Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI:10.1093/JLEO/EWS028
Joseph P. H. Fan, T. Wong, Tianyu Zhang
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引用次数: 261

Abstract

Pyramidal organizational structures are common throughout the world. This article considers an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating firms from political interference. Although intermediate pyramidal layers insulate managers from a pyramid's top owners and hence induce agency costs, they also minimize political costs of state intervention. All else equal, the optimal division of power between the government and the managers should be the point at which the marginal agency costs are equal to the marginal political costs. Our empirical results, based on hand-collected data for 742 local government-owned Chinese business groups are generally in line with this hypothesis. (JEL: D21, D23, G32, L22, L32, P31). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.
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制度与组织结构:以国有金字塔企业为例
金字塔型的组织结构在全世界都很常见。本文考虑了国家建造金字塔的一种解释:将企业与政治干预分离开来。尽管中间金字塔层将管理者与金字塔的最高所有者隔离开来,从而导致代理成本,但它们也将国家干预的政治成本降至最低。在其他条件相同的情况下,政府和管理者之间的最优权力分配应该是边际代理成本等于边际政治成本。我们的实证结果基于对742家地方政府所有的中国企业集团的手工收集数据,总体上符合这一假设。(jel: d21, d23, g32, l22, l32, p31)。作者2012。牛津大学出版社代表耶鲁大学出版。版权所有。有关许可,请发送电子邮件:journals.permissions@oup.com,牛津大学出版社。
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CiteScore
2.20
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0.00%
发文量
25
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