{"title":"Chapter One: Defence and military analysis","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2017.1271206","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"non-defence and aerospace business. Russia, China and India have also had concerns over their defence-industrial base, although their efforts have largely focused on attempting to improve efficiency. Efforts to recapitalise Russia’s ageing defenceindustrial infrastructure in the air, land and maritime sectors have shown limited and varying degrees of progress against a backdrop of increasing pressure on spending. India’s policy goal of growing its national production capacity has resulted in continuing efforts to increase private-sector involvement in what has long been a bastion of state-owned industry. China, meanwhile, has also been trying to improve the performance and efficiency of its defence sector; this effort has led to the emergence of some privately owned firms. If anything, recent M&A activity serves as a reminder of the dynamic nature of the defence-industrial landscape. For democratic governments, it is a landscape that they can influence, but not fully direct. State-procurement choices offer one means of shaping the sector, although policymakers will often go to considerable lengths to stress that equipment selections have been or will be made on performance and price, and without consideration of broader industrial or political factors. Autocratic states, on the other hand, enjoy a greater degree of control in their ability to shape the sector, although this brings its own problems, not least of all the risk of overt political interference in the defence industry.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"56 1","pages":"18 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Military Balance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271206","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
non-defence and aerospace business. Russia, China and India have also had concerns over their defence-industrial base, although their efforts have largely focused on attempting to improve efficiency. Efforts to recapitalise Russia’s ageing defenceindustrial infrastructure in the air, land and maritime sectors have shown limited and varying degrees of progress against a backdrop of increasing pressure on spending. India’s policy goal of growing its national production capacity has resulted in continuing efforts to increase private-sector involvement in what has long been a bastion of state-owned industry. China, meanwhile, has also been trying to improve the performance and efficiency of its defence sector; this effort has led to the emergence of some privately owned firms. If anything, recent M&A activity serves as a reminder of the dynamic nature of the defence-industrial landscape. For democratic governments, it is a landscape that they can influence, but not fully direct. State-procurement choices offer one means of shaping the sector, although policymakers will often go to considerable lengths to stress that equipment selections have been or will be made on performance and price, and without consideration of broader industrial or political factors. Autocratic states, on the other hand, enjoy a greater degree of control in their ability to shape the sector, although this brings its own problems, not least of all the risk of overt political interference in the defence industry.