{"title":"超越独立:CEO影响力与董事会内部运作","authors":"Derek Horstmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2500852","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes–Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO’s presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Beyond Independence: CEO Influence and the Internal Operations of the Board\",\"authors\":\"Derek Horstmeyer\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2500852\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes–Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO’s presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.\",\"PeriodicalId\":235827,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-10-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500852\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500852","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Beyond Independence: CEO Influence and the Internal Operations of the Board
Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes–Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO’s presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.
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