The literalist bias in the autistic spectrum conditions: review of existing accounts (El sesgo literalista en las condiciones del espectro autista: revisión de las teorías existentes)

Abstract

ABSTRACT There is a tendency across the Autistic Spectrum Conditions (ASC) to understand non-literal uses of language in a literal way. Different accounts for such a literalist bias have been proposed. Three of them can be considered ‘classical’ by now: the Executive Dysfunction theory, the Theory of Mind theory and the Weak Central Coherence theory. Currently, there is another hypothesis gaining traction, namely the Structural Language hypothesis. In this paper, we critically analyse these four accounts, with a focus on the Structural Language hypothesis, which holds that issues in figurative meaning comprehension relate not to ASC core traits but to structural language problems. We argue that the notion of ‘structural language’ is vague, and also that many studies taken to support the hypothesis have not actually tested the literalist bias. We conclude by suggesting interesting areas for further research.