派信仰通常涉及某种形式的理性失败,哲学家和心理学家对据称涉及的理性失败的性质进行了各种辩护。我认为,对被误导的党派信仰的非理性的标准诊断没有一个是令人信服的,但我也认为,我们应该拒绝将这些信仰定性为理性的或与认知美德一致的企图。因此,我为相关认识错误的另一种诊断辩护。具体地说,我坚持认为,当个人评估证词时,他认为合作关系比他在实际情况下应该给予的权重更大,从而在有更好的替代方案时相信合作关系的证词时,通常会产生这种信念。
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引用次数: 0
Normative Inference Tickets 规范推理票据
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.43
Jen Foster, Jonathan Ichikawa
Abstract We argue that stereotypes associated with concepts like he-said–she-said , conspiracy theory , sexual harassment , and those expressed by paradigmatic slurs provide “normative inference tickets”: conceptual permissions to automatic, largely unreflective normative conclusions. These “mental shortcuts” are underwritten by associated stereotypes. Because stereotypes admit of exceptions, normative inference tickets are highly flexible and productive, but also liable to create serious epistemic and moral harms. Epistemically, many are unreliable, yielding false beliefs which resist counterexample; morally, many perpetuate bigotry and oppression. Still, some normative inference tickets, like some activated by sexual harassment , constitute genuine moral and hermeneutical advances. For example, our framework helps explain Miranda Fricker's notion of “hermeneutical lacunae”: what early victims of “sexual harassment” – as well as their harassers – lacked before the term was coined was a communal normative inference ticket – one that could take us, collectively, from “this is happening” to “this is wrong.”
我们认为,与“他说-她说”、阴谋论、性骚扰等概念相关的刻板印象,以及那些由范式诽谤表达的概念,提供了“规范性推理门票”:对自动的、很大程度上未经反思的规范性结论的概念许可。这些“心理捷径”是由相关的刻板印象所支撑的。因为刻板印象承认例外,规范推理门票是高度灵活和富有成效的,但也容易造成严重的认知和道德危害。在认识论上,许多是不可靠的,产生错误的信念,抵制反例;在道德上,许多人延续了偏见和压迫。尽管如此,一些规范性推理门票,比如一些由性骚扰引发的门票,构成了真正的道德和解释学上的进步。例如,我们的框架有助于解释米兰达·弗里克(Miranda Fricker)的“解释学空白”(hermeneutical lacunae)概念:在“性骚扰”这个词被创造出来之前,“性骚扰”的早期受害者——以及骚扰她们的人——缺乏的是一个共同的规范推理票——一个可以把我们从“这正在发生”带到“这是错误的”的票。
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引用次数: 0
A Solution to the General Epistemic Problem for Anti-Intellectualism 反智主义一般认知问题的解答
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.44
M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj
Abstract Some authors maintain that anti-intellectualism faces a general epistemic problem of explaining the cognitive aspect of know-how, and answering the question of why know-how as a kind of disposition is to be considered a distinct kind of knowledge. In the present paper, I argue for a solution to this problem, the central idea of which is that there is a broader sense of knowledge to which both knowledge-that and knowledge-how belong. I present two versions of this solution. According to the first version, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is a general analyzable category of knowledge under which both know-how and know-that fall. This general category is analyzed into three components: a success component, an externalist anti-luck component, and an internalist anti-luck component. According to the second version of the solution, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is an unanalyzable analogical conception of knowledge that comes first in both the theoretical realm (as propositional knowledge) and the practical realm (as know-how). Both versions of the solution are plausible since they distinguish between know-how and knacks in an anti-intellectualist manner by positing that there is an internal relation between know-how and non-propositional intentionality.
一些作者认为,反智主义面临着解释知识的认知方面的一般认识论问题,并回答为什么知识作为一种倾向被认为是一种独特的知识。在本文中,我提出了一种解决这个问题的方法,其核心思想是,存在一种更广泛的知识意义,知识-那和知识-如何都属于这种意义。我提出了这个解决方案的两个版本。根据第一个版本,专有技术是一种独特的知识,因为有一个一般的可分析的知识类别,专有技术和专有知识都属于这个类别。这一总体分类被分析为三个组成部分:成功组成部分,外部主义反运气组成部分和内部主义反运气组成部分。根据该解决方案的第二个版本,诀窍是一种独特的知识,因为在理论领域(作为命题知识)和实践领域(作为诀窍)中都存在一种不可分析的类比知识概念。这两个版本的解决方案都是合理的,因为它们通过假设知识和非命题意向性之间存在内在关系,以一种反知识主义的方式区分了诀窍和诀窍。
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引用次数: 0
Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe 误导高阶证据与理性:我们不能总是理性地相信我们有证据相信的东西
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.45
Wade Munroe
Abstract Evidentialism as an account of theoretical rationality is a popular and well-defended position. However, recently, it's been argued that misleading higher-order evidence (HOE) – that is, evidence about one's evidence or about one's cognitive functioning – poses a problem for evidentialism. Roughly, the problem is that, in certain cases of misleading HOE, it appears evidentialism entails that it is rational to adopt a belief in an akratic conjunction – a proposition of the form “ p , but my evidence doesn't support p ” – despite it being the case that believing an akratic conjunction appears to be clearly irrational. In this paper, I diffuse the problem for evidentialism using the distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality. I argue that, although it can be propositionally rational to believe an akratic conjunction (according to evidentialism), one cannot inferentially base an akratic belief in one's evidence, and, thus, one cannot doxastically rationally possess an akratic belief. In addition, I address the worry that my solution to the puzzle commits evidentialists to the possibility of epistemic circumstances in which a proposition, p , is propositionally rational to believe (namely, an akratic conjunction), yet one cannot, in principle, (doxastically) rationally believe p . As I demonstrate, cases of misleading HOE are not the only types of cases that force evidentialists to accept that propositional rationality does not entail the possibility of doxastic rationality. There are no new problems raised by misleading HOE that weren't already present in cases involving purely first-order evidence.
证据主义作为一种理论合理性的解释是一种普遍的、有充分辩护的立场。然而,最近有人认为,误导性的高阶证据(HOE)——即关于一个人的证据或关于一个人的认知功能的证据——给证据主义带来了一个问题。粗略地说,问题在于,在某些误导HOE的情况下,证据主义似乎意味着,相信一个akratic合词是理性的——一个形式为“p,但我的证据不支持p”的命题——尽管在这种情况下,相信一个akratic合词显然是非理性的。在本文中,我用命题理性和对立理性的区别来扩散证据主义的问题。我认为,尽管相信一个阿克拉底结合(根据证据主义)可以是命题理性的,但一个人不能在自己的证据中推断出一个阿克拉底信仰,因此,一个人不能完全理性地拥有一个阿克拉底信仰。此外,我还提出了一个担忧,即我对这个难题的解决方案使证据主义者认为,在认识环境中,一个命题p在命题上是可以理性相信的(即,一个akratic合词),但在原则上,人们不能(荒谬地)理性地相信p。正如我所展示的,误导的HOE案例并不是迫使证据主义者接受命题理性不包含悖论理性可能性的唯一案例类型。在涉及纯一阶证据的案件中,误导的HOE并没有引起新的问题。
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引用次数: 0
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Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology
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