个性化推荐下的偏好动态

Sarah Dean, Jamie Morgenstern
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引用次数: 11

摘要

内容推荐系统的设计是许多在线平台的基础:社交媒体提要、在线新闻聚合器和音频/视频托管网站都选择如何最好地组织大量内容供用户消费。许多项目(包括实用的和学术的)都设计了算法,在用户的偏好和观点不随他们看到的内容而改变的假设下,将用户与他们喜欢的内容匹配起来。然而,越来越多的证据表明,个人的偏好直接受到他们所看到的内容的影响——激进化、兔子洞、两极分化和无聊都是受内容影响的偏好现象。两极分化甚至可能发生在有“大众媒体”的生态系统中,那里没有个性化,正如[14]和[13]最近在偏好动态的自然模型中所探索的那样。如果所有用户的偏好都被他们已经喜欢的内容所吸引,或者被他们已经不喜欢的内容所排斥,那么对媒体的统一消费将导致异质偏好的人群只向两极汇聚。在这项工作中,我们探讨了当用户收到个性化内容推荐时是否会出现类似极化的现象。我们使用了类似的偏好动态模型,即个人的偏好倾向于他们消费和喜欢的内容,而远离他们消费和不喜欢的内容。我们表明,在这样的环境中,标准用户奖励最大化几乎是一个微不足道的目标(一大类简单算法只能实现持续遗憾)。那么,一个更有趣的目标是了解在什么条件下推荐算法可以确保用户偏好的平稳性。我们展示了如何设计一个内容推荐,它可以在已知用户偏好的情况下,在可用内容集的温和条件下实现近似平稳性,以及如何在用户偏好最初未知的情况下充分了解用户偏好以实现这样的策略。
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Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations
The design of content recommendation systems underpins many online platforms: social media feeds, online news aggregators, and audio/video hosting websites all choose how best to organize an enormous amount of content for users to consume. Many projects (both practical and academic) have designed algorithms to match users to content they will enjoy under the assumption that user's preferences and opinions do not change with the content they see. However, increasing amounts of evidence suggest that individuals' preferences are directly shaped by what content they see---radicalization, rabbit holes, polarization, and boredom are all example phenomena of preferences affected by content. Polarization in particular can occur even in ecosystems with "mass media," where no personalization takes place, as recently explored in a natural model of preference dynamics by [14] and [13]. If all users' preferences are drawn towards content they already like, or are repelled from content they already dislike, uniform consumption of media leads to a population of heterogeneous preferences converging towards only two poles. In this work, we explore whether some phenomenon akin to polarization occurs when users receive personalized content recommendations. We use a similar model of preference dynamics, where an individual's preferences move towards content the consume and enjoy, and away from content they consume and dislike. We show that standard user reward maximization is an almost trivial goal in such an environment (a large class of simple algorithms will achieve only constant regret). A more interesting objective, then, is to understand under what conditions a recommendation algorithm can ensure stationarity of user's preferences. We show how to design a content recommendations which can achieve approximate stationarity, under mild conditions on the set of available content, when a user's preferences are known, and how one can learn enough about a user's preferences to implement such a strategy even when user preferences are initially unknown.
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