Fiscal Decentralization and Local Government Performance: Decentralized Taxation and Expenditure in Korean Local Governments

Abstract

Recent administrations in Korea have greatly emphasized the importance of decentralization and autonomous local governments. However, numerous efforts on decentralization have not been accompanied by adequate level of fiscal decentralization. Some critiques have long claimed that local governments are not equipped with enough financial independence or autonomy to deliver preferred services. Some others have challenged this claim, accusing local governments on potential waste of financial resources and local administration capacities, with no significant improvement in public service performance. This research analyzes fiscal decentralization in terms of taxation and expenditure. It empirically investigates whether decentralized taxation and decentralized expenditure affect public service performance in Korean local governments. Based on an assortment of data on local government finance and public service performance, the analysis shows that decentralized taxation and decentralized expenditure have positive effects on a local government performance when either one of them was included in the model. In contrast, in the research model that included both variables, the effect of decentralized taxation on the government performance was not statistically significant. Meanwhile, the positive effect of decentralized expenditure was statistically significant. Results show that decentralized expenditure does not necessarily hinder local government performance, contrary to many concerns. It is advised that administrations in Korea emphasize decentralized expenditure more than decentralized taxation. Decentralized expenditure does not hinder local government performance, and thus the government should continue to promote it to resolve imbalances across local governments.