Chapter Six: Asia

Q3 Social Sciences The Military Balance Pub Date : 2017-01-01 DOI:10.1080/04597222.2017.1271212
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The previous report, however, anticipated the same in 2015. Strengthening China’s capacity to project military power into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean has also been an objective of the PLA. Speaking in November 2015, Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris Jr said that China was ‘building runways and ... facilities to support possible militarization of an area vital to the global economy’. By early 2016, there had been significant construction activity on seven Chinese-occupied features in the Spratly Islands, with military facilities established on six of them. Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef each had a 3km runway that could be used by combat aircraft, and a similar airstrip was under construction on Subi Reef. Moreover, in February 2016 China deployed two batteries of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system on Woody Island in the Paracels; in the following weeks, J-11 and JH-7 combat aircraft were also reported on the island. China’s increasingly assertive role in the South China Sea was also demonstrated by the interception of fishing and supply vessels from other claimant states (the Philippines and Vietnam) in both the Paracel and the Spratly islands. One important consequence of China’s activities in the South China Sea was that they led the United States Navy to undertake freedom-of-navigation operational patrols (FONOPs), designed to assert the right of the US (and others) to fly and sail wherever Regional military roles Armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region typically undertake a broader range of roles than their Western equivalents. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, where armed forces – and armies in particular – sometimes remain central players in national politics (notably in Myanmar and Thailand) and retain significant internal-security responsibilities (as is the case in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand). In the region’s single-party states – China, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – the institutional nature of civil–military relations and military doctrine means that the preservation of domestic stability and party rule are vital concerns of the armed forces. From a Western perspective, the wider role of Asian forces may often seem to detract from their military capabilities, particularly in terms of their capacity to deter and defeat external adversaries, and to mount expeditionary operations. However, it should be remembered that they and their governments often employ notions of capability that differ substantially from Western norms. Nevertheless, the development of greater capacity for conventional warfare is the dominant theme in regional defence policymaking. 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Abstract

are affecting defence planning and procurement, as well as deployments. Bolstering China’s position in the South China Sea has in recent years emerged as a priority for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This has been pursued in order to reinforce Beijing’s extensive territorial claims, as well as to protect its Jin-class (Type-094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). These boats will become an important element of China’s nuclear deterrent and are due to carry the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It has been reported that the boats commenced operational patrols in 2015. The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress on China’s military power spoke of four boats of the class being ‘operational’, without giving details, and anticipated a first Chinese SSBN deterrent patrol ‘sometime in 2016’. The previous report, however, anticipated the same in 2015. Strengthening China’s capacity to project military power into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean has also been an objective of the PLA. Speaking in November 2015, Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris Jr said that China was ‘building runways and ... facilities to support possible militarization of an area vital to the global economy’. By early 2016, there had been significant construction activity on seven Chinese-occupied features in the Spratly Islands, with military facilities established on six of them. Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef each had a 3km runway that could be used by combat aircraft, and a similar airstrip was under construction on Subi Reef. Moreover, in February 2016 China deployed two batteries of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system on Woody Island in the Paracels; in the following weeks, J-11 and JH-7 combat aircraft were also reported on the island. China’s increasingly assertive role in the South China Sea was also demonstrated by the interception of fishing and supply vessels from other claimant states (the Philippines and Vietnam) in both the Paracel and the Spratly islands. One important consequence of China’s activities in the South China Sea was that they led the United States Navy to undertake freedom-of-navigation operational patrols (FONOPs), designed to assert the right of the US (and others) to fly and sail wherever Regional military roles Armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region typically undertake a broader range of roles than their Western equivalents. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, where armed forces – and armies in particular – sometimes remain central players in national politics (notably in Myanmar and Thailand) and retain significant internal-security responsibilities (as is the case in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand). In the region’s single-party states – China, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – the institutional nature of civil–military relations and military doctrine means that the preservation of domestic stability and party rule are vital concerns of the armed forces. From a Western perspective, the wider role of Asian forces may often seem to detract from their military capabilities, particularly in terms of their capacity to deter and defeat external adversaries, and to mount expeditionary operations. However, it should be remembered that they and their governments often employ notions of capability that differ substantially from Western norms. Nevertheless, the development of greater capacity for conventional warfare is the dominant theme in regional defence policymaking. While rising tensions in the East China and South China seas, as well as on the Korean Peninsula, may have bolstered the case for developing conventional military capabilities, recent military developments should be seen as the latest phase in long-term defence-modernisation programmes and as such do not simply reflect external security preoccupations. These programmes are also shaped by increased financial resources resulting from sustained economic growth, strategic cultures rooted in the awareness of past conflicts and the perceived dangers of military weakness, and a pervasive longterm sense of strategic uncertainty deriving in large part from real and anticipated changes in the regionalsecurity roles of the major powers.
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第六章:亚洲
正在影响国防计划和采购,以及部署。近年来,加强中国在南中国海的地位已成为中国人民解放军(PLA)的首要任务。这是为了加强北京广泛的领土主张,以及保护其晋级(094型)核动力弹道导弹潜艇(ssbn)。这些潜艇将成为中国核威慑的一个重要组成部分,预计将携带CSS-NX-14 (JL-2)潜射弹道导弹(SLBM)。据报道,这些船只于2015年开始执行巡逻任务。五角大楼向国会提交的关于中国军事力量的最新年度报告称,该级别的四艘潜艇“可操作”,但没有提供细节,并预计中国将在“2016年某个时候”进行首次SSBN威慑巡逻。然而,上一份报告预计2015年也是如此。加强中国向西太平洋和印度洋投射军事力量的能力也是解放军的一个目标。2015年11月,美国太平洋司令部司令哈里·哈里斯上将说,中国正在“修建跑道……支持对全球经济至关重要的地区可能军事化的设施”。截至2016年初,中国在南沙群岛的7个地物上进行了重大建设活动,其中6个地物上建立了军事设施。美济礁和永暑礁各有一条3公里长的跑道,可供作战飞机使用,渚碧礁上也正在建设一条类似的飞机跑道。此外,2016年2月,中国在西沙群岛的永兴岛上部署了两套红旗-9地对空导弹系统;在接下来的几周里,歼-11和歼轰-7战斗机也被报道在岛上。中国在南中国海日益强硬的角色,也体现在在西沙群岛和南沙群岛拦截来自其他主权声索国(菲律宾和越南)的渔船和补给船上。中国在南中国海活动的一个重要后果是,它们导致美国海军承担了航行自由行动巡逻(FONOPs),旨在维护美国(和其他国家)在任何地方飞行和航行的权利。亚太地区的武装力量通常承担着比西方同行更广泛的角色。在东南亚尤其如此,那里的武装力量——尤其是军队——有时仍然是国家政治的核心角色(特别是在缅甸和泰国),并保留着重要的内部安全责任(就像印度尼西亚、缅甸、菲律宾和泰国的情况一样)。在该地区的一党制国家——中国、老挝、朝鲜和越南——军民关系和军事学说的制度性质意味着,维护国内稳定和党的统治是武装部队的重要关切。从西方的角度来看,亚洲军队的广泛作用似乎往往会削弱他们的军事能力,特别是在威慑和击败外部对手以及发动远征行动方面。然而,应该记住的是,他们和他们的政府经常使用与西方标准有很大不同的能力概念。然而,发展更大的常规战争能力是地区防务政策制定的主要主题。尽管东中国海和南中国海以及朝鲜半岛不断升级的紧张局势可能支持了发展常规军事能力的理由,但最近的军事发展应被视为长期国防现代化计划的最新阶段,因此不只是反映了对外部安全的关注。这些计划还受到以下因素的影响:持续的经济增长所带来的财政资源增加,根植于对过去冲突的认识和对军事弱点危险的认识的战略文化,以及普遍存在的长期战略不确定性,这种不确定性很大程度上源于大国在地区安全角色方面的实际和预期变化。
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来源期刊
The Military Balance
The Military Balance Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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1.00
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发文量
18
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