James H. Hale, Harshit Jalan, Nidhi Saini, Shao Ling Tan, Junhyuck Woo, J. Gratch
{"title":"引入非线性效用的谈判博弈","authors":"James H. Hale, Harshit Jalan, Nidhi Saini, Shao Ling Tan, Junhyuck Woo, J. Gratch","doi":"10.1145/3514197.3549678","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Much prior work in automated negotiation makes the simplifying assumption of linear utility functions. As such, we propose a framework for multilateral repeated negotiations in a complex game setting---to introduce non-linearities---where negotiators can choose with whom they negotiate in subsequent games. This game setting not only creates non-linear utility functions, but also motivates the negotiation.","PeriodicalId":149593,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 22nd ACM International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Negotiation game to introduce non-linear utility\",\"authors\":\"James H. Hale, Harshit Jalan, Nidhi Saini, Shao Ling Tan, Junhyuck Woo, J. Gratch\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3514197.3549678\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Much prior work in automated negotiation makes the simplifying assumption of linear utility functions. As such, we propose a framework for multilateral repeated negotiations in a complex game setting---to introduce non-linearities---where negotiators can choose with whom they negotiate in subsequent games. This game setting not only creates non-linear utility functions, but also motivates the negotiation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":149593,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 22nd ACM International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-09-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 22nd ACM International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3514197.3549678\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 22nd ACM International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3514197.3549678","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Much prior work in automated negotiation makes the simplifying assumption of linear utility functions. As such, we propose a framework for multilateral repeated negotiations in a complex game setting---to introduce non-linearities---where negotiators can choose with whom they negotiate in subsequent games. This game setting not only creates non-linear utility functions, but also motivates the negotiation.