Strident, Ambiguous and Duplicitous: Ukraine and the 2008 Russia-Georgia War

Q2 Social Sciences Demokratizatsiya Pub Date : 2009-09-01 DOI:10.3200/DEMO.17.4.350-372
Taras Kuzio
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia and de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will undoubtedly have repercussions for Ukaine's security. Although Ukraine had high hopes--following the Orange Revolution and election of the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko--of quickly integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures, only NATO opened its door in 2005-06 but closed it in 2007-08 due to low public support within Ukraine and the growing appeasement of Russia by key Western European NATO members. The EU continues not to view Ukraine as a future member. Ukraine's security vacuum is coupled with instability, preventing the adoption of a unified position on Russia's aggression in Georgia, which has plagued the entire Yushchenko administration and Russian assertiveness in the region. Russian-Ukrainian relations have deteriorated to their lowest point since the disintegration of the USSR. This poor state of affairs, combined with Russia's willingness and legal justification for defending "Russian citizens" abroad, opens up the possibility that localized conflict in the Crimea and Sevastopol can no longer be ruled out. (1) This article is divided into five sections. In the first section, I analyze Ukrainian security policies and security dilemmas in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, (2) taking into consideration that NATO and EU membership are not likely for Ukraine in the foreseeable future. In the second section, I analyze Ukrainian-Georgian relations and the close ideological, personal, and security bonds between Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili. Although these particular connections emerged after the 2003 Rose Revolution and 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine and Georgia had a well-established security relationship under President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine and President Edward Shevardnadze of Georgia until 2003-04. In the third and fourth sections of the article, I discuss the likelihood of the Crimea becoming the next target for Russian territorial assertiveness in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Ukraine's security responses to what Kyiv sees as growing Russian nationalism. Russian opinion polls also show that the United States, Georgia, and Ukraine are the three most disliked countries in Russia. In these sections, I discuss Russia's inability to come to terms with Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, and territorial control over the Crimea, as well as Ukraine's fight to have different national interests from Russia. In the final section, I discuss how the Russia-Georgia war affected Ukrainian domestic politics (for a breakdown by leader and party, see the appendix). This section argues that existing divisions within the Orange Coalition prevented a unified response to the war, although both Our Ukraine (3) and the Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT), as the coalition's two key political forces, feuded, leading to the collapse of the coalition on September 3. (4) Both wings of the democratic (i.e. Orange) coalition supported Georgia's territorial integrity. The oppositional Party of Regions' official stance, in support of the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, split the party in the Ukrainian parliament. The party's resolution in support of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia was supported by the Communist Party, but failed to win sufficient votes to be adopted. A similar resolution passed in the Crimean parliament. Ukraine's Security Dilemmas Russia's invasion of Georgia has reshaped the geopolitical region and its domestic politics. Ukraine and other states in Eurasia believe that Russia has effectively annexed two Georgian territories without any major repercussions. From Ukraine's vantage point, this usurpation was compounded by the perception that the EU gave its seal of approval to a flawed peace plan beneficial to Russia. By the winter of 2008-09, the EU and NATO had rushed to repair their relations with Russia in the wake of their previous support for Georgia. …
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尖锐、模棱两可和表里不一:乌克兰和2008年俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚战争
俄罗斯在2008年8月入侵格鲁吉亚,并事实上吞并了南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹,这无疑会对乌克兰的安全产生影响。尽管在橙色革命和亲西方的尤先科当选后,乌克兰曾对迅速融入欧洲-大西洋结构寄予厚望,但只有北约在2005-06年向乌克兰敞开了大门,但在2007-08年关闭了大门,原因是乌克兰国内公众支持率低,以及北约主要西欧成员国对俄罗斯的日益绥绥化。欧盟仍然不把乌克兰视为未来的成员国。乌克兰的安全真空与不稳定相结合,阻碍了对俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚采取统一立场,这困扰着整个尤先科政府和俄罗斯在该地区的自信。俄罗斯与乌克兰的关系已经恶化到自苏联解体以来的最低点。这种糟糕的状况,再加上俄罗斯在海外保护“俄罗斯公民”的意愿和法律依据,使得克里米亚和塞瓦斯托波尔发生局部冲突的可能性无法再被排除。这篇文章分为五个部分。在第一部分中,我分析了乌克兰在2008年8月俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚后的安全政策和安全困境,(2)考虑到乌克兰在可预见的未来不太可能成为北约和欧盟成员国。在第二部分,我分析了乌克兰和格鲁吉亚的关系,以及乌克兰总统尤先科和格鲁吉亚总统萨卡什维利之间密切的意识形态、个人和安全关系。尽管这些特殊的联系是在2003年玫瑰革命和2004年橙色革命之后出现的,但直到2003-04年,在乌克兰总统列奥尼德·库奇马和格鲁吉亚总统爱德华·谢瓦尔德纳泽的领导下,乌克兰和格鲁吉亚建立了牢固的安全关系。在文章的第三和第四部分,我讨论了克里米亚成为俄罗斯在独联体(CIS)领土主张的下一个目标的可能性,以及乌克兰对基辅视为日益增长的俄罗斯民族主义的安全反应。俄罗斯的民意调查还显示,美国、格鲁吉亚和乌克兰是俄罗斯最不喜欢的三个国家。在这些章节中,我讨论了俄罗斯无法接受乌克兰对克里米亚的主权、独立和领土控制,以及乌克兰与俄罗斯争夺不同国家利益的斗争。在最后一节,我讨论了俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚战争是如何影响乌克兰国内政治的(按领导人和政党分类,见附录)。本节认为,尽管“我们的乌克兰”(Our Ukraine, 3)和“尤利娅季莫申科集团”(Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko, BYuT)作为联盟的两大主要政治力量相互争斗,导致联盟在9月3日瓦解,但橙色联盟内部现有的分歧阻碍了对战争的统一反应。民主联盟(即橙色联盟)的两翼都支持格鲁吉亚的领土完整。反对派地区党支持承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹独立的官方立场,使该党在乌克兰议会中分裂。该党支持南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹独立的决议得到了共产党的支持,但未能获得足够的票数通过。克里米亚议会也通过了类似的决议。乌克兰的安全困境俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚重塑了地缘政治地区和国内政治。乌克兰和欧亚大陆的其他国家认为,俄罗斯实际上吞并了格鲁吉亚的两块领土,而没有引起任何重大反响。从乌克兰的角度来看,这种篡夺行为还伴随着一种看法,即欧盟批准了一项对俄罗斯有利的有缺陷的和平计划。2008年至2009年冬季,欧盟和北约急于修复与俄罗斯的关系,此前它们曾支持格鲁吉亚。…
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Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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