Evidence for the Source of the 2001 Attack Anthrax

M. Hugh-Jones, B. H. Rosenberg, Stuart Jacobsen
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

The elemental composition of the 2001 attack anthrax presents critical clues that were not considered or were misinterpreted throughout the original investigation. Extensive experimental data released by the FBI after the anthrax case was closed make it possible to trace some of the implications of these clues: the substantial presence of tin, a toxic material that must have been added subsequent to growth, and a uniquely high content of silicon in the attack spores. No Bacillus spore preparations other than the attack anthrax have ever been found to contain such a high level of silicon, although some surrogate spore powders prepared at Dugway following FBI instructions have been cited as evidence that high levels of silicon can be reproduced; however, examination of the experimental data reveals that the silicon in these samples was unquestionably an artifact. The elemental evidence suggests that the attack spores had been coated with silicone (a polysiloxane) in the presence of tin, which catalyzes the cross-linking of polysiloxane chains needed to form an encapsulating coating on the spore coat. Microencapsulation helps protect biological agents from damage during atmospheric exposure and from the body’s defenses during infection, and would defeat some detection methods. Microencapsulation, which would explain the location and amounts of both tin and silicon in the attack spores, requires special expertise and sophisticated facilities. DOD-sponsored projects explicitly involving microencapsulation at DARPA, Dugway and perhaps elsewhere were spelled out publicly in budget documents in 1999 and thereafter, and executed at the very time of the anthrax attacks. Both the Dugway laboratory and Battelle Memorial Institute, a sub-contractor at Dugway, had extensive experience in making Bacillus spore powders; both had access to Bacillus anthracis genetically matching the attack spores; both could have made the attack spores legally for institutions conducting biodefense activities that required microencapsulated spores. Furthermore, a small but significant amount of tin, about 4% of that in the attack spores, has been found in some surrogate spore products made at Dugway. A measureable tin content has not been found in any other Bacillus spores except the attack spores. The tin in the Dugway surrogates may have been a remnant, indicative of earlier, classified work. Avoidance of governmentsponsored, classified research may account for some of the limitations of the investigation.
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2001年袭击炭疽病毒来源的证据
2001年袭击炭疽的元素组成提供了在最初的调查中没有被考虑或被误解的关键线索。炭疽热案件结束后,联邦调查局公布了大量的实验数据,使得追踪这些线索的一些含义成为可能:锡的大量存在,一种有毒物质,一定是在生长后添加的,以及攻击孢子中独特的高含量硅。除了攻击炭疽菌外,从未发现芽孢杆菌孢子制剂含有如此高水平的硅,尽管在杜格威按照联邦调查局的指示制备的一些替代孢子粉末被引用为可以复制高水平硅的证据;然而,对实验数据的检查表明,这些样品中的硅毫无疑问是人造的。元素证据表明,攻击孢子在锡存在的情况下被硅酮(一种聚硅氧烷)包裹,锡催化聚硅氧烷链的交联,形成孢子外壳上的封装涂层。微胶囊化有助于保护生物制剂在暴露于大气中时不受破坏,在感染时不受人体防御的伤害,并且会击败一些检测方法。微胶囊化可以解释攻击孢子中锡和硅的位置和数量,这需要特殊的专业知识和复杂的设备。国防部资助的项目明确涉及DARPA、杜格威(Dugway)和其他地方的微胶囊技术,这些项目在1999年及之后的预算文件中被公开列出,并在炭疽病毒袭击发生的同一时间执行。杜格威实验室和杜格威的分包商巴特尔纪念研究所在制造芽孢杆菌孢子粉方面都有丰富的经验;他们都能接触到基因上与攻击孢子匹配的炭疽芽孢杆菌;这两家机构都可以合法地制造攻击孢子,用于进行需要微封装孢子的生物防御活动。此外,在杜格威制造的一些替代孢子产品中发现了少量但数量可观的锡,约占攻击孢子中锡的4%。除攻击孢子外,在其他芽孢杆菌孢子中未发现可测量的锡含量。杜格威替身里的锡可能是残留的,表明了早期的机密工作。避免政府资助的机密研究可能是调查的一些局限性的原因。
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