Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia

Abstract

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine failed in its initial objectives and exposed significant shortcomings in several areas of the Russian armed forces, including strategy, command and control, training, logistics and industrial supply. By year’s end, Russia had resorted to using Iranian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct attack munitions due to the Russian armed forces’ heavy use of its own ballistic and cruise missiles and the continued threat posed by Ukraine’s air defences. The performance of some Russian weapons has been underwhelming. Russia’s tanks and infantry fighting vehicles proved vulnerable to modern antiarmour systems while some air-launched weapons, such as its cruise missiles, were not as successful as they were in Syria. Most notably, the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) air-launched cruise missile failed to meet expectations. Russia’s decision to ‘partially’ mobilise shows that the plan to produce a full-time service component, of contractors, failed when confronted with a high-intensity war. The mobilisation process has highlighted institutional and infrastructure shortcomings as well as problems in training. The heavy losses to Russia’s equipment inventory, particularly its armour and artillery, raises significant questions over the direction of Russia’s state armament programme; the country needs to reconstitute its ground forces’ combat capability while they are at war, balancing current needs against existing and future development plans. Both Russia and Ukraine have suffered significant casualties. Ukraine mobilised early, and Western training assistance is intended to produce a steady stream of trained troops, though the training package lasts weeks instead of months. The battlefield successes of Ukraine’s troops have shown the benefits of the training delivered with Western assistance after 2014 and Kyiv’s plan – also with Western assistance – to develop a professional noncommissioned officer cadre. Western materiel support has reshaped Ukraine’s artillery capabilities. But much legacy-equipment remains and ammunition-supply for these will be a key near-term constraint. However, Kyiv’s forces are now able to strike faster and further and have shown the capability to integrate real-time targeting into this process through the use of small UAVs.