C. Murphy, Thomas Turner, M. O'Sullivan, J. MacMahon, Jonathan Lavelle, L. Ryan, P. Gunnigle, Mike O'Brien
This paper examines the strategies adopted by Irish unions in responding to zero hours work in four sectors. It concludes that rather than adopting either a passive or a uniform approach, unions have pragmatically varied their strategies to curtail zero‐hours work through actively combining both bargaining and regulatory approaches.
{"title":"Trade Union Responses to Zero Hours Work in Ireland","authors":"C. Murphy, Thomas Turner, M. O'Sullivan, J. MacMahon, Jonathan Lavelle, L. Ryan, P. Gunnigle, Mike O'Brien","doi":"10.1111/irj.12271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12271","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the strategies adopted by Irish unions in responding to zero hours work in four sectors. It concludes that rather than adopting either a passive or a uniform approach, unions have pragmatically varied their strategies to curtail zero‐hours work through actively combining both bargaining and regulatory approaches.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118874202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider the role of money as a means of payment, store of value and medium of exchange. I outline a number of quantitative and qualitative experiences of monetary management. Successful regimes have sprung up in a variety of surprising places, and been sustained with state (centralised) interventions. Although the link between state and money, and its standard of identity and account may be clear, particularly in earlier stages of economic development, the extent to which the state is widely felt to hold responsibility for 'sound money' is less clear in modern democracies, where there are many other public responsibilities implying ongoing trade-offs.
{"title":"Of Gold and Paper Money","authors":"J. Chadha","doi":"10.17863/CAM.27670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.27670","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the role of money as a means of payment, store of value and medium of exchange. I outline a number of quantitative and qualitative experiences of monetary management. Successful regimes have sprung up in a variety of surprising places, and been sustained with state (centralised) interventions. Although the link between state and money, and its standard of identity and account may be clear, particularly in earlier stages of economic development, the extent to which the state is widely felt to hold responsibility for 'sound money' is less clear in modern democracies, where there are many other public responsibilities implying ongoing trade-offs.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"2020 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114201776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The supply chain literature has devoted much attention to studying how the variability of orders propagates upstream. We explore how this insight extends to the variability of payments to suppliers and its impact on how risk is generated and propagates upstream. To do so, we model the financial features of a supply chain based on industry reports and empirical findings from the finance literature. Capturing policies and constraints of the agents in the supply chain in a formal model, we are able to generate and explain the behavior observed in real supply chains. We show that payment variability occurs and propagates, even if orders are constant, in a cash-constrained supply chain. Furthermore, our model reveals that payment variability may even become amplified under severe cash restrictions. We identify the factors that drive the propagation of variability—the industry risk, the firm's operational leverage, the existence of a financial leverage target, and the cost of debt. The model also makes it possible to explore states of nature not often observed in practice, but that may have an effect in managers' behavior, for example, bankruptcies. We numerically illustrate the impact of these drivers on the risk of upper echelons (suppliers and suppliers' suppliers) as well as the interactions between order and payment variability. We close by summarizing our findings and discussing future research opportunities.
{"title":"Risk Propagation through Payment Distortion in Supply Chains","authors":"A. Serrano, Rogelio Oliva, Santiago Kraiselburd","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1707728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1707728","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The supply chain literature has devoted much attention to studying how the variability of orders propagates upstream. We explore how this insight extends to the variability of payments to suppliers and its impact on how risk is generated and propagates upstream. To do so, we model the financial features of a supply chain based on industry reports and empirical findings from the finance literature. Capturing policies and constraints of the agents in the supply chain in a formal model, we are able to generate and explain the behavior observed in real supply chains. We show that payment variability occurs and propagates, even if orders are constant, in a cash-constrained supply chain. Furthermore, our model reveals that payment variability may even become amplified under severe cash restrictions. We identify the factors that drive the propagation of variability—the industry risk, the firm's operational leverage, the existence of a financial leverage target, and the cost of debt. The model also makes it possible to explore states of nature not often observed in practice, but that may have an effect in managers' behavior, for example, bankruptcies. We numerically illustrate the impact of these drivers on the risk of upper echelons (suppliers and suppliers' suppliers) as well as the interactions between order and payment variability. We close by summarizing our findings and discussing future research opportunities.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130548418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes–Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO’s presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.
{"title":"Beyond Independence: CEO Influence and the Internal Operations of the Board","authors":"Derek Horstmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2500852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500852","url":null,"abstract":"Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes–Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO’s presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115881839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.
{"title":"Are Team Members Less Inequality Averse than Individual Decision Makers?","authors":"Haoran He, M. Villeval","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2441936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2441936","url":null,"abstract":"We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117120248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article analyses the effects of the financial and economic crisis on the structures and activities of the European Works Councils (EWCs) at Honda and Toyota, which until 2007–8 were categorized as non‐efficient representation bodies. A theoretical concept is introduced to measure activation and to analyse the factors explaining change/stability. In the empirical part, the EWCs are analysed using data from expert interviews. Both EWCs have undergone different activation ‘paths’, which partly lead to a restructuring of the bodies and the implementation of new co‐ordination processes. Yet the basic logic was retained because of cultural and power related aspects.
{"title":"European Works Councils and the Crisis: Change and Resistance in Cross‐Border Employee Representation at Honda and Toyota","authors":"Markus Hertwig","doi":"10.1111/bjir.12027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12027","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyses the effects of the financial and economic crisis on the structures and activities of the European Works Councils (EWCs) at Honda and Toyota, which until 2007–8 were categorized as non‐efficient representation bodies. A theoretical concept is introduced to measure activation and to analyse the factors explaining change/stability. In the empirical part, the EWCs are analysed using data from expert interviews. Both EWCs have undergone different activation ‘paths’, which partly lead to a restructuring of the bodies and the implementation of new co‐ordination processes. Yet the basic logic was retained because of cultural and power related aspects.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130267535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although part-time employment often appears as a substandard form of employment, evidence that part-time employees are less satisfied than full-time employees is ambiguous. To shed more light on this puzzle, I test an extended discrepancy theory framework using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The results help explain previous inconsistent findings: Part-time employment increases the chances of being underemployed while it reduces the likelihood of working more hours than preferred, and the negative effects of both types of working time mismatches on job satisfaction are similar in size. Furthermore, the importance attributed to family roles mitigates the negative effect of part-time employment on job satisfaction.
{"title":"The Part‐Time Job Satisfaction Puzzle: Different Types of Job Discrepancies and the Moderating Effect of Family Importance","authors":"Anja Iseke","doi":"10.1111/bjir.12019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12019","url":null,"abstract":"Although part-time employment often appears as a substandard form of employment, evidence that part-time employees are less satisfied than full-time employees is ambiguous. To shed more light on this puzzle, I test an extended discrepancy theory framework using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The results help explain previous inconsistent findings: Part-time employment increases the chances of being underemployed while it reduces the likelihood of working more hours than preferred, and the negative effects of both types of working time mismatches on job satisfaction are similar in size. Furthermore, the importance attributed to family roles mitigates the negative effect of part-time employment on job satisfaction.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120674766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-08-12DOI: 10.5465/ambpp.2013.12905abstract
J. Joseph, V. Gaba
This study examines how firms respond to feedback from comparisons of a single performance indicator to multiple aspiration levels. Empirically, we compare firm performance to both historical and social aspiration levels, and examine the impact of the correlation of these two indicators on new products introductions. We argue that three types of feedback ambiguous (weak correlations), contradictory (negative correlation), and consistent feedback (positive correlation)have different implications for firm responses. Our findings demonstrate that both contradictory and consistent feedback increase a firm’s propensity to respond to feedback. However, ambiguous feedback lowers a firm’s propensity to respond due to motivation and coordination problems that arise when performance signals are ambiguous. Our study builds and augments theories of ambiguity and performance feedback in organizations.
{"title":"The Fog of Feedback: Ambiguity and Firm Responses to Multiple Aspiration Levels","authors":"J. Joseph, V. Gaba","doi":"10.5465/ambpp.2013.12905abstract","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2013.12905abstract","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how firms respond to feedback from comparisons of a single performance indicator to multiple aspiration levels. Empirically, we compare firm performance to both historical and social aspiration levels, and examine the impact of the correlation of these two indicators on new products introductions. We argue that three types of feedback ambiguous (weak correlations), contradictory (negative correlation), and consistent feedback (positive correlation)have different implications for firm responses. Our findings demonstrate that both contradictory and consistent feedback increase a firm’s propensity to respond to feedback. However, ambiguous feedback lowers a firm’s propensity to respond due to motivation and coordination problems that arise when performance signals are ambiguous. Our study builds and augments theories of ambiguity and performance feedback in organizations.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127838324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the corporate finance tradition starting with Berle & Means (1923), corporations should generally be run so as to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) generally considers CSR as a managerial agency problem and a waste of corporate resources, since corporate insiders do good with other people’s money. We evaluate this agency view using large-scale datasets with global coverage (59 countries) on firm-level corporate engagement and compliance with respect to environmental, social, and governance issues. Using an instrumental variable approach, we document that CSR ratings are higher for companies with fewer agency problems (using standard proxies such as having lower levels of free cash flow and higher dividend payout and leverage ratios). Moreover, certain aspects of CSR (e.g., environmental, labor and social protection) are associated with increased executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and the maximization of shareholder value.
{"title":"Socially Responsible Firms","authors":"Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, L. Renneboog","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464561","url":null,"abstract":"In the corporate finance tradition starting with Berle & Means (1923), corporations should generally be run so as to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) generally considers CSR as a managerial agency problem and a waste of corporate resources, since corporate insiders do good with other people’s money. We evaluate this agency view using large-scale datasets with global coverage (59 countries) on firm-level corporate engagement and compliance with respect to environmental, social, and governance issues. Using an instrumental variable approach, we document that CSR ratings are higher for companies with fewer agency problems (using standard proxies such as having lower levels of free cash flow and higher dividend payout and leverage ratios). Moreover, certain aspects of CSR (e.g., environmental, labor and social protection) are associated with increased executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and the maximization of shareholder value.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123225837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For a fixed large donation a matching scheme that simply uses a one-for-one match ratio can actually raise less money than a seed money scheme. But when the match ratio is chosen to reflect the characteristics of the small donor base so as to exhaust the large donor's willingness to give, matching schemes always raise more money and are preferred by both charities and large donors. However, when the large donor chooses the size of her donation, a conflict can arise. The large donor can prefer a smaller leadership gift and more reliance on small donor matching while the charity can prefer seed money.
{"title":"The Design of Charitable Fund-Raising Schemes: Matching Grants or Seed Money?","authors":"Ning Gong, Bruce D. Grundy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1103680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1103680","url":null,"abstract":"For a fixed large donation a matching scheme that simply uses a one-for-one match ratio can actually raise less money than a seed money scheme. But when the match ratio is chosen to reflect the characteristics of the small donor base so as to exhaust the large donor's willingness to give, matching schemes always raise more money and are preferred by both charities and large donors. However, when the large donor chooses the size of her donation, a conflict can arise. The large donor can prefer a smaller leadership gift and more reliance on small donor matching while the charity can prefer seed money.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130897931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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