Conscience in Transgender Health Care: Yet Another Area Where We Should Be Prioritizing Patient Interests

A. Reiheld
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Abstract

1. Setting the stage McLeod (2020) focuses her book on what she calls “typical refusals in reproductive healthcare.” She defines this at several points, describing these as primarily refusals that “target services that are standard (legal and professionally accepted) and that the objectors believe will result in the death of a human being that has the moral or religious status of a person (e.g., a fetus or embryo)” (136). Abortion is one procedure that is commonly targeted by “typical refusals.” McLeod notes that clinicians engaging in such refusals may refuse not only the procedure itself but also to make a referral for a procedure because they find this kind of indirect complicity to still be a violation of conscience (104). This rejection of referrals constitutes a rejection of attempts to find a compromise position that treats the clinician and the patient as equals. By contrast, McLeod draws our attention through the book to the irrefutable fact that, as socially-licensed gatekeepers of access to medical care, clinicians are not equal to patients. Instead, they have dramatically more power. This creates obligations of care in the exercise of that power and in particular should make us look for ways to give patients more power, or at least to protect them from the harms that clinician power, exercised in the form of refusal to provide care, can cause. This is no small part of why McLeod argues for a “patient prioritization” approach. And yet, McLeod is careful not to casually sweep aside the harms of requiring someone to act against their conscience. Please note that in substance, I do not disagree with McLeod’s patient prioritization view: When clinician conscience seems to require refusing care to a patient who is seeking that care, the power dynamic that inherently exists can only be balanced by patient prioritization. Like McLeod, I do not think the harms to clinician integrity of being compelled to do something they consider immoral can be lightly dismissed. But there is a great deal more to be said and considered, here, some of which would greatly complicate the relationship between 10.3138/ijfab-15.2.12 15 2
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跨性别医疗保健的良心:我们应该优先考虑患者利益的另一个领域
1. 麦克劳德(2020)将她的书重点放在了她所谓的“生殖保健中的典型拒绝”上。她在几个方面对此作出了定义,将其描述为主要拒绝"针对标准的(法律和专业接受的)服务,以及反对者认为将导致具有人的道德或宗教地位的人(例如胎儿或胚胎)死亡的服务"(136)。堕胎是“典型拒绝”的常见目标之一。McLeod指出,参与此类拒绝的临床医生可能不仅会拒绝手术本身,还会拒绝转介手术,因为他们认为这种间接的共谋仍然是违反良心的(104)。这种拒绝转诊构成了拒绝试图找到一个妥协的立场,对待临床医生和病人平等。相比之下,麦克劳德通过书将我们的注意力吸引到一个无可辩驳的事实,即作为获得社会许可的医疗保健看门人,临床医生与患者并不平等。相反,他们拥有更大的权力。这就产生了在行使这种权力时的照顾义务,尤其应该让我们寻找给病人更多权力的方法,或者至少保护他们免受临床医生权力的伤害,以拒绝提供照顾的形式行使,可能造成的伤害。这也是麦克劳德支持“病人优先”方法的重要原因。然而,麦克劳德小心翼翼地不轻易忽视要求某人违背良心行事的危害。请注意,从本质上讲,我并不反对麦克劳德的病人优先考虑的观点:当临床医生的良心似乎要求拒绝为寻求治疗的病人提供治疗时,内在存在的权力动态只能通过病人优先考虑来平衡。像麦克劳德一样,我不认为临床医生被迫做一些他们认为不道德的事情对他们的诚信造成的伤害可以轻易忽视。但是这里有很多东西需要说明和考虑,其中一些会使10.3138/ijfab-15.2.12 15 2之间的关系变得非常复杂
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