Wage versus efficient bargaining in a Cournot duopoly: A Preliminary Note on Welfare

D. Buccella
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Abstract

Wage versus efficient bargaining in a Cournot duopoly: A preliminary note on welfare In a unionized Cournot duopoly with decentralized, firm-level bargaining, this note re-examines the endogenous equilibrium agendas wage vs. efficient bargaining that can arise under three different specifications of the timing of negotiations and the impact of the outcome of the bargaining process on social welfare. Given that explicit conflict of interest among the bargaining parties can arise in every timing specification, this note proposes, analyzes, and discusses some guiding principles for governments and public authorities interested in pursuing social welfare improvements.
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古诺双头垄断中的工资与有效议价:关于福利的初步说明
在工会化的古诺双头垄断和分散的企业层面的议价中,本文重新审视了在三种不同的谈判时间规范和议价过程结果对社会福利的影响下可能出现的工资与有效议价的内生均衡议程。鉴于在每一个时间规范中,谈判各方之间都可能出现明显的利益冲突,本文为有意追求社会福利改善的政府和公共当局提出、分析和讨论了一些指导原则。
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