{"title":"The Future of Immortality: Remaking Life and Death in Contemporary Russia","authors":"J. Quijada","doi":"10.1080/21567689.2022.2083783","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"populism and authoritarianism that have been resurgent in recent years. Kaminski’s conclusion is that Islam and liberalism have fundamental ontological incompatibilities. They are fundamentally divided on the conceptualization and hierarchy between the religious and the worldly (dīnī and dunyāwī). Secularism, a core condition of possibility for liberalism, is completely alien from Islam and even the Arabic language (except as a modern loan word). In the end, liberalism is inextricable from its Enlightenment origins, which will never be compatible with a religion that remains tied to its founding miraculous moment in the past. What is to be done in the face of these intractable, core disagreements about the nature of reality and the source of moral knowledge? Kaminski closes by calling for a more generalized ethos of tolerance. Without becoming liberals, Muslims would do well to recognize the historical fact of pluralism and not expect universal adherence to Islam to be the precondition for pursuing justice and cooperation in the world. Indeed, both Kaminski’s opening salvo and conclusion are more liberal than perhaps the general tenor of the book would suggest. He closes by calling for greater individual commitment to practices of toleration and pluralism based on the view that ‘moral progress is ultimately made at the individual level and this begins by recognizing everyone’s inherent moral worth,’ averring that this would be the position of both John Rawls and the Prophet Muh ammad. Indeed, his basic stance on the encounter between Islam and liberalism seems to be that since ‘generalized lower-order similarities between Islam and liberalism should be seen primarily as incidental to rather than indicative of any deeper discursive congruence’ we should avoid the search for a foundational metaphysical agreement between Islam and liberalism and instead search for tangible, concrete, and specific points of consensus and conciliation. This is, without a doubt, both reflective of common sense but also the most we can hope for if both liberals and Muslims are going to retain a coherent, integral, and defensible understanding of and commitment to their own traditions.","PeriodicalId":44955,"journal":{"name":"Politics Religion & Ideology","volume":"38 1","pages":"248 - 251"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics Religion & Ideology","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2022.2083783","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Abstract
populism and authoritarianism that have been resurgent in recent years. Kaminski’s conclusion is that Islam and liberalism have fundamental ontological incompatibilities. They are fundamentally divided on the conceptualization and hierarchy between the religious and the worldly (dīnī and dunyāwī). Secularism, a core condition of possibility for liberalism, is completely alien from Islam and even the Arabic language (except as a modern loan word). In the end, liberalism is inextricable from its Enlightenment origins, which will never be compatible with a religion that remains tied to its founding miraculous moment in the past. What is to be done in the face of these intractable, core disagreements about the nature of reality and the source of moral knowledge? Kaminski closes by calling for a more generalized ethos of tolerance. Without becoming liberals, Muslims would do well to recognize the historical fact of pluralism and not expect universal adherence to Islam to be the precondition for pursuing justice and cooperation in the world. Indeed, both Kaminski’s opening salvo and conclusion are more liberal than perhaps the general tenor of the book would suggest. He closes by calling for greater individual commitment to practices of toleration and pluralism based on the view that ‘moral progress is ultimately made at the individual level and this begins by recognizing everyone’s inherent moral worth,’ averring that this would be the position of both John Rawls and the Prophet Muh ammad. Indeed, his basic stance on the encounter between Islam and liberalism seems to be that since ‘generalized lower-order similarities between Islam and liberalism should be seen primarily as incidental to rather than indicative of any deeper discursive congruence’ we should avoid the search for a foundational metaphysical agreement between Islam and liberalism and instead search for tangible, concrete, and specific points of consensus and conciliation. This is, without a doubt, both reflective of common sense but also the most we can hope for if both liberals and Muslims are going to retain a coherent, integral, and defensible understanding of and commitment to their own traditions.
近年来死灰复燃的民粹主义和威权主义。卡明斯基的结论是,伊斯兰教和自由主义具有根本的本体论不相容。他们在宗教和世俗之间的概念化和等级上存在根本性的分歧(d ā n ā和dunyāwī)。世俗主义是自由主义可能性的核心条件,它与伊斯兰甚至阿拉伯语(除了作为一个现代借词)完全格格不入。最后,自由主义与启蒙运动的起源是分不开的,它永远不会与一个与过去奇迹般的创始时刻联系在一起的宗教相容。面对这些关于现实本质和道德知识来源的棘手的核心分歧,我们该怎么做?最后,卡明斯基呼吁一种更普遍的宽容精神。在不成为自由主义者的情况下,穆斯林最好认识到多元主义的历史事实,不要指望普遍信奉伊斯兰教是在世界上追求正义与合作的先决条件。的确,卡明斯基的开篇和结语都比本书的主旨所暗示的更为自由。他最后呼吁更大的个人承诺实践宽容和多元主义基于这样的观点"道德进步最终是在个人层面上实现的这始于认识到每个人内在的道德价值"他断言这将是约翰·罗尔斯和先知Muhammad的立场。事实上,他对伊斯兰教和自由主义之间相遇的基本立场似乎是,既然“伊斯兰教和自由主义之间普遍的低阶相似性应该主要被视为偶然的,而不是任何更深层次的话语一致性的指示”,我们应该避免寻找伊斯兰教和自由主义之间基本的形而上学协议,而是寻找切实的、具体的、具体的共识和和解点。毫无疑问,这既是常识的反映,也是我们所能期望的,如果自由主义者和穆斯林都将对自己的传统保持连贯、完整和可辩护的理解和承诺。