Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162725
{"title":"Index of country/territory abbreviations","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162725","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"48 1","pages":"506 - 506"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75584293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719
United Arab Emirates 63,000 Iran emerged as a key military supporter of Russia in 2022, as the latter struggled during its war in Ukraine. Iran sent Shahed 131 and 136 Direct Attack Munitions to Ukraine, and there was speculation that in response Russia would step up sales to Iran, potentially selling the Su-35 aircraft originally intended for Egypt. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. 2022 saw regional governments embrace deescalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen before. These developments were motivated largely by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. However, the picture was not wholly positive: violence persisted in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued. Ties improved between Turkey and Gulf states, and between Turkey and Israel. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This occurred within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including maritime and air exercises, between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, as well as between Greece and the UAE. To foster greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, USCENTCOM launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems and in April the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies. Amidst a challenging global economic context, regional real GDP growth is estimated to have increased from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. But regional trends mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022. Growth among oil importers is estimated to have reached 4.4% in 2022 compared to 5.2% for oil exporters and 6.5% for Gulf Cooperation Council member states. Fiscal conservatism still shaped spending decisions in 2022.
{"title":"Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719","url":null,"abstract":"United Arab Emirates 63,000 Iran emerged as a key military supporter of Russia in 2022, as the latter struggled during its war in Ukraine. Iran sent Shahed 131 and 136 Direct Attack Munitions to Ukraine, and there was speculation that in response Russia would step up sales to Iran, potentially selling the Su-35 aircraft originally intended for Egypt. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. 2022 saw regional governments embrace deescalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen before. These developments were motivated largely by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. However, the picture was not wholly positive: violence persisted in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued. Ties improved between Turkey and Gulf states, and between Turkey and Israel. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This occurred within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including maritime and air exercises, between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, as well as between Greece and the UAE. To foster greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, USCENTCOM launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems and in April the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies. Amidst a challenging global economic context, regional real GDP growth is estimated to have increased from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. But regional trends mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022. Growth among oil importers is estimated to have reached 4.4% in 2022 compared to 5.2% for oil exporters and 6.5% for Gulf Cooperation Council member states. Fiscal conservatism still shaped spending decisions in 2022.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"22 1","pages":"302 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84504428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162713
latest modernisation phase (the ‘New Look’) began in 2008 has not brought the desired outcome. While important vulnerabilities in Russian capabilities have been demonstrated, once Russia resorted to artillery-heavy assaults the gap between expectation and performance was – in relation to Russia’s weapons – perhaps reduced a little. But in other aspects – such as command and control, maintenance, logistics, planning, reconnaissance and soldier training – significant deficiencies soon became apparent. In the first real test of Russian combat power against a peer adversary for decades, the armed forces have so far come up short. Military setbacks and the only incrementallygrowing resources that Russia is committing to the war have meant that there is a growing gap between military realities and Russia’s aims. As of late 2022, though state media control remained tight, and public support ostensibly remained high, some in the Russian security community likely recognised this gap. A crucial issue was whether this was recognised also by President Putin and the military leadership and, if it was, whether they would sustain their intentions or revise goals in line with miltary realities on the ground. If a key objective of the war was to reassert Russian primacy over its ‘near abroad’, it has had the opposite effect. The war has reinforced Ukrainian statehood and galvanised its population and armed forces. The effect of the war on Russia’s periphery has been varied. Belarus has been drawn closer to Moscow and has been complicit in Russia’s actions by offering logistical and material – if not directly physical – support. But in Central Asia, Russia’s grip appeared weaker at the end than at the start of 2022, while its ability to be an effective broker elsewhere, such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is in doubt. The effect in Europe has been profound. Russia’s European strategy, as winter deepened, appeared to focus on weakening Western public resolve by cutting gas supplies. This has caused European states to sharpen their attention on resilience and energy security. It has made more important continued Ukrainian military progress in winter 2022–23 – even if this is at a reduced tempo compared to its mid-September Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is reshaping the security environment in Europe and has ramifications elsewhere. The scale of Moscow’s miscalculation is apparent nearly a year on, but at the outset it was not clear that Russia would face such difficulty. One of the preliminary lessons offered by the war – beyond those for the belligerents – is that defence and intelligence specialists need to sharpen focus on methodologies important to the assessment of military capabilities, and in this case revise how they evaluate Russia’s armed forces. Other early take-aways include those related to the importance of aspects of military capability such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), longer range artillery a
{"title":"Chapter One: Defence and military analysis","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162713","url":null,"abstract":"latest modernisation phase (the ‘New Look’) began in 2008 has not brought the desired outcome. While important vulnerabilities in Russian capabilities have been demonstrated, once Russia resorted to artillery-heavy assaults the gap between expectation and performance was – in relation to Russia’s weapons – perhaps reduced a little. But in other aspects – such as command and control, maintenance, logistics, planning, reconnaissance and soldier training – significant deficiencies soon became apparent. In the first real test of Russian combat power against a peer adversary for decades, the armed forces have so far come up short. Military setbacks and the only incrementallygrowing resources that Russia is committing to the war have meant that there is a growing gap between military realities and Russia’s aims. As of late 2022, though state media control remained tight, and public support ostensibly remained high, some in the Russian security community likely recognised this gap. A crucial issue was whether this was recognised also by President Putin and the military leadership and, if it was, whether they would sustain their intentions or revise goals in line with miltary realities on the ground. If a key objective of the war was to reassert Russian primacy over its ‘near abroad’, it has had the opposite effect. The war has reinforced Ukrainian statehood and galvanised its population and armed forces. The effect of the war on Russia’s periphery has been varied. Belarus has been drawn closer to Moscow and has been complicit in Russia’s actions by offering logistical and material – if not directly physical – support. But in Central Asia, Russia’s grip appeared weaker at the end than at the start of 2022, while its ability to be an effective broker elsewhere, such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is in doubt. The effect in Europe has been profound. Russia’s European strategy, as winter deepened, appeared to focus on weakening Western public resolve by cutting gas supplies. This has caused European states to sharpen their attention on resilience and energy security. It has made more important continued Ukrainian military progress in winter 2022–23 – even if this is at a reduced tempo compared to its mid-September Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is reshaping the security environment in Europe and has ramifications elsewhere. The scale of Moscow’s miscalculation is apparent nearly a year on, but at the outset it was not clear that Russia would face such difficulty. One of the preliminary lessons offered by the war – beyond those for the belligerents – is that defence and intelligence specialists need to sharpen focus on methodologies important to the assessment of military capabilities, and in this case revise how they evaluate Russia’s armed forces. Other early take-aways include those related to the importance of aspects of military capability such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), longer range artillery a","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"111 1","pages":"8 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80706250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162721
In West Africa, tentative improvements in the region’s security achieved in recent years are now either at risk or are being rolled back. Jihadist activity is again on the rise, notably in Gulf of Guinea countries, while coups and insurrections have highlighted continued problems with civil-military relations. Conflict continued in the Eastern DRC, and in September an agreement was signed enabling the intervention of armed forces from East African Community (EAC) states. An initial force of Kenyan troops landed at Goma in early November; it has been reported that the Kenyan contingent alone could number up to 900. Though a ceasefire was signed between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan forces at the end of the year, in 2022 Ethiopia more than quadrupled its defence budget from USD0.38bn to USD1.58bn amid the return to conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. As a result, growth in East African defence spending in 2022 was faster than in other sub-regions. Combined with consistent spending in Tanzania and a 2020 jump in Uganda’s defence budget, this means that the sub-region now accounts for 25.1% of total regional spending, up from 11.0% in 2010. Nigeria’s budget has grown significantly in recent years, from NGN594bn (USD1.83bn) in 2019 to NGN1.14 trillion (USD2.78bn) in 2022, averaging 16% nominal growth between 2020 and 2022. However, the budget has been stagnant in real terms, and accounted for between 0.5% and 0.6% of GDP, well below the regional average of 1.5%. South Africa retains the largest defence budget in sub-Saharan Africa, but the country’s share of regional spending has fallen considerably over the last decade. In 2011, South African spending accounted for 27% of the total for sub-Saharan Africa but this proportion has declined every year since, falling to just 15% in 2022. Two decades of underfunding have left the South African National Defence Force in a parlous state. Nevertheless, it has sustained contingents in the DRC and Mozambique and some border patrols. The air force has faced significant challenges in generating operational capability, but a new support contract for the Gripen has enabled the start of a process to rebuild air combat capability.
{"title":"Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162721","url":null,"abstract":"In West Africa, tentative improvements in the region’s security achieved in recent years are now either at risk or are being rolled back. Jihadist activity is again on the rise, notably in Gulf of Guinea countries, while coups and insurrections have highlighted continued problems with civil-military relations. Conflict continued in the Eastern DRC, and in September an agreement was signed enabling the intervention of armed forces from East African Community (EAC) states. An initial force of Kenyan troops landed at Goma in early November; it has been reported that the Kenyan contingent alone could number up to 900. Though a ceasefire was signed between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan forces at the end of the year, in 2022 Ethiopia more than quadrupled its defence budget from USD0.38bn to USD1.58bn amid the return to conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. As a result, growth in East African defence spending in 2022 was faster than in other sub-regions. Combined with consistent spending in Tanzania and a 2020 jump in Uganda’s defence budget, this means that the sub-region now accounts for 25.1% of total regional spending, up from 11.0% in 2010. Nigeria’s budget has grown significantly in recent years, from NGN594bn (USD1.83bn) in 2019 to NGN1.14 trillion (USD2.78bn) in 2022, averaging 16% nominal growth between 2020 and 2022. However, the budget has been stagnant in real terms, and accounted for between 0.5% and 0.6% of GDP, well below the regional average of 1.5%. South Africa retains the largest defence budget in sub-Saharan Africa, but the country’s share of regional spending has fallen considerably over the last decade. In 2011, South African spending accounted for 27% of the total for sub-Saharan Africa but this proportion has declined every year since, falling to just 15% in 2022. Two decades of underfunding have left the South African National Defence Force in a parlous state. Nevertheless, it has sustained contingents in the DRC and Mozambique and some border patrols. The air force has faced significant challenges in generating operational capability, but a new support contract for the Gripen has enabled the start of a process to rebuild air combat capability.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"25 1","pages":"420 - 489"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83376734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162715
According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in unclassified form in October, Russia is an ‘acute’ threat but China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense. The modernisation of China’s armed forces remains the principal driver of US policy attention and capability development. The US has led the international response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. US officials have played key roles in coordinating defence assistance to Ukraine, and the US has delivered significant stocks, including anti-armour weapons, various air and missile defence systems, and HARM anti-radiation missiles and artillery (particularly HIMARS rocket artillery). The US Army is focused on regenerating its capability for large-scale combat operations under its MultiDomain Operations (MDO) concept. Integrating lessons drawn from Ukraine delayed the official publication of MDO as army doctrine, though the updated document – FM 3-0, Operations – was eventually published in October. The US Navy ‘Navigation Plan’ outlined goals, including 12 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 66 tactical submarines, 96 large and 56 small surface combatants, as part of a force design for 373 crewed vessels, plus approximately 150 uninhabited surface and subsurface platforms, to be achieved by 2045. The US Air Force unveiled the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber in December 2022, but a timeline for the public display of a prototype crewed element of the Next-Generation Air Dominance project remains unclear. The FY2023 DoD budget request prioritises the Pentagon’s plan to build advantage by investing in innovation and modernisation as well as industrial capability. The Pentagon is also looking to improve recruitment and retention, and the FY2023 budget includes a 4.6% pay raise for both military and civilian personnel. Canada and the US agreed to upgrade infrastructure and systems associated with the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
根据10月份以非机密形式发布的2022年国防战略(NDS)，俄罗斯是一个“严重”威胁，但中国是国防部的节奏挑战。中国军队的现代化仍然是美国政策关注和能力发展的主要驱动力。美国主导了国际社会对俄罗斯2022年入侵乌克兰的反应。美国官员在协调对乌克兰的国防援助方面发挥了关键作用，美国已经交付了大量库存，包括反装甲武器，各种空中和导弹防御系统，以及HARM反辐射导弹和火炮(特别是HIMARS火箭炮)。美国陆军正致力于在其多域作战(MDO)概念下重建其大规模作战行动的能力。整合从乌克兰吸取的教训推迟了MDO作为陆军学说的正式出版，尽管更新的文件- FM 3-0，作战-最终于10月出版。美国海军“导航计划”概述了目标，包括12艘核动力航空母舰，66艘战术潜艇，96艘大型和56艘小型水面战舰，作为373艘载人船只的力量设计的一部分，加上大约150个无人居住的水面和水下平台，到2045年将实现。美国空军于2022年12月公布了诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司的B-21“突袭者”轰炸机，但公开展示下一代空中优势项目原型机的时间表仍不清楚。2023财年国防部预算要求优先考虑五角大楼通过投资创新和现代化以及工业能力来建立优势的计划。五角大楼也在寻求改善招聘和保留，2023财年预算包括为军事和文职人员加薪4.6%。加拿大和美国同意升级与北美航空航天防御司令部相关的基础设施和系统。
{"title":"Chapter Three: North America","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162715","url":null,"abstract":"According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in unclassified form in October, Russia is an ‘acute’ threat but China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense. The modernisation of China’s armed forces remains the principal driver of US policy attention and capability development. The US has led the international response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. US officials have played key roles in coordinating defence assistance to Ukraine, and the US has delivered significant stocks, including anti-armour weapons, various air and missile defence systems, and HARM anti-radiation missiles and artillery (particularly HIMARS rocket artillery). The US Army is focused on regenerating its capability for large-scale combat operations under its MultiDomain Operations (MDO) concept. Integrating lessons drawn from Ukraine delayed the official publication of MDO as army doctrine, though the updated document – FM 3-0, Operations – was eventually published in October. The US Navy ‘Navigation Plan’ outlined goals, including 12 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 66 tactical submarines, 96 large and 56 small surface combatants, as part of a force design for 373 crewed vessels, plus approximately 150 uninhabited surface and subsurface platforms, to be achieved by 2045. The US Air Force unveiled the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber in December 2022, but a timeline for the public display of a prototype crewed element of the Next-Generation Air Dominance project remains unclear. The FY2023 DoD budget request prioritises the Pentagon’s plan to build advantage by investing in innovation and modernisation as well as industrial capability. The Pentagon is also looking to improve recruitment and retention, and the FY2023 budget includes a 4.6% pay raise for both military and civilian personnel. Canada and the US agreed to upgrade infrastructure and systems associated with the North American Aerospace Defense Command.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"132 3-4","pages":"16 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72470303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162717
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine failed in its initial objectives and exposed significant shortcomings in several areas of the Russian armed forces, including strategy, command and control, training, logistics and industrial supply. By year’s end, Russia had resorted to using Iranian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct attack munitions due to the Russian armed forces’ heavy use of its own ballistic and cruise missiles and the continued threat posed by Ukraine’s air defences. The performance of some Russian weapons has been underwhelming. Russia’s tanks and infantry fighting vehicles proved vulnerable to modern antiarmour systems while some air-launched weapons, such as its cruise missiles, were not as successful as they were in Syria. Most notably, the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) air-launched cruise missile failed to meet expectations. Russia’s decision to ‘partially’ mobilise shows that the plan to produce a full-time service component, of contractors, failed when confronted with a high-intensity war. The mobilisation process has highlighted institutional and infrastructure shortcomings as well as problems in training. The heavy losses to Russia’s equipment inventory, particularly its armour and artillery, raises significant questions over the direction of Russia’s state armament programme; the country needs to reconstitute its ground forces’ combat capability while they are at war, balancing current needs against existing and future development plans. Both Russia and Ukraine have suffered significant casualties. Ukraine mobilised early, and Western training assistance is intended to produce a steady stream of trained troops, though the training package lasts weeks instead of months. The battlefield successes of Ukraine’s troops have shown the benefits of the training delivered with Western assistance after 2014 and Kyiv’s plan – also with Western assistance – to develop a professional noncommissioned officer cadre. Western materiel support has reshaped Ukraine’s artillery capabilities. But much legacy-equipment remains and ammunition-supply for these will be a key near-term constraint. However, Kyiv’s forces are now able to strike faster and further and have shown the capability to integrate real-time targeting into this process through the use of small UAVs.
{"title":"Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162717","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine failed in its initial objectives and exposed significant shortcomings in several areas of the Russian armed forces, including strategy, command and control, training, logistics and industrial supply. By year’s end, Russia had resorted to using Iranian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct attack munitions due to the Russian armed forces’ heavy use of its own ballistic and cruise missiles and the continued threat posed by Ukraine’s air defences. The performance of some Russian weapons has been underwhelming. Russia’s tanks and infantry fighting vehicles proved vulnerable to modern antiarmour systems while some air-launched weapons, such as its cruise missiles, were not as successful as they were in Syria. Most notably, the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) air-launched cruise missile failed to meet expectations. Russia’s decision to ‘partially’ mobilise shows that the plan to produce a full-time service component, of contractors, failed when confronted with a high-intensity war. The mobilisation process has highlighted institutional and infrastructure shortcomings as well as problems in training. The heavy losses to Russia’s equipment inventory, particularly its armour and artillery, raises significant questions over the direction of Russia’s state armament programme; the country needs to reconstitute its ground forces’ combat capability while they are at war, balancing current needs against existing and future development plans. Both Russia and Ukraine have suffered significant casualties. Ukraine mobilised early, and Western training assistance is intended to produce a steady stream of trained troops, though the training package lasts weeks instead of months. The battlefield successes of Ukraine’s troops have shown the benefits of the training delivered with Western assistance after 2014 and Kyiv’s plan – also with Western assistance – to develop a professional noncommissioned officer cadre. Western materiel support has reshaped Ukraine’s artillery capabilities. But much legacy-equipment remains and ammunition-supply for these will be a key near-term constraint. However, Kyiv’s forces are now able to strike faster and further and have shown the capability to integrate real-time targeting into this process through the use of small UAVs.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"10 1","pages":"150 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79515510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162710
{"title":"Indexes of Tables, Figures and Maps","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162710","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"24 1","pages":"4 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91216228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162729
{"title":"The 2023 Military Balance Chart: Military space assets: China, Russia and the United States","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162729","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"13 1","pages":"ci - ci"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73302725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162726
{"title":"Index of countries and territories","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162726","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"7 1","pages":"507 - 508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84893634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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