{"title":"Between Singularity and Plurality: Kierkegaard and the Paradox of Absolute Difference","authors":"A. Kulak","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study is dedicated to exploring the ways in which Kierkegaard provides a criterion for thinking about the principles of plurality when, in the context of distinguishing between Socrates and Christ, between different conceptions of difference—between those that support the difference of the other and those that do not—he writes that, just as no one must separate what God has joined, so no one must join what God has separated. When Kierkegaard then makes central to faith the incommensurability of single individuals, he indicates that the inviolable singularity of self and other is the one principle that can be true for all—that can be plural—since it is the one principle that is inclusive of all. In my paper I argue through Kierkegaard that the relationship between the singular and the plural embraces the paradox of absolute difference, the paradox of difference as absolute: the single individual exists only by standing in absolute relation to all others as absolute; the plural exists only insofar as it involves the commitment to the singular standard that, as absolute, preserves the difference of all.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract This study is dedicated to exploring the ways in which Kierkegaard provides a criterion for thinking about the principles of plurality when, in the context of distinguishing between Socrates and Christ, between different conceptions of difference—between those that support the difference of the other and those that do not—he writes that, just as no one must separate what God has joined, so no one must join what God has separated. When Kierkegaard then makes central to faith the incommensurability of single individuals, he indicates that the inviolable singularity of self and other is the one principle that can be true for all—that can be plural—since it is the one principle that is inclusive of all. In my paper I argue through Kierkegaard that the relationship between the singular and the plural embraces the paradox of absolute difference, the paradox of difference as absolute: the single individual exists only by standing in absolute relation to all others as absolute; the plural exists only insofar as it involves the commitment to the singular standard that, as absolute, preserves the difference of all.