国家公路交通安全管理局提出的以重量为基础的Cafe标准的经济评价

R. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
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引用次数: 2

摘要

2003年12月,美国国家公路交通安全管理局(NHTSA)发布了一份关于拟议规则制定的预先通知,征求对企业平均燃油经济性(CAFE)计划的修改建议的意见。在其他监管概念中,国家公路交通安全管理局建议,未来的CAFE标准应该基于5000磅以下卡车的整装重量,并应鼓励减少5000磅以上卡车的整装重量,通过将目前受监管的5000磅以上的卡车车型纳入不基于整装重量的标准。本文分析了制造商可以做出的改变,以使目前受监管的车队中所有整装重量在5000磅或以上的轻型卡车符合每加仑18英里(mpg)的标准,旨在鼓励这些卡车减轻重量。分析得出了两个重要的实证结论:(1)车型年(MY) 2002轻型卡车不符合18 mpg标准的属性与符合18 mpg标准的同重量级别轻型卡车的属性存在显著差异;(2)消费者高度重视如果强迫他们从满足标准的车型中进行选择将会牺牲的属性。我们估计消费者福利的减少将与汽车制造商对CAFE计划拟议变化的两种可能的反应有关。如果制造商做出反应,从目前受监管的车队中淘汰重量超过5000磅的轻型卡车,这些卡车不符合新标准(“情景1”),迫使消费者只能从今天达到标准的相同重量的车辆中进行选择,相关的消费者福利减少每年可能在4.32至6.48亿美元之间。或者,如果制造商的反应是减轻车队中车辆的重量,以符合新标准(“情景2A”),而这些车型的重量不需要发生重大变化,那么消费者福利的相关减少将在每年6.36至7.48亿美元之间。相反,如果制造商不顾轻型卡车的重量要求变化,通过减轻车队中车辆的重量来满足新标准(“情景2B”),则消费者福利的相关减少将为每年15.16亿美元。撇开NHTSA安全模型的方法问题不谈,根据NHTSA 2003年9月发布的初步安全分析,如果36款未达到新标准的车型都能通过减轻重量来达到标准(“情景2B”),那么每年大约可以挽救6.0条生命。假设社会对每条生命的价值在300万元至400万元之间,则在2002年情景2B下预期收益的现值在1.79亿至2.38亿元之间。如果只有那些不需要显著减轻重量的模型减少它们的重量(情景2A),那么每年大约可以挽救四分之一的生命。相关安全效益的现值将在800万至1100万美元之间。我们得出的结论是,与每种情况相关的消费者福利的减少大大超过了对轻型卡车CAFE标准结构进行改革的所谓好处。因此,消费者福利减少与安全效益的比率在6 ~ 95之间。即使在情景2A和情景2B中,受监管公司的反应方式与《通知》所设想的一致,拟议的改革也会大大减少福利。因此,消费者福利方面的考虑要求拒绝这种CAFE改革。
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An Economic Assessment of the Weight-Based Cafe Standard Proposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
In December 2003, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that sought comments on suggested changes to the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) program. Among other regulatory concepts, NHTSA suggested that future CAFE standards should be based on the curb weight of trucks up to 5,000 pounds, and should encourage reductions in the curb weights of trucks over 5,000 pounds, by holding truck models in the currently regulated fleet over 5,000 pounds to standards that would not be based on curb weight. This paper analyzes the changes that manufacturers could make to bring all light trucks in the currently regulated fleet with a curb weight of 5,000 pounds or more into compliance with a standard of 18 miles per gallon (mpg), intended to encourage the downweighting of those trucks. The analysis reaches two important empirical conclusions: (1) the attributes of model year (MY) 2002 light trucks over 5,000 pounds that would not meet an 18 mpg standard are significantly different from the attributes of light trucks in the same weight class that would meet an 18 mpg standard; (2) consumers value highly the attributes that would be sacrificed if they were forced to choose from those models that satisfy the standard. We estimate the reduction in consumer welfare that would be associated with two possible reactions of automobiles manufacturers to the proposed change in the CAFE program. If manufacturers react by eliminating light trucks in the currently regulated fleet with weights over 5,000 pounds that do not comply with the new standard ("Scenario 1"), forcing consumers to choose from only those vehicles of the same weight that achieve the standard today, the associated reduction in consumer welfare would likely be between $432 and $648 million per year. Alternatively, if manufacturers react by reducing the weight of the vehicles in that fleet to comply with the new standard ("Scenario 2A") for those models that do not require a significant change in the weight, the associated reduction in consumer welfare would be between $636 and $748 million per year. If instead manufacturers react by reducing the weight of the vehicles in that fleet to comply with the new standard ("Scenario 2B") regardless of the required change in the weight of the light truck, the associated reduction in consumer welfare would be $1.516 billion per year. Setting aside any methodological problems with NHTSA's safety model, if each of the 36 models that failed the new standard were to comply with the standard solely through weight reduction ("Scenario 2B"), then roughly 6.0 lives per year would be saved according to a preliminary safety analysis published by NHTSA in September 2003. Assuming that society values a life saved between $3 and $4 million, the present discounted value of expected benefits under Scenario 2B is between $179 and $238 million in 2002. If only those models that did not require a significant reduction in weight were to reduce their weights (Scenario 2A), then roughly one-quarter of a life per year would be saved. The present discounted value of the associated safety benefits would be between $8 and $11 million. We conclude that the reduction in consumer welfare associated with each of these scenarios vastly exceeds the purported benefits of this reform to the structure of the light truck CAFE standards. Therefore, the ratio of consumer welfare reductions to safety benefits is in the range of 6 to 95. Even in Scenarios 2A and 2B, in which the regulated firms react in a manner consistent with that envisioned by the Notice, the proposed reform would greatly decrease welfare. Hence, consumer welfare considerations require the rejection of this CAFE reform.
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