Spousal effects on wages, labour supply and household production in Ghana

Abstract

The theory of working spouse premium or penalty postulates that a spouse’s hours of work impact their partner’s wages while the theory of labour supply suggests that spouses’ wages influence their partners’ hours of work (Killewald & Gough 2013; Song 2007; Weeden, Cha & Bucca 2016). These seemingly contradicting theories have attracted a vast amount of empirical literature in developed countries (Glauber 2007; Kelly & Grant 2012; Killewald 2013; Schmitt 2010). However, very limited evidence exists in developing countries where labour market rigidities, social norms and cultural values play an important role in shaping the extent of validity (or otherwise) of these theories (Petersen, Penner & Hogsnes 2011). Most of the studies on marriage premiums or penalties have focused mainly on the husband. According to Breusch and Gray (2004), the little evidence that is available shows positive (but small), zero or even negative effects of marriage on women’s remuneration. In many developing countries, social norms and cultural practices influence intra-household bargaining power, gender roles and resources allocation (Doss 2013). This means that analysis of the determinants of labour market outcomes and household production need to be context specific.