一般和扩展形式博弈的最优相关均衡:固定参数算法,硬度和双边列生成

B. Zhang, Gabriele Farina, A. Celli, T. Sandholm
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引用次数: 12

摘要

我们研究了寻找各种类型的最优相关均衡的问题:正规型粗相关均衡(NFCCE)、广义型粗相关均衡(EFCCE)和广义型相关均衡(EFCE)。这在一般情况下是np困难的,并且已经在特殊情况下进行了研究,最著名的是无三角形博弈[2],其中包括所有具有公共机会移动的两方博弈。然而,一般情况并没有得到很好的理解,而且算法通常伸缩性很差。在本文中,我们做出了两个主要贡献。首先,我们引入相关DAG,它是相关策略空间的表示,其结构和大小依赖于所需的特定解概念。将Zhang等人的团队信念DAG推广到一般和博弈。对于这三种解决方案概念中的每一种,其大小仅取决于与游戏信息结构相关的参数。我们还证明了一个基本的复杂性差距:虽然NFCCE的大小界限与Zhang等人在团队游戏中获得的大小界限相似,但在标准复杂性假设下,其他两个概念是不可能实现的。其次,我们提出了一种双边列生成方法来计算广泛形式博弈中的最优相关策略。我们的算法改进了Farina等人的片面方法,通过对相关策略进行新的分解,允许玩家根据之前添加到支持中的相关计划重新优化他们的序列形式策略。实验表明,我们的技术在计算最优一般和相关均衡方面优于现有技术,并且我们的两类方法具有互补的优势:当参数较小时,相关DAG快速,当参数较大时,双边列生成方法优越。对于团队游戏,我们表明双面列生成方法大大优于标准列生成方法,使其成为参数较大时最先进的算法。在此过程中,我们还引入了两个新的基准游戏:一个是模拟桥牌游戏终局阶段的招式游戏,另一个是乘车共享游戏,其中两个司机通过一个图来竞争到达特定节点并服务请求。完整版本可在:https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.07181
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Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation
We study the problem of finding optimal correlated equilibria of various sorts: normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), and extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE). This is NP-hard in the general case and has been studied in special cases, most notably triangle-free games[2], which include all two-player games with public chance moves. However, the general case is not well understood, and algorithms usually scale poorly. In this paper, we make two primary contributions. First, we introduce the correlation DAG, a representation of the space of correlated strategies whose structure and size are dependent on the specific solution concept desired. It extends the team belief DAG of Zhang et al. [3] to general-sum games. For each of the three solution concepts, its size depends exponentially only on a parameter related to the information structure of the game. We also prove a fundamental complexity gap: while our size bounds for NFCCE are similar to those achieved in the case of team games by Zhang et al. [3], this is impossible to achieve for the other two concepts under standard complexity assumptions. Second, we propose a two-sided column generation approach to compute optimal correlated strategies in extensive-form games. Our algorithm improves upon the one-sided approach of Farina et al. [1] by means of a new decomposition of correlated strategies which allows players to re-optimize their sequence-form strategies with respect to correlation plans which were previously added to the support. Experiments show that our techniques outperform the prior state of the art for computing optimal general-sum correlated equilibria, and that our two families of approaches have complementary strengths: the correlation DAG is fast when the parameter is small and the two-sided column generation approach is superior when the parameter is large. For team games, we show that the two-sided column generation approach vastly outperforms standard column generation approaches, making it the state of the art algorithm when the parameter is large. Along the way, we also introduce two new benchmark games: a trick-taking game that emulates the endgame phase of the card game bridge, and a ride-sharing game, where two drivers traversing a graph are competing to reach specific nodes and serve requests. The full version is available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.07181
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